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DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF BOULDER. STATE OF COLORADO 
Case Number 99-CV-1020 Division 2 
ORDER RE DEFENDANTS' JOINT MOTION TO DISxMISS VERIFIED 
COMPLAINT 
CHARLES A. STEEN, JR., JAYNE MARIE STEEN. NANCY CIDDIO STEEN-
ADAMS, MONICA LEE STEEK CHARLES A. STEEN III, ANDREW KIRK STEEN, 
JR., KAREN M. STEEN, and JENNIFER STEEN 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MI VTDA ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah corporation, MARK ASHBY STEEN, JOHN 
CHARLES STEEN, CHARLES A. STEEN, SOUTHERN CROSS PROSPECTING CO., 
a Colorado corporation, GOLD REEF MINING CO., INC., a Colorado corporation, 
GOLD HILL MINES, INC, a Colorado corporation, GOLDEN TONTINE, LLC, a 
Colorado limited liability company, 
Defendants. 
On November 9, 1999, the Court took the following actions in the above-
captioned case and directs the Clerk to enter these proceedings in the register of actions. 
APPEARANCES: No parties appearing. 
This matter comes before the Court on the Defendants5 Joint Motion to Dismiss 
Verified Complaint. The Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition. The Defendants filed a 
reply. Having considered the parties' briefs and the applicable law, the Court enters the 
following Ruling and Order. 
L STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the material 
allegations of the complaint as true and may not dismiss a claim unless the non-moving 
party is not entitled to relief under any statement of facts. Douglas Countv Nat'l Bank v. 
Pfeik 809 P.2d 1100 (Colo.App. 1991). If relief could be granted on the basis of the 
facts stated in the complaint, then the complaint is sufficient. Schlitters v. State of 
Colorado. 787 P.2d 656, 658 (Colo.App. 1990). The allegations contained in the 
complaint must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Dunlap v. Colorado 
Springs CablevisioiL 829 P.2d 1286, 1291 (Colo. 1992). A Court may not consider 
matters outside the allegations in the complaint when ruling on a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim. Id at 1290. When matters outside of the pleadings are presented 
to and not excluded by the Court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary 
.»fqqe» _Q 
judgment and disposed of pursuant to C.R.C.P. 56. C.R.C.P 12 (b). 
The purpose of summary judgment is to permit the parties to pierce the formal 
allegations of the pleadings and to save the time and expense connected with trial. 
Because summary judgment is a drastic remedy, the Court may properly enter summary 
judgment only when there is no genuine issue about any material fact and the moving 
parry is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pueblo W. Metro. Dist. v. Southeastern 
Colo. Water Conservancy Dist.. 689 P.2d 594 (Colo. 1984). In determining whether 
summary judgment is proper, the non-moving party is entitled to the benefit of all 
favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the undisputed facts, and all 
doubts must be resolved against the moving party. Jones v. Dressel 623 P.2d 370 (Colo 
1981); Casebolt v. Cowan, 829 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1992). Even where it is extremely 
doubtful that genuine issues of material fact exist, summary judgment is not appropriate. 
Mancuso v. United Bank of Pueblo, 818 P.2d 732 (Colo. 1991).~ 
The burden of establishing the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact is 
on the moving party. C.R.C.P. 56(c); Continental Air Lines. Inc. v. Keenan. 731 P.2d 708 
(Colo. 1987). The movant may satisfy this burden by demonstrating that there is an 
absence of evidence in the record to support the non-moving party's case. Id.; Civil Serv. 
Comm'n v. Pinder. 812 P.2d 645 (Colo. 1991). Once the movant makes a convincing 
showing that genuine issues of material fact are lacking, the opposing party cannot rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials in his or her pleadings, but must demonstrate by 
specific facts that a controversy exists. Sullivan v. Davis. 474 P.2d 218 (Colo. 1970). 
H FACTS 
When viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the facts are as follows. 
In 1951, Defendant Charles A. Steen, Sr. ("Charles, Sr.") discovered what has been 
described as the largest uranium deposit in United States history. Through the 1950s and 
1960s Charles, Sr. and his wife, M.L. Steen, now deceased, conducted successful mining 
businesses and invested in diverse businesses. However, by the late 1960s Charles, Sr. 
and M.L. found themselves in financial trouble. In 1968, the Internal Revenue Service 
("IRS") seized large amounts of their assets, and they filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection. In 1971, Charles, Sr. suffered a serious head injury that resulted in his 
inability to control his personal or business affairs. Since that time, Charles, Sr ?s son, 
Mark Ashby Steen ("Mark"), has controlled his affairs. Since the accident, Charles, Sr.'s 
four sons, Charles, Jr., Andy, John, and Mark, have engaged in a hostile family struggle 
over the assets that remained after the ERS and bankruptcy proceedings. The struggle has 
revolved around the family's corporation^ Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc. ("Mi Vida"). 
Defendant Mi Vida is a closely held family corporation. Mi Vida is in the 
business of mining, acquiring land for mining projects, and developing real estate. Mi 
Vida was incorporated in Utah in 1973 and was authorized to conduct business in 
Colorado until 1992. when the Colorado Secretary of State revoked its certification. Mi 
Vida's authorization ro conduct business in Colorado was subsequently reinstated, but 
was again revoked in 1995. Mi Vida re-resistered as a foreign corporation in Colorado in 
1997 and is currently in good standing. Mi Vida owns extensive real estate in Boulder 
County, Colorado and elsewhere. Because of the family infighting, Mi Vida has failed 
make productive use of its assets. However, the assets, namely enormous property 
holdings, are estimated to be worth several million dollars. 
Mi Vida conducts business from the home of Defendant Mark Steen in 
Longmont, Colorado. No shareholder meetings have been held since 1994. In their 
Complaint, the Plaintiffs contend that the stock of Mi Vida is held by the following 
individuals and in the following percentages: 
•Defendant Charles A. Steen, Sr.: 500,000 shares representing 16.7% of 
Mi Vida. Charles, Sr. has served as president and director of Mi Vida 
throughout the relevant period. However, Charles. Sr. suffers from 
Alzheimer's disease. Because of his illness, he is unable to manage his 
business or personal affairs. His son, Defendant Mark Steen, with whom 
he lives, manages Charles, Sr.'s affairs. 
•Minnie Lee Holland Steen (CCM.L/')' 500,000 shares representing 16.7% 
of Mi Vida. M.L. died on July 14, 1997, and was the wife of Charles, Sr. 
Her estate is currently being probated in the Boulder County District 
Court. Defendant Mark Steen is the personal representative of M.L.'s 
estate. 
•Defendant Mark Steen: 500,000 shares representing 16.7% of Mi Vida. 
Since at least 1987, Mark has served as vice president, treasurer, and 
director of Mi Vida. 
•Defendant John Charles Steen ("John"): 500,000 shares representing 
16.7% of Mi Vida. Since at least 1987. John has served as secretary and 
director of Mi Vida. Because of an illness, Mark manages John's 
business affairs. 
•Plaintiff Charles A. Steen, Jr. ("Charles, Jr."): 125,000 shares 
representing 4.2% of Mi Vida. Since 1987, Charles, Jr. has been a director 
of Mi Vida, although he has received no notice of directors' meetings or 
actions taken by the directors since 1994. 
•Plaintiff Jayne Marie Steen ("Jayne"): 116,980 shares representing 
about 3 9% of Mi Vida. Jayne is the current wife of Charles, Jr. 
•Plaintiff Nancy Ciddio Steen-Adams ("Nancy"): 250,000 shares 
representing 8.3% of Mi Vida. Nancy is the ex-wife of Charles, Jr. 
•Plaintiff Monica Lee Steen (''Monica"): ML. bequeathed 50,000 
shares, representing 1 67% of Mi Vida. to Monica in her will. Monica is 
the adult daughter of Charles, Jr. and Nancy. 
•Plaintiff Charles A. Steen m ("Charles HT): ML. bequeathed 50,000 
shares, representing 1.67% of Mi Vida, to Charles III in her will. Charles 
III is the adult son of Charles, Jr. and Nancy. 
•Andrew Kirk Steen ("Andy7')- 500.000 shares representing 16.7% of Mi 
Vida Andy is the son of Charles, Sr and MX. His last known mailing 
address was in Switzerland but none of :he Plaintiffs knows with certainty 
where he currently resides Andy has been a director of Mi Vida since 
198", but has not participated as a director for at least twelve years. 
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•Plaintiff Andrew Kirk Steen, Jr. ('"Kirk"): M.L. bequeathed 100,000 
shares, representing 3.33% of Mi Vida, to Kirk in her will. Kirk is the 
adult son of Andy. 
•Plaintiff Karen M. Steen ("Karen"): 4,010 shares representing .13% of 
Mi Vida. Karen is the minor daughter of Charles, Jr. and Jayne. 
•Plaintiff Jennifer Steen ("Jennifer"'): 4,010 shares representing .13% of 
Mi Vida. Jennifer is the minor daughter of Charles, Jr. and Jayne. 
•Ashley Victoria Steen ("Ashley"): M.L. bequeathed 100,000 shares, 
representing 3.33% of Mi Vida, to Ashley in her will. Ashley is the minor 
daughter of Mark. 
•Tera Marie Holland ('Tera"): M.L. bequeathed 150,000 shares, 
representing 5% of Mi Vida, to Tera in her will. Tera is M.L.'s sister and 
is currently living in a nursing home and cannot care for herself. 
•Karla Wright ("Karla"): M.L. bequeathed 50,000 shares, representing 
1.67% of Mi Vida, to Karla in her will. Karla is Tera's adult daughter. 
The Plaintiffs assert that the recipients of M.L.'s bequests are the beneficial owners of 
their respective shares because those shares will pass by operation of law at the 
conclusion of the probate process. 
Because Mark manages Charles, Sr.'s and John's business affairs, as well as 
serves as the personal representative of M.L.'s estate, he currently controls Mi Vida. 
Further, Mark controls the Board of Directors because of the five living directors, Mark 
controls his own vote and the votes of Charles, Sr. and John. 
In June, 1992, Mark created three Colorado corporations, Gold Reef Mining 
Company, Inc. ("Gold Reef), Southern Cross Prospecting Company, Inc. ("Southern 
Cross"), and Gold Hill Mines, Inc. ("Gold Hill")- Further, Mark created Golden Tontine, 
LLC ("Golden Tontine"), a Colorado limited liability company. These four companies 
are named as defendants and referred to collectively as the Mark Steen Companies. The 
Mark Steen Companies share the same Longmont, Colorado address as Mi Vida. 
In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs, minority shareholders, assert six claims against 
the Defendants. First, the Plaintiffs claim a breach of fiduciary duty by Mi Vida's 
officers. Second, the Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment regarding diverted corporate 
opportunities and property. Third, the Plaintiffs request an accounting and a return of 
certain Mi Vida property. Fourth, the Plaintiffs wish to review certain corporate 
documents of Mi Vida. Fifth, the Plaintiffs request this Coun to order an involuntary 
corporate dissolution of Mi Vida. Finally, the Plaintiffs request that a receiver be 
appointed. The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss seeks to dismiss all of these claims. 
m. ARGUMENT 
The Defendants first argue that this Coun lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear 
this case The Defendants contend that Mi Vida's status as a Utah corporation operates to 
deprive this Coun of authority to hear the case. The Defendants argue that neither Utah's 
:> 
corporate code nor Colorado's corporate code authorizes the dissolution of Mi Vida or a 
receivership pursuant to dissolution. In further support of this position, the Defendants 
rely on C.R.S. § 7-101-104(11), which defines a corporation as i%a corporation for profit 
which is not a foreign corporation." Motion If 7. Thus? the Defendants conclude that the 
provisions in Colorado's corporate code that deal with dissolution of a corporation only 
implicate domestic corporations. Further, the Defendants cite Utah Code § 16-10a-
102(11) and (19), which define "corporation" and 'foreign corporation" the same way 
Colorado Revised Statutes define those terms. In addition, the Defendants cite Utah 
Code § 16-10a-143L which states that any proceeding for dissolution by a shareholder 
"shall be brought in the district court of the county in this state where the corporation's 
principal office, or, if it has no principal office in this state, its registered agent is or was 
located/' The Defendants also argue that Mi Vida's bylaws bind the Plaintiffs to Utah as 
a venue and for choice of law Finally, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs have not 
asserted facts to show an imminent threat of future harm that can be forestalled by the 
drastic remedy of involuntary dissolution. On these grounds, the Defendants argue that 
the Plaintiffs fifth and sixth claims, for involuntary dissolution and receivership, should 
be dismissed. 
The Defendants next argue that certain of the Plaintiffs lack standing. The 
Defendants claim that Plaintiffs Monica Lee Steen, Charles III, and Andrew Kirk Steen, 
Jr. do not have, and have never had, any shares in Mi Vida. The Defendants contend that 
the Plaintiffs incorrectly claim that these three Plaintiffs are "beneficial" shareholders 
because they received their shares through bequests of M.L. Steen. The Defendants cite 
Utah Code § 16-10a-102(33), which defines "shareholder" as either a record owner or a 
"benencial owner of shares to the extent recognized pursuant to section 16-10a-723." 
Motion *f 16. The Defendants contend that Utah Code § 16-10a-723 recognizes only 
those whose interests are registered in the name of the nominee if the corporation has 
such a procedure. The Defendants then conclude that because Mi Vida does not have 
such a procedure, these three Plaintiffs lack standing because the record owner of those 
shares is M.L. Steen. 
The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for the improper 
taking of a corporate opportunity The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' contention 
that Mi Vida is deadlocked is fatal to their claim of taking of corporate opportunities. 
The Defendants state that there is no deadlock on their pan, any deadlock has been 
created by Plaintiff Charles, Jr. in his capacity as a joint mortgage holder. The 
Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs* claim a taking of corporate opportunity as another 
ground for dissolution because they cannot prove actual deadlock. The Defendants 
contend that the Plaintiffs have failed to plead the two elements of taking of a corporate 
opportunity First, the Plaintiffs must plead facts that allege in what way the opportunity 
in question belonged to the corporation. Second, the Plaintiffs must allege facts 
demonstrating that the corporation had the financial ability to consummate the 
opportunity The Defendants argue that Mi Vida's tax returns, which the Plaintiffs have 
access :o. prove thai the corporation did not have sufficient funds to finance any of the 
opportunities taken by the Mark Steen Companies The Defendants aiso complain that 
Plaintiff Charles. Jr and nis wife. Jayne, ha^ e engaged in the same t\pes of taking of 
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corporate opportunities. Finally, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs taking of 
corporate opportunity claim is "incoherently stated and confused with other possible 
claims which are not properly pled." Motion § V. 
The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs should have asserted claims for a 
derivative action, a quiet title action, and/or a fraudulent conveyance action. In regard to 
the derivative action, the Defendants claim that the Plaintiffs did not comply with 
C.R.C.P 23.1, which requires a plaintiff to make a written demand to a corporation 
before initiating a derivative suit. 
Next, the Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs have failed to join indispensable 
parties. The Defendants argue that because the Plaintiffs should have pled claims for a 
derivative action, a quiet title action, and/or a fraudulent conveyance action, they have 
failed to join indispensable parties to those claims. 
The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim is barred 
by the statute of limitations. Under both the Colorado Statutes and the Utah Code, claims 
for breach of fiduciary duty must be brought within three years. The Defendants object 
to several of the factual allegations asserted in the Plaintiffs' complaint in support of the 
breach of fiduciary duty claim. In particular, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' 
allegations that the Steen library and mineral collection are Mi Vida assets wrongfully 
transferred to Mark are barred because these assets were owned by Charles, Sr. and MX. 
when they filed for bankruptcy in 1968. The Defendants contend that these items became 
part of the bankruptcy estate and that they had to have been disposed of prior to the 
termination of the bankruptcy in 1979. The Defendants conclude that the Plaintiffs 
cannot now assert a claim for breach of fiduciary duty based on these items. 
Additionally, the Defendants reject the Plaintiffs' argument that the Plaintiffs only 
recently discovered the factual information relating to land transfers underlying their 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Instead, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs must 
affirmatively state reasons for their failure to discover such facts earlier. The Defendants 
argue that because all real estate transfers must be recorded, the recordations of the 
alleged improper transfers of real estate put :he Plaintiffs on constructive notice. The 
Defendants also assert that some of the Plaintiffs had actual knowledge of some of the 
transfers now complained of 
Next, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' claim for an accounting fails to 
state a legally cognizable claim. The Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs have repeatedly 
refused to see that Mi Vida's accountant is paid, and if he were paid the Plaintiffs would 
have the accounting. Further, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs have no equitable 
right to an accounting of the Mark Steen Companies because they hold no equity interest 
in any of these entities. 
Finally, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs' claim requesting that corporate 
documents be produced fails to state a claim The Defendants claim that the Plaintiffs 
fail :o identify what records exist and which are desired Further, the Defendants contend 
that all but four of the documents requested by the Plaintiffs are financial documents 
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available at the offices of Mi Vida's accountant, Mr. Snodgrass. The Defendants assert 
that the four documents that are not financial are in the possession of the Plaintiffs. 
The Plaintiffs" response is as lengthy and detailed as the Defendants' motion. The 
Plaintiffs begin by arguing that the exhibits attached to the Defendants' motion are 
improper because there are no accompanying affidavits to authenticate the exhibits or to 
describe what facts the Defendants view as relevant. Because the Defendants did not 
furnish any affidavits, the Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants have failed to meet their 
burden under C.R.C.P. 56. The Plaintiffs further argue that their Verified Complaint, 
because it is verified, suffices to show that numerous issues of material fact exist which 
preclude the entry of summary judgment. 
In response to the Defendants' claim that this Court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear this case, the Plaintiffs admit that Mi Vida is a Utah corporation, but 
deny that this fact deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Plaintiffs argue 
that the Court has jurisdiction over their first through fourth claims: breach of fiduciary 
duty; declaratory judgment regarding diverted corporate opportunities; request for an 
accounting and return of Mi Vida property; and review of corporate documents. The 
Plaintiffs support this assertion by stating that because the corporate officers are all 
Colorado residents and reside in Boulder County, the Court has personal jurisdiction over 
them and thus Boulder County is the proper venue. Further, the Plaintiffs argue that 
jurisdiction is proper over the first four claims because these claims all involve actions 
taken by the Defendants in Colorado, diversion of corporate opportunities including land 
located in Colorado, and transactions that occurred in Colorado. In addition, the Plaintiffs 
contend that it is well established that shareholders of a foreign corporation may file 
derivative claims in a state in which the corporation is not incorporated. Finally, the 
Plaintiffs argue that Colorado case law supports their fourth claim for a review of 
corporate documents. 
In regard to their fifth and sixth claims for involuntary dissolution and 
receivership, the Plaintiffs contend that this Court has discretion to assert jurisdiction. 
The Plaintiffs rely primarily on two cases, Ficon Inc. v. McHugh, 639 P.2d 385 (Colo. 
1982). and Jefferson Indus. Bank v. First Golden Bancorporatioq 762 P.2d 768 
(Colo.App. 1988). The Plaintiffs state that these cases interpreted the predecessor to the 
current Colorado corporate code as allowing application of the act to foreign corporations 
in certain circumstances. These circumstances include those where choice of law 
principles permit such application, where the foreign corporation has transacted 
substantial business in Colorado, and where policy considerations do not dictate a 
different conclusion. Although the Plaintiffs do not cite any Colorado cases directly on 
the issue of dissolution of a foreign corporation, they state that other jurisdictions have 
considered the issue. According to the Plaintiffs, these jurisdictions have found that 
jurisdiction could be properly exercised when the situation involves "strong ties to the 
forum, especially where the bulk of corporate assets are located there, the bulk of 
business has been done there, and corporate officers and directors are subject to the 
court's jurisdiction." Annotation, Dissolving or Winding L"p Affairs of Corporation 
Domicned in .Another State, 19 A.L.RJd ::~Q, 1285-86 Finally, the Plaintiffs rely on 
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Fletcher's Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations to support their assertion that this 
Court has discretion to assen jurisdiction over Mi Vida's dissolution because some courts 
have "focused on convenience and equity rather than treating the issue as a question of 
power." Fletcher's at § 8579. The Plaintiffs consider all of these faaors in relation to Mi 
Vida and conclude that this Court can, and should, use its discretion and exercise 
jurisdiction over their fifth and sixth claims. 
The Plaintiffs argue that even if this Court declines to exercise its jurisdiction to 
hear the fifth and sixth claims, this Court may order Mi Vida's officers to seek 
dissolution in Utah and appoint a custodian over Mi Vida's assets in Colorado Again, 
the Plaintiffs rely on Fletcher's, which states that if a court has jurisdiction over a 
corporation's officers the court may "make decrees and orders affecting the property of 
the corporation in other states and enforce obedience to them." Fletcher's at § 8561. 
Finally, the Plaintiffs state that "local courts may appoint receivers for the property and 
assets of a foreign corporation located in the state, and wind up the affairs of the foreign 
corporation so far as they are within the jurisdiction." Fletcher's at § 8579. 
In response to the Defendants' statute of limitations argument, the Plaintiffs 
contend that all of their factual claims are within the statute of limitations. The Plaintiffs 
argue that because the Defendants admit in their motion that at least one of the Plaintiffs' 
factual claims is within the statute of limitations, none of the Plaintiffs' claims for relief 
can be dismissed on this ground. Further, the Plaintiffs argue that it is unclear when the 
statute of limitations began to run on their claims. The Plaintiffs assert that under the 
Utah Code, the statute does not begin to run until after their discovery of the facts upon 
which the claims are based. The Plaintiffs state that because there has been no 
shareholders meeting since 1994 and because no financial information exists for the last 
several years, they simply did not know what the corporate officers were doing with Mi 
Vida's assets and had no reason to know that the Mark Steen Companies existed. 
Additionally, the Plaintiffs agree with the Defendants that failure to hold shareholders 
meetings is alone not enough to compel dissolution, but argue that they thus had no basis 
for bringing any claims until they learned that the Mark Steen Companies had been 
formed and were active in mining and land transactions in Colorado. The Plaintiffs assert 
that they did not become aware of the Mark Steen Companies until June, 1998, when 
they read in a newspaper about a deal berween ITEC Environmental Colorado, Inc. 
("ITEC") and one of the Mark Steen Companies. The Plaintiffs conclude that because 
the complaint was filed a year after they discovered the newspaper articles, they have 
complied with the statute of limitations. Finally, the Plaintiffs argue that if there is a 
factual dispute about when the Plaintiffs knew or should have known about some of their 
claims, such a dispute is not properly resolved at this stage. 
The Plaintiffs next assert that all the Plaintiffs are properly before the Court. 
Specifically, the Plaintiffs argue that Monica Lee Steen, Andrew Kirk Steen, Jr. and 
Charles III have standing because they are each to receive a percentage of the late M.L. 
Steen's shares in Mi Vida under her will, which is in probate in this Court. The Plaintiffs 
contend that this Court may take judicial notice of its own files *hich show that no one 
has challenged M L/s will in this regard The Plaintiffs rely on American Jurisprudence, 
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Second, which states that "stock acquired by purchase or devise entitles a minority 
stockholder to bring such suit against the corporation although the stock had not been 
transferred on the books of the company in the name of the plaintiff" 19 Am. Jur. 2d 
Corporations § 2771. Finally, the Plaintiffs argue that because Defendant Mark Steen is 
the personal representative of M.L. Steen any delay in registering Monica, Kirk, and 
Charles HI as record shareholders can be attributed to him. 
In regard to their diversion of corporate opportunity claim, the Plaintiffs argue 
that they have stated a proper claim. The Plaintiffs contend that there is a factual dispute 
that cannot be resolved in this motion about whether Mi Vida had the financial ability to 
consummate any of the opportunities. The Plaintiffs assert that they do not have tax 
returns or other financial information since 1994 and that the only financial document 
presented with the Defendants' motion was a 1990 tax return. 
The Plaintiffs argue that the Mark Steen Companies are properly named as 
defendants in this case. The Plaintiffs assert that if a corporate officer or director usurps 
a corporate opportunity, he or she will be deemed to hold the usurped property in 
constructive trust for the corporation. The Plaintiffs further argue that such a remedy is 
appropriate when an innocent third party has subsequently acquired an interest in the 
property. The Plaintiffs reason that because the Mark Steen Companies received Mi Vida 
property and opportunities and because the Mark Steen Companies were created in 
violation if Mark's duty to Mi Vida, these companies are properly before the Court as 
defendants. 
Next, the Plaintiffs argue that their fourth claim for a review of corporate 
documents is properly before the Court. The Plaintiffs contend that corporate statutes 
require that certain documents be kept by a corporation and require that the corporation 
make those documents available to shareholders upon request. The Plaintiffs point to 
their letters requesting such information and Mi Vida's letter rejecting the same, which 
are attached to the complaint. Finally, the Plaintiffs state that Colorado courts have 
required foreign corporations to provide the requested documents and thus conclude that 
their fourth claim is proper. 
The Plaintiffs state that they have complied with C.R.C.P. 23.1 in initiating a 
derivative suit. The Plaintiffs argue that their complaint demonstrates that the written 
demand required by Rule 23.1 would be futile because Mark, John, and Charles, Sr. 
control a majority of Mi Vida's stock and its board of directors and are the individuals 
alleged to have breached their duties. The Plaintiffs conclude that because Colorado does 
not require a demand where it would be futile, they have properly filed a derivative suit. 
In response to the Defendants' contention that the Plaintiffs should have asserted 
claims based on fraudulent conveyance or quiet title, the Plaintiffs argue that it is not the 
proper role of the Defendants' counsel to suggest the best claims available to the 
Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs assert that they have properly pled their claims and it is those 
ciaims only that are subject to this motion Similarly, the Plaintiffs argue that :hey have 
joined aii the necessary parties for the claims in their complaint and that any parties 
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necessary for claims not asserted, but merely suggested by the Defendants, are not 
necessary or relevant. 
IV. MERITS 
The Defendants attached twelve exhibits to their motion to dismiss and six 
exhibits to their reply. The Court considered this evidence with regard to those claims to 
which the exhibits referred. The Coun will thus treat those claims under the standards for 
summary judgment pursuant to the provisions of C.R.C.P. Rule 56. The Coun will treat 
the claims that are not supported by any of the exhibits under the standard for motions to 
dismiss pursuant to the provisions of C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). 
A. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
The first issue presented by the Defendants is whether this Coun has subject 
matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' fifth and sixth claims for involuntary dissolution 
and the appointment of a receiver. The Defendants argue that this Coun lacks such 
jurisdiction because Mi Vida is a Utah corporation. The exercise of subject matter 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations is unsettled; courts are divided, especially on the 
issue of the dissolution of a foreign corporation. There are no Colorado cases directly on 
point. The general rule has been that a coun does not have jurisdiction to dissolve or 
wind up the affairs of a foreign corporation. The decisions that reach this conclusion 
reason that because the corporation is a creature of the state creating it, that state alone 
should terminate its legal existence. Annotation, Dissolving or Winding Up Affairs of 
Corporation Domiciled in Another State. 19 A.L.R.3d 1279, 1281. 
More recently, other couns have held that it is in a court's discretion whether to 
exercise jurisdiction in the dissolution of a foreign corporation. These couns considered 
the presence of "strong ties to the forum, especially where the bulk of corporate assets are 
located there, the bulk of business has been done there, and corporate officers and 
directors are subject to the court's jurisdiction." lcL at 1285-86. In In Re Mercantile 
Guaranty Co.. 238 Cal.App. 426 (Ct. App. 1965), the plaintiffs sought the winding up of 
a Delaware corporation that had its principal place of business in San Francisco. The 
Mercantile court relied on cases from several other jurisdictions in holding that "the 
question is not one of jurisdiction, it is rather whether the court can, should it assume 
jurisdiction, make its decree effective. In other words, not whether it has jurisdiction, but 
should it in its discretion exercise the inherent jurisdiction which it possesses." 
Mercantile. 238 Cal. App.2d at 432 (internal citations omitted). The Mercantile court 
went on to state, "the question of whether the local court should exercise jurisdiction over 
the foreign corporation [is] one of policy and expediency, and not of power." Id 
(internal citations omitted). Finally, the Mercantile court cited Fletcher's Cyclopedia of 
Corporations, which states: 
Most courts now hold that the question is not one of jurisdiction or power 
in the coun of the state which is not the legal domicile cf a foreign 
corporation, but it is a question rather of discretion in the court as to 
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whether considerations of public policy, efficiency, expedience and justice 
to all parries interested demand that jurisdiction be retained in the foreign 
court, or that it be declined under the rule of forum non conveniens 
Id. at 433 (internal citations omitted). 
The more recent New York case of In Re Application of Dohring. 537 N.Y.S.2d 
767 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1989), summarized the rend in this area of law. In rejecting two 
earlier cases that held New York courts lacked jurisdiction to dissolve a foreign' 
corporation, the Dohring court stated: 
The rule followed in [the earlier cases of] Langfelder and Cohn has been 
subject to substantial modification in more recent cases, however. One 
federal appeals court has stated: "Though courts will not ordinarily 
interfere with the internal affairs of foreign corporations, they have 
jurisdiction to do so in the exercise of sound discretion." . . . This trend in 
the direction of expanding jurisdiction over foreign corporations was 
noted . . . in New York in 1964. While earlier courts had considered 
themselves jurisdictionally barred from entertaining lawsuits involving the 
internal affairs of foreign corporations, the more recent view was to regard 
the issue as one of convenience and discretion. 
Dohring, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 769 (internal citations omitted). Finally, the Dohring court 
concluded "jurisdiction to resolve the internal disputes of foreign corporations may be far 
more readilv exercised where the corporation's contacts with [the venue] are substantial." 
Ii 
Similarly, there is a split in authority on whether a court may appoint a receiver 
over a foreign corporation's assets. Notwithstanding that a court may appoint a receiver 
of the local assets of a foreign corporation in order to prevent waste or dispersion of such 
assets, some courts have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the issue. 19 AX.R.3d at 
1284. Other courts have considered the issue to be one of discretion. These courts have 
held it proper to exercise jurisdiction over appointment of receiver claims when a 
substantial pan of the corporation's assets, the business conducted, its officers, and books 
and records were within the forum. Id. at 1287; Dallasega v Victoria Amusement Enter. 
43 F. Supp. 697 (MD. Pa. 1942). In Hill v Dealers' Credit Union. 140 A. 569 (N.J. Ch. 
1928), the court appointed a receiver over a foreign corporation to protect the 
shareholders. The court stated that although a court usually declines to exercise its 
equitable power to administer the internal affairs of a foreign corporation, the court does 
possess the discretion to assume jurisdiction. Id. at 571. Fletcher's Cyclopedia of 
Corporations states that "local courts may appoint receivers for the property and assets of 
a foreign corporation located in the state and wind up the affairs of such corporation so 
far as they are within the jurisdiction." Fletcher's § 8579. 
The Court chooses to adopt the more recent trend in this area of the law, 
particularly because the decisions on which the Court relies are important jurisdictions. 
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Accordingly, this Court may exercise jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' fifth and sixth 
claims in its discretion after considering the factors discussed above. 
In the present case, all of Mi Vida's corporate officers are Colorado residents and 
thus subject to personal jurisdiction in this Court. Mi Vida's principal place of business 
and corporate records are located in Colorado. Further, except for some land located 
around Moab, Utah, Mi Vida's assets are located in Colorado. In particular, many of the 
events complained of by the Plaintiffs involved Mi Vida assets in the form of real 
property located in Colorado. Mi Vida has no corporate office in Utah. Essentially, Mi 
Vida is a Utah corporation in name only. In addition, because the Court has jurisdiction 
over the Plaintiffs' four other claims, it would be redundant and illogical to insist that the 
Plaintiffs bring suits in two different states when the facts giving rise to ail the claims are 
the same. 
The Defendants argument that Mi Vida's bylaws bind the Plaintiffs to Utah law 
and Utah as the proper forum is not supported by a copy of the bylaws or any other 
competent evidence to support that assertion. 
Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss claims five and six for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction is denied. 
B. CHOICE OF LAW 
Having determined that the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over claims five 
and six is proper, the Court must next determine the proper choice of law. The choice of 
law depends on the type of relief requested. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws guides the Court's determination of the proper law to apply to the Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss and to the Plaintiffs' original claims as presented in their Verified 
Complaint. 
The Restatement distinguishes between different claims by and against 
corporations, officers, directors, and shareholders. The distinction lies between actions 
for dissolution on the one hand and ail other actions, such as shareholder inspection of 
corporate records, the powers and liabilities of corporate officers and directors, defining 
who is a shareholder, and the internal affairs of a corporation on the other hand. 
Restatement § 299 Termination or Suspension of Corporate Existence states that the local 
law of the state of incorporation determines whether a corporation has been suspended or 
terminated. Therefore, Utah law governs the Plaintiffs' dissolution claim. The Utah 
Code states that a proceeding for dissolution "shall be brought in the district court of this 
state where the corporation's principal office or, if it has no principal office in this state, 
its registered office is or was last located." U.C.A. § 16-10a-143I. That the Utah code 
requires a dissolution proceeding to be brought in a Utah court does not deny this Court 
the discretion to hear the facts underlying the claim for involuntary dissolution. The 
Involuntary dissolution is a drastic remedy. It is therefore possible, after hearing 
testimony and evidence on the Plaintiffs* dissolution claim, that this Court may determine 
involuntary dissolution is an inappropriate remedy; in such a case, the Court may order 
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alternative remedies under Colorado law. Dohring, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 769. Although the 
Court may not have the power to dissolve Mi Vida, it does have the power to "partition 
the property of a foreign corporation within the state, or to give other equitable relief 
founded on the court's power over the corporation officers or property within its 
jurisdiction." 19 CJ.S. Corporations § 932 (1990). Alternatively, if the Court 
determines that involuntary dissolution is the proper remedy, it may order the Defendants 
to seek such dissolution in a Utah court, de Nunez v. Bartels, 727 So.2d 463 (La. Ct. 
App. 1998). Accordingly, the Court chooses to exercise its discretion to hear the factual 
allegations that underlie the claim and, if necessary, direct the Defendants to seek 
dissolution in Utah. 
Restatement §§ 301- 310 include discretionary language that allows a court to 
apply its own local law in place of the law of the state of incorporation in dealing with 
issues other than dissolution. Section 302 addresses issues with respect to powers and 
liabilities of a corporation and states that 
(1) Issues involving the rights and liabilities of a corporation . . . are 
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to the 
particular issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and 
the parties under the principles stated in section 6.l 
(2) The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to 
determine such issues, except in the unusual case where, with respect to 
the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship to 
the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other 
state will be applied. 
Comment g to Restatement § 302 states that "it is in situations where the corporation has 
little contact with the state of its incorporation that the local law of some other state is 
most likely to be applied." 
Restatement § 309 Directors' or Officers' Liability states that the local law of the 
state of incorporation will be applied, except where "some other state has a more 
significant relationship under the principles stated in section 6 to the parties and the 
transaction, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied." id Comment 
c to Restatement § 309 states that acts such as seizing a corporate opportunity can 
"practicably be decided differently in different states." 
* Section 6 of the Restatement articulates general choice-of-law principles: 
(1) A court subjea to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice 
of law. 
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, 
(b) the relevant policies of the forum, 
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the 
determination of the particular issue. 
id) the protection of justified expectations. 
i e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law. 
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and 
(*) zisz in the determination and application of the law to be applied. 
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Because the actions complained of by the Plaintiffs have a "significant 
relationship" to Boulder County, this Court can properly apply Colorado law to the 
Plaintiffs' claims for breach of fiduciary duty, declaratory judgment regarding diverted 
corporate opportunities, request for an accounting and return of Mi Vida property, review 
of corporate documents, and appointment of a receiver. Accordingly, the Court will 
apply the relevant portions of the Colorado Business Corporations Act in considering 
these five claims. 
G STANDING 
Colorado law also governs the Defendants' argument that M.L.'s grandchildren 
lack standing. Restatement § 303 Shareholders sizxts that: 
The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to determine 
who are shareholders of a corporation except in the unusual case where, 
with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant 
relationship under the principles stated in section 6 to the person involved 
and the corporation, in which event the local law of the other state will be 
applied. 
Comment e to § 303 states that " courts, upon the death of a shareholder, would usually 
determine questions of inheritance to his shares by the law that would be applied by the 
courts of the state where the shareholder was domiciled at the time of his death." MX. 
Steen was domiciled in Colorado when she died. As a result, the Court will apply 
Colorado law in determining whether her grandchildren are shareholders who thus have 
standing in this case. Accordingly, the Defendants' reliance on the Utah Code section 
relating to beneficial owners is misplaced. In contrast, Colorado law applies. C.R.S. § 7-
107-402(1) addresses actions by shareholders. It states: 
No action shall be commenced by a shareholder in the right of a domestic 
corporation, and no action shall be commenced in this state by a 
shareholder in the right of a foreign corporation, unless the plaintiff was a 
shareholder of the corporation at the time the transaction of which the 
plaintiff complains or the plaintiff is a person upon whom shares or voting 
trust certificates thereafter devolved by operation of law from a person 
who was a shareholder at such time. 
Further, C.R.C.P. Rule 23.1 states that in a derivative action brought by a shareholder, the 
complaint must "allege that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the 
transaction of which he complains or that his membership thereafter devolved on him by 
operation of law." 
There is no dispute that M.L. Steen bequeathed shares of Mi Vida to Monica, 
Charles III. and Kirk. The question therefore becomes whether the three grandchildren 
satisfy' C.R.S. § 7-107-402(1) and C.R.C.P. Rule 23.1. The Plaintiffs correctly state that 
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this Court may take judicial notice of its own files. Linker v Linker, 470 P.2d 882 (Colo. 
1970). The grandchildren will become record shareholders of Mi Vida stock by 
operation of law upon the conclusion of the probate case; they thus have a clear interest 
in this case and its underlying claims. The issue then becomes whether the grandchildren 
have standing even though the probate process is not yet complete and they have thus not 
yet actually received their shares through devolution of law. The purpose of C.R.S. § 7-
107-402(1) and C.R.C.P. 23.1 is to protect the interests of shareholders who are not yet 
record shareholders but have an undisputed right to and interest in shares of a 
corporation. American Jurisprudence, Second explains the interest necessary or 
sufficient for a plaintiff to maintain a derivative suit: 
In order that one may be considered a stockholder for the purpose of 
asserting the right of a minority shareholder to sue for the dissolution of 
the corporation, it is not strictly essential that a certificate of stock be 
issued to him; it is sufficient for this purpose of he has subscribed and paid 
for the stock. Stock acquired by purchase or devise entitles a minority 
stockholder to bring such a suit against the corporation although the stock 
had not yet been transferred on the books of the company in the name of 
the plaintiff. 
19 Am.Jur.2d § 2771. It is clear from this section that a plaintiff in a derivative action 
need not be a record shareholder. It is enough that the plaintiff will become a record 
shareholder by purchase or devise. Again, there is no dispute that the grandchildren will 
become record shareholders at the conclusion of the probate case. A denial of standing 
would thus not be based on any substantive legal reasoning but would instead rest on the 
timing of the probate process. Such a denial would be arbitrary and contrary to the intent 
of both C.R.S. § 107-402(1) and C.R.C.P. 23.1. As a result, the Court determines that all 
three grandchildren have standing to participate in this derivative suit. Accordingly, the 
Defendant's motion to dismiss Monica, Charles III, and Kirk for lack of standing is 
denied. 
D. TAKING OF CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY CLAIM 
The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for the taking 
of corporate opportunities because they did not state the two necessary elements of the 
claim, namely that the opportunities complained of belonged to Mi Vida and that Mi 
Vida had the financial ability to realize the opportunities. The Defendants go on to refer 
to two exhibits to support their argument that the Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the second 
element and that the Court should this dismiss the claim. The Defendants seem to request 
that the Court simultaneously consider their assertion under both a motion to dismiss 
standard and a motion for summary judgment standard. In other words, the Defendants' 
motion attempts to obtain dismissal of the Plaintiffs' claim for taking of corporate 
opportunity for failure to state claim under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). Alternatively, the 
Defendants seek to have the Court, should it determine that the Plaintiffs properly stated 
a claim for taking of corporate opportunity, rule that the claim fails because there is no 
genuine issue of maienal fact in dispute. 
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The Court can determine the threshold issue of whether the Plaintiffs failed to 
state a claim by excluding the Defendants' exhibits from its consideration. The Court 
thus treats the Defendant's motion for failure to state a claim under the standards for 
dismissal under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). If the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have properly 
stated the claim for taking of corporate opportunity, it may then consider the Defendants' 
exhibits in making its determination on summary judgment pursuant to C.R.C.P. 56. 
The Defendants rely on Astarte. Inc. v. Pacific Indus Svs.. Inc.. 865 F Supp. 693 
(D.Colo. 1994) and Three G Corp. v. Daddis. 714 P 2d 1333 (Colo App. 1986) for their 
assertion that the two elements must be plead. The Defendants misstate the holdings of 
these two cases. Further, neither Astarte nor Three G involved the sufficiency of the 
pleadings or a motion to dismiss; each of those cases involved proceedings later in the 
case, after discovery. 
The Astarte court discussed what facts must be proven at trial to prevail on a 
taking of corporate opportunity claim. The Three G court explained the legal standards 
for a taking of corporate opportunity claim but did not hold that a plaintiff's complaint 
must specifically state that the corporation had both an actual or expectancy interest and 
that the corporation had the financial ability to take advantage of that interest. Therefore, 
Astarte and Three G are not useful in assessing the sufficiency of the Plaintiffs complaint 
under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). In their complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that Mark Steen caused 
the Mark Steen Companies to compete directly with Mi Vida or to acquire properties and 
opportunities that belonged to Mi Vida. Verified Complaint *H 28-34. Because no 
technical forms of pleadings are required, the Plaintiffs' complaint satisfies Colorado's 
notice pleading requirements. C.R.C.P. 8(a) and (e). That there remain factual disputes 
to be resolved regarding Mi Vida's ability to consummate those opportunities does not 
defeat the properly stated claim for relief. Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to 
dismiss the Plaintiffs' claim of taking of corporate opportunity for failure to state a claim 
is denied. 
Once it is determined that the Plaintiffs have properly asserted their claim for 
taking of corporate opportunity, the Court must determine if that claim can be resolved 
based on the Defendants' exhibits under the standards for summary judgment. The 
Defendants assert that Mi Vida lacks the financial resources to consummate any of the 
opportunities the Plaintiffs claim were improperly taken. The Defendants argue that the 
Plaintiffs have known this fact based on Mi Vida tax returns, which the Defendants attach 
to their motion. Defendants' Motion Exhibit D. The Defendants also argue that the 
Plaintiffs have known of Mi Vida's financial inability to realize such opportunities for 
some time. In support of this assertion, the Defendants state that the Plaintiffs regularly 
received copies of Mi Vida's tax returns. The Defendants attach as an exhibit a 1990 
letter to shareholders from Mi Vida's counsel. That letter states that it included copies of 
Mi Vida's 1986, 1987, and 1988 tax returns, as well as a copy of a letter from the Utah 
State Tax Commission certifying that Mi Vida Sled all tax returns required and paid all 
taxes due in 1590 Defendants' Motion Exhibit E In their response, the Plaintiffs assert 
that the last tax return rurnished to them, like the rax return attached as Exhibit D, is from 
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1990 The Plaintiffs argue that Mi Vida may or may no: have the financial resources to 
take advantage of corporate opportunities, but that they cannot present facts to prove this 
element of the taking of corporate opportunity claim until the Defendants provide more 
information. 
The Court may properly enter summary judgment only when there is no genuine 
issue about any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Pueblo W. Metro. Dist. v. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist.. 689 P.2d 
594 (Colo. 1984). Once the movant makes a convincing showing thai genuine issues of 
material fact are lacking, the opposing party cannot rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials in his or her pleadings, but must demonstrate by specific facts that a controversy 
exists. Sullivan v. Davis, 474 P.2d 218 (Colo. 1970). The Court must make the 
determination whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Churchev v Adolph Coors 
Co.. 759P.2d 1336 (Colo. 1988). 
Here, the Defendants provide a 1990 tax return to prove that there is no material 
issue of fact regarding Mi Vida's financial ability to consummate corporate opportunities. 
The Court does not accept that an almost decade-old tax return demonstrates the 
nonexistence of material facts on this issue. Therefore, the Defendants have failed to 
carry their initial burden and the motion for summary judgment on this issue is denied. 
E. ALTERNATIVE CLAIMS AND FAILURE TO JOIN 
INDISPENSDBLE PARTIES 
The Defendants' argument that the Plaintiffs should have, but failed to, make 
claims for a derivative action, a quiet title action, and/or a fraudulent conveyance action 
is groundless. The Plaintiffs did assert a derivative action claim. That the Plaintiffs 
chose not to assert claims for a quiet title action and/or a fraudulent conveyance action is 
irrelevant. The Defendants' subsequent argument that the Plaintiffs failed to join 
indispensable parties depending on which of the non-asserted claims should have been 
claimed is equally meritless. It is not the Court's role, nor is it opposing counsel's role, 
to insist a party bring certain claims. With regard to the Plaintiffs derivative action claim, 
the Defendants state that because the Plaintiffs did not first make a written request upon 
Mi Vida to initiate such an action on their behalf pursuant to C.R.C.P. 23.1 the derivative 
suit is improper. However, C.R.C.P. 23.1 also states that such a demand is not necessary 
if it would be futile. Nuesteter v District Court. 675 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1984), stated that the 
futility of a demand under C.R.C.P. 23.1 is "patent" where "both the directors and the 
majority of shareholders who have the ability to cause [a corporation] to seek relief are 
the very persons alleged to have committed the wrongs sought to be remedied." Id at 7. 
The Plaintiffs' complaint asserts facts, taken as true for this motion, that demonstrate 
such a demand would be futile. Accordingly, the Defendants' motion with regard to 
these three arguments is denied. 
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F. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs* claim for breach of fiduciary duty is 
barred by the statute of limitations. The Defendants rely on two arguments, namely that 
the Plaintiffs were charged with constructive notice of the allegedly improper land 
transactions and that the Plaintiffs had actual notice of the transactions complained of. 
The Defendants claim that the events complained of were the conveyance of real 
property, which must be written and recorded in order to be effective, and that such 
recordation is "notice to all the world." Defendants' Reply at 10. The Defendants 
conclude that the Plaintiffs were on constructive notice of the events as far back as the 
early 1990s and that the statute of limitations thus precludes the Plaintiffs' claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty and taking of corporate opportunity. However, the Defendants 
misconstrue the law on constructive notice. Colorado couns have consistently held "that 
record of a deed is constructive notice to all the world is too broad an enunciation of the 
doctrine. Such record is constructive notice only to those who are bound to search for it, 
as subsequent purchasers of the mortgagees, and all others who deal with it on the credit 
of the title in line of which the recorded deed belongs." Smith v. Russell 80 P. 474 
(Colo.App. 1905); Rose v. Dunklee. 56 P. 342 (Colo.App. 1899); Greco v. Pullara.. 444 
P.2d 383 (Colo. 1968); Villa Nat'l Bank v. Green. 478 P.2d 681 (Colo.App. 1970). 
Because the Plaintiffs were not in the chain of title in the transactions they complain of, 
they are not charged with constructive notice, and the Court thus rejects the Defendants' 
argument on this issue. 
The Defendants also argue that the Plaintiffs had actual notice as early as 1991 of 
some of the transactions of which they complain. To support this argument, the 
Defendants include copies of notice and minutes of a special shareholders meeting held 
in 1991. The minutes of that meeting reflect that a cenain contract between Mi Vida and 
Colina Oro Molino, Inc. was ratified. The documents presented by the Defendants also 
include a proxy designation and proxy vote by Plaintiff Charles Steen, Jr. to ratify the 
contract. In addition, the Defendants also include an excerpt from the contract. The one 
page excerpt includes language stating that Mi Vida may assign its rights under the 
contract to several individuals and entities, including: 
(i) to Mark A. Steen or his successor in interest as to properties owned 
by Mark A. Steen lying within the two (2) mile radius restriction imposed 
in this Agreement; and/or 
(ii) to the Gold Hill Ventures, Ltd., limited partnership (a limited 
partnership which the parties agree is not yet fully formed) as to properties 
currently owned by Gold Hill Ventures, Ltd. or which propenies are 
currently scheduled for contribution to said entity upon its formation. 
Defendants' Reply Exhibit E. The Defendants claim that this reference to Gold Hill 
Ventures, Ltd., which became one of the Mark Steen Companies, is actual notice that 
precludes claims based on all of the acts of the Mark Steen Companies. However, even 
assuming that the 1991 meeting and Coiina contract did constitute actual notice of the 
formation of a company by Mark Steen and possible wrongful activities by such 
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company, the meeting and contract cannot be construed as actual notice of any of the 
subsequent acts complained of by the Plaintiffs If anything, the 1991 meeting and 
contract provided only actual notice that if Mark Steen and any of his companies were to 
engage in such activities again in the future, he would undertake such activities in the 
same manner he did in 1991, namely at a properly called shareholders meeting at which 
the shareholders had an opportunity to vote on the contract. In contrast, the subsequent 
acts complained of by the Plaintiffs were not undertaken in this fashion. Instead, no 
shareholders meetings have been held since 1994. 
The one page of the Coiina contract that the Defendant included for the Court's 
consideration is just one small piece of the entire factual context in which that contract 
was ratified. Without more, the mere fact that the contract was approved does not show 
actual notice. As a result, the Court determines that the question of whether the 1991 
meeting and contract provided actual notice is one to be resolved by the fact finder. If the 
fact finder concludes that actual notice was provided, then the facts presented by the 
Plaintiffs on this issue cannot support successful claims for breach of fiduciary duty or 
taking of corporate opportunity. Further, the Defendants concede that the Plaintiffs have 
properly pled the ITEC deal, a deal that underlies all of their claims for'relief Because 
the Plaintiffs have pled the facts underlying the ITEC deal within the statute of 
limitations, none of the Plaintiffs' claims for relief can be dismissed. Accordingly, the 
Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims on the grounds of the statute of 
limitations is denied. 
G. CLAIMS FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND FOR PRODUCTION OF 
CORPORATE DOCUMENTS 
The Defendants' argue that the Plaintiffs' claim for an accounting fails to state a 
legally cognizable claim. The Defendant's motion then goes on to state "while it is 
indeed possible to request equitable relief and, to this end and accounting . . . this is not 
the situation here." Defendants' Motion «[ 61. The Defendants do not reference any 
exhibits to support their argument. The Court thus treats the issue under the standards for 
dismissal pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). The Defendants argue factual issues such as 
whether Mi Vida's accountant has been paid. It is clear that the Defendant recognizes 
that a claim for an accounting is legally cognizable. The Defendants' efforts to argue the 
facts underlying this claim are inappropriate and will not be considered by the Court. 
The Plaintiffs stated a proper claim for an accounting in their complaint. Accordingly, the 
Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claim for an accounting is denied. 
Similarly, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for the 
production of corporate documents. Again, the Defendants reference no exhibits relating 
to this argument, so the Court utilizes the dismissal standards pursuant to C.R.C P 
12(bX5) in deciding the issue. C.R.S. § 7-116-101 provides for the inspection of 
corporate records by shareholders if the shareholder makes a written request. In their 
Verified Complaint the Plaintiffs assert :ha; :hey made such written request upon Mi 
Vida's corporate counsel and that Mi Vida did not provide responsive or complete 
records Verified Complaint *!** 39~*3 In their fourth claim for reiief, the Plaintiffs have 
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stated a proper claim for review of corporate documents. Verified Complaint flf 61-64. 
Accordingly, the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' fourth claim for relief is 
denied. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the Defendant's Joint Motion to Dismiss Verified Complaint is 
herebv DENIED 
BY THE COURT 
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DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF BOULDER, STATE OF COLORADO 
Case Number 99-CV-1020 Division 2 
ORDER RE DEFENDANT MI VIDA'S MOTION TO DISMISS VERIFIED 
COMPLAINT and RENEWED MOTION OF SOUTHERN CROSS PROSPECTING 
COMPANY, INC., GOLD REEF MINLNG COMPANY, INC., GOLD HILL MINES, INC., 
AND GOLDEN TONTINE, LLC, TO DISMISS VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
CHARLES A. STEEN, JR., JAYNE MARIE STEEN, NANCY C1DDIO STEEN-ADAMS, 
MONICA LEE STEEN, CHARLES A STEEN IE, ANDREW KIRK STEEN, JR., KAREN M. 
STEEN, and JENNIFER STEEN 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MI VJJDA ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah corporation, MARK ASHBY STEEN, JOHN 
CHARLES STEEN, CHARLES A. STEEN, SOUTHERN CROSS PROSPECTING CO., a 
Colorado corporation, GOLD REEF MINING CO., INC., a Colorado corporation, GOLD HILL 
MINES, INC., a Colorado corporation, GOLDEN TONTINE, LLC, a Colorado limited liability 
company, 
Defendants 
On July 13, 2000, the Court took the following actions in the above-captioned case and 
directs the Clerk to enter these proceedings in the register of actions. 
APPEARANCES: No parties appearing. 
This matter comes before the Court on the Defendant Mi Vida's Motion to Dismiss 
Verified Complaint and on Defendants Southern Cross Prospecting Company, Inc., Gold Reef 
Mining Company. Inc., Gold Hill Mines, Inc., and Golden Tontine, LLC's Renewed Motion to 
Dismiss Verified Complaint. The Plaintiffs filed a combined response in opposition. The 
Defendants filed a joint reply. Having considered the parties' briefs and the applicable law, the 
Court enters the following Ruling and Order. 
L STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the material allegations of 
the complaint as true and may not dismiss a claim unless the non-moving party is not entitled to 
relief under any statement of facts. Douglas County Nat'l Sank v. Pfeiff. 809 P.2d 1100 
(Colo.App. 1991). If relief could be granted on the basis of the facts stated in the complaint, then 
the complaint is sufficient. Schlitters v. State of Colorado. 787 P.2d 656,658 (Colo.App. 1990). 
The allegations contained in the complaint must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. Dunlap v Colorado Springs Cablevision. 829 P.2d 1286, 1291 (Colo. 1992). A Court 
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may not consider matters outside the allegations in the complaint when ruling on a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim. IcL at 1290. When matters outside of the pleadings are 
presented to and not excluded by the Court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary 
judgment and disposed of pursuant to C.R.C.P. 56. C.R.C.P. 12 (b). 
The purpose of summary judgment is to permit the parties to pierce the formal allegations 
of the pleadings and to save the time and expense connected with trial. Because summary 
judgment is a drastic remedy, the Court may properly enter summary judgment only when there 
is no genuine issue about any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Pueblo W. Metro. Dist. v. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 689 P.2d 
594 (Colo. 1984). In determining whether summary judgment is proper, the non-moving party is 
entitled to the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the 
undisputed facts, and all doubts must be resolved against the moving party. Jones v. DresseL 623 
P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981), Casebolt v. Cowan. 829 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1992). Even where it is 
extremely doubtful that genuine issues of material fact exist, summary judgment is not 
appropriate. Mancuso v. United Bank of Pueblo. 818 P.2d 732 (Colo. 1991). 
The burden of establishing the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact is on the 
moving party. C.R.C.P. 56(c); Continental Air Lines. Inc. v. Keenan. 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987). 
The movant may satisfy this burden by demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence in the 
record to support the non-moving party's case. Id; Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Pinden 812 P.2d 645 
(Colo. 1991). Once the movant makes a convincing showing that genuine issues of material fact 
are lacking, the opposing party cannot rest upon the mere allegations or denials in his or her 
pleadings, but must demonstrate by specific facts that a controversy exists. Sullivan v. Davis. 
474 P.2d 218 (Colo. 1970). 
H. FACTS1 
When viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the facts are as follows. In 
1951, Defendant Charles A. Steen, Sr. ("Charles, Sr.") discovered what has been described as the 
largest uranium deposit in United States history. Through the 1950s and 1960s Charles, Sr. and 
his wife, M.L. Steen, now deceased, conducted successful mining businesses and invested in 
diverse businesses. However, by the late 1960s Charles, Sr. and MX. found themselves in 
financial trouble. In 1968, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") seized large amounts of their 
assets, and they filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, in 1971, Charles, Sr. suffered a 
serious head injury that resulted in his inability to control his personal or business affairs. Since 
that time, Charles, Sr.'s son, Mark Ashby Steen ("Mark"), has controlled his affairs. Since the 
accident, Charles, Sr.'s four sons, Charles, Jr., Andy, John, and Mark, have engaged in a hostile 
family struggle over the assets that remained after the IRS and bankruptcy proceedings. The 
struggle has revolved around the family's corporation, Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc. ("Mi Vida"). 
Defendant Mi Vida is a closely held family corporation. Mi Vida is in the business of 
mining, acquiring land for mining projects, and developing real estate. Mi Vida was 
incorporated in Utah in 1973 and was authorized to conduct business in Colorado until 1992, 
Because the Court included a detailed and lengthy recitation of the facts of this case in its November 9 Oder. it 
will only include a limited factual recitation in this order. 
when the Colorado Secretary of State revoked its certification. Mi Vida's authorization to 
conduct business in Colorado was subsequently reinstated, but was again revoked in 1995. Mi 
Vida re-registered as a foreign corporation in Colorado in 1997 and is currently in good standing. 
Mi Vida owns extensive real estate in Boulder County, Colorado and elsewhere. Because of the 
family infighting, Mi Vida has failed to make productive use of its assets. However, the assets, 
namely enormous property holdings, are estimated to be worth several million dollars. 
Mi Vida conducts business from the home of Defendant Mark Steen in Longmont, 
Colorado. No shareholder meetings have been held since 1994. 
Because Mark manages Charles, Sr.'s and John's business affairs, as well as serves as the 
personal representative of M.L.'s estate, he currently controls Mi Vida. Further, Mark controls 
the Board of Directors because of the five living directors, Mark controls his own vote and the 
votes of Charles, Sr. and John. 
In June, 1992, Mark created three Colorado corporations, Gold Reef Mining Company, 
Inc. ("Gold Reef), Southern Cross Prospecting Company, Inc. ("Southern Cross"), and Gold 
Hill Mines, Inc. ("Gold Hill"). Further, Mark created Golden Tontine, LLC ("Golden Tontine"), 
a Colorado limited liability company. These four companies are named as defendants and 
referred to collectively as the Mark Steen Companies. The Mark Steen Companies share the 
same Longmont, Colorado address as Mi Vida. 
In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs, minority shareholders, assert six claims against the 
Defendants. First, the Plaintiffs claim a breach of fiduciary duty by Mi Vida's officers. Second, 
the Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment regarding diverted corporate opportunities and 
property. Third, the Plaintiffs request an accounting and a return of certain Mi Vida property. 
Fourth, the Plaintiffs wish to review certain corporate documents of Mi Vida. Fifth, the 
Plaintiffs request this Court to order an involuntary corporate dissolution of Mi Vida. Finally, 
the Plaintiffs request that a receiver be appointed. 
In the present motions, the Defendants seek dismissal of the complaint. On November 9, 
1999, the Court denied a prior motion to dismiss the complaint ("November 9 Order"). 
HI. ARGUMENT 
The Defendants argue that Plaintiffs Charles A. Steen, Jr. ("Charles, Jr.") and his wife, 
Jayne Steen ("Jayne") were discharged in bankruptcy on March 29, 1999. The Defendants 
contend that because this action was commenced after that date, neither Charles, Jr., nor Jayne 
has any interest as shareholders of Mi Vida pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 542, and 544, because 
their shares became part of the bankruptcy estate. The Defendants argue that each claim in this 
action derives from an asserted shareholder status and thus conclude that Charles, Jr., and Jayne 
lack standing and must be dismissed from the case. 
The Defendants also argue that the only verification of the complaint is that of Charles, 
Jr. The Defendants assert that C.R.C.P 23.1 provides that a derivative action may only be 
brought by "one or more shareholders" and requires verification of the complaint by a plaintiff-
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shareholder. The Defendants argue that there are no direct actions in this suit, the suit is 
completely a derivative one. Because the Defendants contend that Charles, Jr., lacks standing 
because of his bankruptcy status the Defendants argue that Charles, Jr., had no capacity as a 
shareholder to verify the complaint. The Defendants conclude that the complaint thus fails in its 
entirety. 
The Defendants contend that several of the remaining plaintiffs, namely Monica Steen, 
Charles A. Steen III, and Andrew Kirk Steen, Jr., do not have actual shareholder status, but 
instead only have an inchoate right to receive shares as beneficiaries of the M.L.'s estate. 
However, the Defendants assert that because of the lack of assets in the Steen probate estate and 
the necessity to pay out creditors, the personal representative would have to apply to the Court to 
liquidate the shares. The Defendants rejects the Court's holding in the November 9 Order that 
these grandchildren have standing. In contrast, the Defendants argue that it is the personal 
representative, Mark, who has standing in this case. Because the Defendants argue that these 
plaintiffs lack standing, they conclude that these grandchildren do not satisfy the requirements of 
C.R.C.P. 23.1 that the plaintiffs "fairly and adequately represent'5 the interest of other minority 
shareholders. 
Next, the Defendants argue that Plaintiffs Karen Steen and Jennifer Steen are minors and 
thus lack standing. 
Finally, the Defendants argue that Plaintiff Nancy Ciddio Steen-Adams holds 8.3% of Mi 
Vida's shares and thus does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of other minority 
shareholders. 
In their response, the Plaintiffs first argue that the complaint encompasses direct as well 
as derivative claims. Specifically, the Plaintiffs argue that their complaint contains a direct claim 
for breach of fiduciary duty. 
The Plaintiffs next argue that the discharge in bankruptcy does not justify dismissal of the 
suit's derivative claims. The Plaintiffs contend that Charles, Jr.'s verification of the complaint is 
proper because C.R.C.P. 23.1 does not require that the verifier be a shareholder at the time the 
complaint is filed. The Plaintiffs assert that Charles, Jr., was a shareholder at the time of the 
events forming the basis of the complaint. The Plaintiffs conclude that Charles, Jr., could 
properly verify the factual allegations contained in the complaint. 
With regard to Charles, Jr., and Jayne's discharge in bankruptcy, the Plaintiffs argue that 
such discharge does not automatically strip these two plaintiffs of standing because the 
bankruptcy trustee may or may not wish to pursue the derivative claims on behalf of the 
bankruptcy estate. The Plaintiffs concede that "a valid legal question may exist as to whether the 
claims being pursued here belong to Charles, Jr. and Jayne or their bankruptcy estate," but assert 
that 'that question must be settled in the Bankruptcy Court." Plaintiffs' Response at 4. 
The Plaintiffs next contend that Nancy Steen-Adams may verify the complaint if the 
Court determines that Charles, Jr.'s verification is not sufficient. The Plaintiffs argue that Nancy 
has personal knowledge of most of the facts alleged in the complaint and that she knows about 
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the remaining facts based on information gained through publicly available information. The 
Plaintiffs contend that Nancy's interest sufficiently represents the interests of the other minority 
shareholders. Further, the Plaintiffs argue that Colorado cases hold that only one derivative 
plaintiff may proceed, even when the one plaintiff is representing him or herself. 
The Plaintiffs reject the Defendants' attack on the standing of the other Plaintiffs. First, 
the Plaintiffs argue that the Court has already ruled that Plaintiffs Monica Steen, Charles 111, and 
Andrew Kirk have standing. Second, the Plaintiffs argue that Plaintiff Karen Steen is no longer a 
minor, and thus has standing. Finally, the Plaintiffs assert that Plaintiff Jennifer Steen, although 
she is a minor, does not lack standing based simply on that fact. Instead, the Plaintiffs contend 
that Jennifer's parents may represent her interest or the Court may appoint a guardian ad litem to 
represent her in this case. 
In their joint reply, the Defendants expand on their argument that Charles, Jr., and Jayne 
lack standing.2 The Defendants cite bankruptcy case law to support their argument that these 
two plaintiffs lost standing once the discharge in bankruptcy was entered. The Defendants argue 
that these Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that the bankruptcy trustee "abandoned" the 
claim, which they have failed to show. The Defendants argue that these Plaintiffs have failed to 
show that the trustee abandoned the claim. The Defendants thus conclude that only the 
bankruptcy trustee has standing to prosecute the claims of this case. The Defendants also 
contend that Charles. Jr., and Jayne did not disclose their Mi Vida stock holdings on their 
bankruptcy schedule, deeming the stock holdings unadministered as a matter of law. 
The Defendants next assert that the bankruptcy trustee should not be substituted in this 
case for several reasons. First, the Defendants argue that this Court is without jurisdiction to 
substitute the trustee because Plaintiffs Charles, Jr., and Jayne filed for bankruptcy before this 
suit was filed. The Defendants thus argue that these Plaintiffs lacked standing from the start of 
this suit because they were not shareholders when the case was filed. Second, the Defendants 
argue that the trustees' rights are not necessarily co-extensive with those of Charles, Jr., Jayne, 
and Monica. The Defendants rely on Mi Vida's bylaws, which state that upon the filing of 
bankruptcy by any shareholder, the corporation has the opportunity to purchase the shares at 
book value. The Defendants conclude that the trustee thus has the right to payment from Mi 
Vida, but does not have the right to become a shareholder as such. Third, the Defendants argue 
that the trustee is not likely to submit himself to the counterclaims in this suit, making 
substitution improper. 
With regard to Monica Steen's inheritance of Mi Vida shares, the Defendants argue that 
"Monica's rights in the [M.L.'s probate] estate were 'legal or equitable interests,' as of the date 
of [M.L.'s] death, which were then subsequently transferred to the trustee in her individual 
[bankruptcy] case when she filed her Chapter 7 petition." Defendants' Reply at 7. The 
Defendants conclude that because three of the plaintiffs filed voluntary bankruptcy petitions 
without disclosing their interests in Mi Vida, they all lack standing. 
* The Defendants also contend that Plaintiff Monica Steen also filed for voluntary bankruptcy, and thus incorporate 
their arguments concerning Charles, Jr. and Jayne to apply to Monica. 
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With regard to the verification of the e^plaint. the Defendants argue that the 
verification is a fraud upon the Court. Specifically, the Defendants assert that the complaint 
states. (1) as of February- 6, 1991, Charles, Jr., held and still holds 125,000 shares of Mi Vida 
stock and that he held his shares during which the actions complained of occurred, (2) since at 
least 1991, Jayne has been and still is the owner of 116,980 shares of Mi Vida, and (3) Monica 
claims a right to inherit shares in Mi Vida. The Defendants contend that all of these alleged 
facts, verified to in the complaint, are false. 
The Defendants assert that before the Court can proceed with a derivative suit, it must be 
assured that the plaintiff or some other person has investigated the charges and found them to 
have substance. The Defendants argue that the misrepresentations in the complaint are simply re-
verified by Nancy, who knows or should have known that some important facts alleged in the 
complaint are false. The Defendants state. "Regarding the most essential facts - ownership of 
the shares, on which everything else hangs - the Complaint has already been proved false." 
Defendants5 Reply at 9. 
The Defendants argue that the Court should reject the complaint and its verification for 
several reasons. First, the Defendants contend that the allegations in the complaint are not 
plausible. The Defendants rely on the Utah court's ruling to support this argument. Second, the 
Defendants argue that this action was brought not only to harm the corporation, but to dissolve it. 
Third, the Defendants assert that there is no adequate justification for moving forward on 
"information and belief because important alleged facts in the complaint have been shown to be 
false. 
The Defendants next argue that the Plaintiffs have produced no evidence to contradict 
Mark Steen's affidavit that there will be insufficient assets in M.L 's estate to pay off creditors if 
the Mi Vida shares are simply distributed The Defendants argue that it is uncontroverted that 
the liabilities of M.L.'s estate exceed the non-stock assets available for liquidation. The 
Defendants conclude that the Court's November 9 Order as it relates to the inheritance of stock 
and standing must be reconsidered 
The Defendants contend that the minor plaintiff Jennifer Steen lacks standing to sue in 
her own name. The Defendants argue that although the Plaintiffs argue that a guardian ad litem 
or next friend may sue on her behalf, the Plaintiffs fail to move for the appointment of such a 
guardian. The Defendants reject the Plaintiffs' assertion that Charles, Jr., and Jayne, Jennifer's 
parents, may appear in a representative capacity because Mi Vida has asserted claims against 
these two individuals for corporate takings and tortious activities, which place them in conflict 
with Jennifer"b interests. 
Finally, the Defendants argue that the remaining minority shareholders are not 
representative. The Defendants contend that the rule for determining whether a shareholder can 
adequately represent a corporation in a derivative suit has been adopted from the class 
representations rule: (1) the plaintiffs attorney must be qualified, experienced, and generally 
able to conduct the proposed litigation, and (2) the plaintiff must not have interests antagonistic 
to those of the class. The Defendants assert that the potential beneficiaries (Andy, Jr. and 
Charles, HI) do not adequately represent the shareholder class because they are interested in 
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increasing their share of the inheritance. The Defendants argue that that remaining shareholders, 
Nancy, Karen, and Jennifer, "have an interest in collecting on the claims of Mi Vida from 
whatever source. Their totally divergent interests are antagonistic and the conflict prevents them 
from standing in a representative capacity in a derivative action." Defendants' Reply at 16. The 
Defendants thus conclude that the remaining plaintiffs are Nancy and Karen, who collectively 
hold 8.43% of Mi Vida stock. The Defendants argue that their interests are divergent from the 
9.77% held by bankruptcy trustees because Nancy and Karen are "presently fighting liquidation 
of their interests whereas the trustees are statutorily compelled to pursue such remedies." Id at 
17. 
IV. MERITS 
A. Verification of Complaint 
C.R.C.P. 23.1 provides in pertinent part: 
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to enforce 
a right of a corporation . . . the complaint shall be verified and shall allege that the 
plaintiff was a shareholder . . . at the time of the transaction of which he 
complains or that his share or membership thereafter devolved on him by 
operation of law. . . . The derivative action may not be maintained if it appears 
that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the 
shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the 
corporation or association. . . 
The rule only provides that the plaintiff-verifier have been a shareholder at the "time of the 
transaction of which he complains." The complaint in this action alleges actions taken by the 
Defendants beginning in the late 1980s and continuing until the present. 
Charles, Jr., and Jayne filed their Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on November 18, 1998. 
Even assuming that the stock became a part of the bankruptcy estate in late 1998,3 Charles, Jr. 
was in fact still a shareholder for the majority of the 'time of the transaction of which he 
complains" occurred. Accordingly, Charles, Jr., could properly verify the complaint pursuant to 
C.R.C.P. 23.1. The fact that the shares may have become property of the bankruptcy estate in 
late November, 1998, does thus not render Charles, Jr.'s verification insufficient or improper. 
Although Charles, Jr., technically may verify the complaint, the Court agrees with the 
Defendants that he misrepresented important facts regarding his and Jayne's Mi Vida holdings. 
Whether the misrepresentation was intentional or not, the Court cannot accept the verification of 
such misrepresentations. Further, the Court agrees with the Defendants that Nancy's verification 
does not cure the defect because at the time she verified the complaint - May 26, 2000 - the fact 
of Charles, Jr.'s and Jayne's bankruptcy petitions had been disclosed for 25 days. Thus, Nancy's 
verification in essence does no more than verify facts that she knew or should have known are 
false. Although the Court finds that the verifications are insufficient, it will permit the Plaintiffs 
fifteen days to file a proper verification. 
" Charles. Jr. and Jayne did not list their Mi Vida shares in their bankruptcy schedule. 
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B. Effect of Bankruptcy Proceedings - Standing of Plaintiffs Charles, Jr., 
Jayne, and Monica Steen 
In the present case, plaintiffs Charles, Jr. and Jayne filed for bankruptcy on November 18, 
1998, and the discharge in bankruptcy was granted on March 29, 1999 Plaintiff Monica Steen 
filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on October 9, 1998, and the discharge was granted on January 25, 
1999. The verified complaint was filed on July 6, 1999. 
The commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an estate comprised of all legal or 
equitable interests of the debtor in property. 11 U.S.C. § 541. Causes of action belonging to the 
debtor are property of the estate, and only the trustee has standing to assert them. See Black v. 
First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'a. 830 P.2d 1103 (Colo.App. 1992), citing Folz v. Bancohio 
Nat'l Bank. 88 B.R. 149 (S.D. Ohio 1987); see also In re Alexander. 980 P.2d 659 (Okla. 1999); 
In re Smith, 640 F.2d 888 (7th Cir. 1981); In re FBN Food Serv.. Inc., 185 B.R. 265 (N.D. Ill 
1995); In re U.S. Marketing Concepts. Inc.. 113 B.R. 487 (Bankr. N. D. Ind. 1990); Lambert v. 
Fuller Co.. 122 B.R 243 (E.D. Pa. 1990). However, a trustee is not bound to accept a cause of 
action that does not offer the promise of a benefit to the estate. Black, citing 11 U.S.C. § 554(a). 
The bankruptcy Court may order the trustee to abandon such property. Id, citing 11 U.S.C. § 
554(b). If the bankruptcy court orders property to be abandoned, title reverts to the debtor. Id , 
citing Barletta v. TedeschL 121 B.R. 669 (N.D.N. Y. 1990). 
Courts in other jurisdictions have held that where a debtor files for bankruptcy and then 
subsequently files a civil action, the cause of action asserted in the lawsuit becomes the property 
of the bankruptcy estate and the debtor no longer has standing to sue. For example, in Cable v. 
I w Tech State College. 200 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 1999), after filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the 
plaintiff sued his former employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act for alleged injuries 
that occurred before his bankruptcy. Id at 469-70. Although the plaintiff subsequently 
converted his case from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13, the court addressed the rights of a debtor to file 
a suit after filing for bankruptcy. In discussing the differences between Chapter 7 and Chapter 
13 bankruptcy, the court stated: 
Chapter 7 establishes a much more radical solution to indebtedness, requiring the 
liquidation of the debtor's property, to which end Congress granted the trustee 
broad powers without interference from the debtor. The trustee has sole authority 
to dispose of property, including managing litigation related to the estate. See 11 
U S.C. sec sec 541(a)(1), 704(1). . . . In [Chapter 7] liquidation proceedings, only 
the trustee has standing to prosecute or defend a claim belonging to the estate. See 
In re New Era, 135 F.3d 1206, 1209 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that Chapter 7 trustee 
has exclusive right to represent debtor in court), see also Lambert v. Fuller Co.. 
122 B.R. 243, 245 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Gullev v. Winnebago County Forest Preserve 
DisL, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11639 No. 91- C20231, 1992 WL 185938 (N.D. 111. 
May 7, 1992); In re Davis. 158 B.R. 1000, 1002 (Bankr N.D. Ind. 1993). . . . 
Chapter 7, . . . in contrast to Chapters 11 and 13, does not recognize the legal 
entity debtor-in-possession. 
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Id 'emphasis in original), see also Richardson v. United Parcel Serv.. 195 B.R. 737 (E.D. Mo 
1996) (because the chose in action remained estate property and had not been abandoned 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 554, it had to be pursued for the benefit of the estate). 
Although causes of action become part of the bankruptcy estate and may only be asserted 
by the trustee, this is not the case where the trustee abandons the property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
§ 554. As stated in in re Davis, 158 B.R. 1000 (Bankr. N.D. lnd. 1993): 
The cause of action against defendants arose from an alleged pre-petition 
violation of the FDCPA. Property of the estate encompasses "all legal and 
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case," 
which includes causes of action. It is a debtor's duty to file a schedule of assets 
existing at the time the petition for relief is filed. Even though Debtors failed to 
list the cause of action as an asset, it nevertheless became property of the estate 
pursuant to [11 U.S.C] § 541(a)(1). After notice and a hearing, property may be 
abandoned from the estate by the trustee or upon request of a party in interest. 11 
U.S.C. §§ 554 (a) and (b). However, in this case the Debtors' cause of action was 
never abandoned from the estate under either §§ 554(a) or (b). Any scheduled 
property not administered at the time of the closing of the case is abandoned to 
the debtor and deemed administered. 11 U.S.C. § 554(c). This section explicitly 
provides that it applies only to property that has been scheduled, and it is not 
enough that the trustee learns of property through other means. Since Debtors' 
cause of action was not scheduled, § 554(c) is not applicable and the cause of 
action was not deemed administered and abandoned. Property of the estate that 
has not been expressly abandoned or administered by the trustee at the time the 
case is closed remains property of the estate. II U.S.C. § 554 (d). Consequently, 
the cause of action was initially property of the estate, and remained property of 
the estate even though the case was closed. 
Id. (internal case law citations omitted). 
In the present ca^e, the filing of the two bankruptcy petitions and the subsequent 
discharges in bankruptcy occurred in temporal proximity to the filing of the verified complaint. 
Thus, it is a reasonable inference that the causes of action asserted in the present suit existed at 
the time of the creation of the bankruptcy estates. Consistent with the holding in Davis, then, the 
causes of action in this case as asserted by Charles, Jr., Jayne, and Monica are only properly 
asserted by the respective bankruptcy trustee, unless either trustee abandoned the claims pursuant 
t o l l U.S.C §554. 
The party seeking to demonstrate abandonment bears the burden of persuasion. Mele v. 
First Colony Life Ins. Co.. 127 B.R. 82 (D.D.C. 1991). Property may be abandoned by 
implication where the debtor has listed the property in the appropriate bankruptcy filing. See id, 
11 U.S.C. § 554(c). However, under § 554(d), unadministered property will remain in the 
bankruptcy estate unless it has been expressly abandoned under other provisions of § 554. S ^ kL 
In the present case, none of the three bankrupt Plaintiffs listed his or her causes of action against 
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the Defendants in their bankruptcy schedules. Unlisted assets are not deemed abandoned. In Re 
Cundiff. 227 B.R. 476 (Bankr. App. 6th Cir. 1998). Thus, the causes of action constitute 
unadministered property and remain property of the bankruptcy estate. As a result, only the 
trustees have standing to pursue this action. 
The Plaintiffs have not moved to substitute the trustees for the bankrupt Plaintiffs. The 
Plaintiffs concede that there is valid legal question regarding whether the claims belong to the 
bankruptcy estate or to the individual Plaintiffs. Further, because Charles, Jr., Jayne, and Monica 
failed to disclose their Mi Vida shares on their bankruptcy petitions, that property was 
unadministered and remains part of the bankruptcy estate. The shares were a part of the 
bankruptcy estate from the start of this suit. Thus, these three Plaintiffs lacked standing from the 
start of this action. Based on the foregoing discussion, the Court finds that Charles, Jr., Jayne, 
and Monica lack standing in this case. Accordingly, they are dismissed as plaintiffs in this case.4 
C. Standing of Plaintiffs Charles III and Kirk Steen 
In its November 9 Order, the Court addressed the issue of the standing of M.L.'s 
grandchildren, who are scheduled to received shares of Mi Vida under her will. The Court held: 
There is no dispute that M.L. Steen bequeathed shares of Mi Vida to Monica, 
Charles in, and Kirk. The question therefore becomes whether the three 
grandchildren satisfy C.R.S. § 7-107-402(1) and C.R.C.P. Rule 23.1. The 
Plaintiffs correctly state that this Court may take judicial notice of its own files. 
Linker v. Linker, 470 P.2d 882 (Colo. 1970). The grandchildren will become 
record shareholders of Mi Vida stock by operation of law upon the conclusion of 
the probate case; they thus have a clear interest in this case and its underlying 
claims. The issue then becomes whether the grandchildren have standing even 
though the probate process is not yet complete and they have thus not yet actually 
received their shares through devolution of law. The purpose of C.R.S. § 7-107-
402(1) and C.R.C.P. 23.1 is to protect the interests of shareholders who are not 
yet record shareholders but have an undisputed right to and interest in shares of a 
corporation. American Jurisprudence. Second explains the interest necessary or 
sufficient for a plaintiff to maintain a derivative suit: 
In order that one may be considered a stockholder for the purpose 
of asserting the right of a minority shareholder to sue for the 
dissolution of the corporation, it is not strictly essential that a 
certificate of stock be issued to him; it is sufficient for this purpose 
that he has subscribed and paid for the stock. Stock acquired by 
purchase or devise entitles a minority stockholder to bring such a 
suit against the corporation although the stock had not yet been 
4
 These three Plaintiffs may have a remedy by requesting that their bankruptcy estates be reopened and further 
requesting the respective trustees be substituted as plaintiffs in this case or by requesting the trustees to formally 
abandon these claims. The Court does not by this order take a position regarding whether it can or will substitute 
the trustees. 
n 
transferred on the books of the company in the name of the 
plaintiff. 
19 Am.Jur.2d § 2771. It is clear from this section that a plaintiff in a derivative 
action need not be a record shareholder. It is enough that the plaintiff will 
become a record shareholder by purchase or devise. Again, there is no dispute 
that the grandchildren will become record shareholders at the conclusion of the 
probate case. A denial of standing would thus not be based on any substantive 
legal reasoning but would instead rest on the timing of the probate process. Such 
a denial would be arbitrary and contrary to the intent of both C.R.S. § 107-402(1) 
and C.K.C.P. 23.1. As a result, the Court determines that all three grandchildren 
have standing to participate in this derivative suit. Accordingly, the Defendant's 
motion to dismiss Monica, Charles HI, and Kirk for lack of standing is denied. 
xNovember Order at 14-15. The Defendants ask the Court to reconsider this ruling based on an 
affidavit by Mark Steen stating that M.JL.'s estate does not have sufficient assets to satisfy its 
liabilities, and thus the grandchildren will not receive the Mi Vida shares. However, until the 
probate estate is closed, it is not certain that the shares will need to be liquidated to satisfy the 
creditors of M.L/s estate. Thus, the grandchildren continue to have standing in this matter/ 
D. Standing of Plaintiffs Karen Steen and Jennifer Steen 
The Plaintiffs assert in their response that Karen Steen is no longer a minor. Although 
the Plaintiffs have not moved to amend their complaint to reflect this fact, the Court accepts the 
assertion by counsel. The Plaintiffs do not contest that Plaintiff* Jennifer Steen is a minor. The 
Plaintiffs properly state that a guardian ad litem may pursue her rights, but have not moved for 
the appointment of such a guardian. The Plaintiffs have fifteen days to file the appropriate 
motions to cure these two defects. 
E. The Remaining Plaintiffs 
Although the Court has dismissed Plaintiffs Charles, Jr., Jayne, and Monica, the 
following Plaintiffs remain: Nancy Ciddio Steen-Adams, Charles Steen, HI, Andrew Kirk Steen, 
Jr., Karen Steen, and Jennifer Steen. Mi Vida is a very small closely held corporation. Of the 
fifteen shareholders of Mi Vida, three are defendants and eight are plaintiffs.6 Thus a majority of 
the minority shareholders have attempted to assert claims in this suit. This is not a situation 
involving a large, publicly held corporation where one or a few disgruntled minority 
shareholders assert a derivative suit without the support of the other hundreds or thousands of 
minority shareholders. The Court thus finds that these Plaintiffs adequately represent the 
* Plaintiff Monica Steen, although she has standing as a grandchild who will become a record shareholder is 
nonetheless dismissed from this action based on her discharge in bankruptcy. See Section IV.B., supra. 
* The shareholders who are not parties to tliis actions are: (1) Andrew Kirk Steen, whose whereabouts are unknown; 
(2) Ashley Victoria Steen, minor daugliter of Defendant Mark Steen; (3) Tera Marie Holland, who is M-L.*s sister 
and who will receive shares representing 5% of Mi Vida through MLL.'s bequest; and (4) Karla Wright, Tera's adult 
daughter who will receive shares representing 1.67% of Mi Vida through M.L/S bequest. 
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shareholder interests. Thus, the Court denies the Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint in 
;ts entirety. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the Defendant's Joint Motion to Dismiss Verified Complaint is hereby 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY 
MI VIDA ENTERPRISES, Inc. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MAXINE S. BOYD, et al. 
Defendants. 
and 
NANCY CIDDIO STEEN-ADAMS; 
CHARLES A. STEEN III and 
ANDREW KIRK STEEN, Jr.; 
Counterclaim and Cross-Claimants 
vs. 
MI VIDA ENTERPRISES, INC. and 
MARK ASHBY STEEN 
, STATE OF UTAH 
Civil No: 000-700-040 
Judge Lyle Anderson 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on the Motion of Mi Vida 
Enterprises, Inc., ("Mi Vida"), Mark A. Steen ("Mark") and John C. Steen 
("John") to dismiss the claims of defendant Nancy Ciddio Steen-Adams ("Nancy") 
set out in her pleading filed on January 30, 2001. Mi Vida was represented by its 
Colorado counsel, Cynthia T. Kennedy, Esq. and its local counsel, Keith H. 
Chiara, Esq. Mark and John were represented by Thomas J. Finch, Esq. Colorado 
counsel and Allen Thorpe, Esq. as local counsel. Nancy was represented by 
James M. Hult, Esq. and Stephen S. Wills, Esq. (as Colorado counsel admitted pro 
hac vice) and Randal L. Meek, Esq. (as local counsel). Although oral argument 
was initially requested and a hearing scheduled for May 23, 2002, the parties 
eventually stipulated to waive oral argument and submit for decision on the filed 
memoranda. THIS ORDER is entered pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules 
of Judicial Administration based on the written Ruling of the Court issued July 10, 
2002. 
THE COURT MAKES THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDERS: 
A. The Uncontroverted Facts 
The Summary Judgment Motion was accompanied by a detailed statement 
of facts supported by affidavit. Nancy attempted to controvert a number of those 
statements. However, her efforts to do so simply by stating that she disagrees 
cannot be honored. Neither can her reliance on the verified pleadings of Charles 
A. Steen, Jr. ("Junior"). A party resisting summary judgment is not entitled to rest 
on pleadings, but must come forward with specific averments contradicting 
specific facts asserted by the moving party. The court agrees with Mi Vida that 
Nancy has only successfully controverted Mi Vida's statements of fact nos. 76 and 
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77, having to do with materials sent and notice given in 1993 and 1994. The 
events of 1993 and 1994 referred to in statements of fact nos. 16 and 77 are not 
crucial to resolution of this dispute. Based on the uncontroverted facts, the Court 
makes the following findings: 
Mi Vida was organized on December 19, 1972 , as a Utah corporation, by 
the filing of articles of incorporation. However, no organizational meeting was 
held, no bylaws were adopted, and no shares were issued at that time. The 
apparent purpose of the corporation was to own real estate that had belonged in 
part to Charles Steen, Sr. and in part to his wife, M.L. Steen. Charlie Steen was 
the subject of bankruptcy proceedings in Nevada at the time. The bankruptcy 
court, on February 1974, approved the transfer of patented and unpatented mining 
claims in Boulder County, Colorado, and certain parcels of land in Grand County, 
Utah (the "Grand County Properties") to Maxine Boyd ("Boyd"). Boyd is Charlie 
Steen's sister. 
On August 5, 1974, Charlie Steen's trustee in bankruptcy and M.L. Steen 
conveyed the Boulder Properties and the Grand County Properties to Mi Vida, not 
Boyd. They were conveyed subject to Boyd's mortgage on the Boulder Properties 
and the Grand County Properties. There was also a mortgage in favor of a trust 
for Charlie Steen's children. The properties were further encumbered by an IRS 
lien for unpaid taxes. No one has explained why Mi Vida took title from the 
bankruptcy estate, rather than Boyd, as the court had ordered. This court presumes 
that some accommodation between Charlie Steen's family and Boyd was reached, 
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pursuant to which Boyd retained a security interest in exchange for allowing Mi 
Vida to hold title. It was intended that Mi Vida be owned by members of Charlie 
Steen's family. 
The bankruptcy transfer did not extinguish any liens. It was not likely in 
1974 that Mi Vida's equity in the Boulder Property and Grand County Properties 
was positive. However, the passage of time has extinguished the IRS liens and the 
amount or validity of the Boyd security interest is also in question, which means 
that the assets of Mi Vida are now worth fighting over, and the family of Charlie 
Steen is doing just that. 
Mi Vida still owns virtually all of the properties conveyed to it in 1974. No 
complaint has been voiced about sales of small portions of the Grand County 
Properties in 1991 and 1994. 
Mi Vida concedes that Nancy is entitled to benefit as a shareholder from 
the present value of the Boulder Properties and the Grand County Properties. 
What is seeks to resolve by the present motion is whether other assets were 
derived from the bankruptcy or the Steen family, and whether Nancy is entitled to 
benefit from mining claims in Boulder County, Colorado, that were purchased in 
1982 and 1983 (the "Cosmos Claims") title to which was taken in the name of 
Mark A. Steen ("Mark"), the vice president of Mi Vida, and certain other mining 
claims in Boulder County, Colorado, that were purchases in 1990 (the "Little and 
Rodgers Claims"), title to which was also taken in Mark's name. The Cosmos 
Claims and the Little and Rodgers Claims were sold to Boulder County, Colorado, 
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in 2001. At the same time, Golden Tontine, L.L.C, a joint venture composed of 
Mi Vida and other entities, released Boulder County from certain obligations it 
might have under an Agreement Regarding Surface Resources dated June 6, 1998. 
The total price paid by Boulder County was $2.7 million. Nancy claims that Mi 
Vida is entitled to a portion of that payment, and that the value of that payment 
should be included in the price of her shares, which Mi Vida is obligated to 
purchase from her. 
Nancy became a shareholder in Mi Vida by means of her marriage to 
Charlie Steen's son, Charles Steen, Jr. ("Junior"). By March 31, 1986, Nancy and 
Junior had divorced, and Nancy had been awarded one-half of Junior's shares in 
Mi Vida. On April 1, 1986, Nancy appointed Lynn McKeever ("McKeever"), and 
attorney in Albuquerque, New Mexico, as her attorney in fact to bring into her 
possession any assets awarded to her in the divorce. At that time, McKeever made 
an inquiry of the trustee of the trust for Charlie Steen's children, which had held a 
mortgage on some or all of Mi Vida's property. 
On February 5, 1987, the law firm of Sherman and Howard was engaged to 
analyze the ownership of Mi Vida and to notice a meeting to shareholders. A 
meeting was called for May 2, 1987, to discuss issuing stock in Mi Vida and to 
discuss a joint venture involving the Boulder County Properties. The notice 
calling for that meeting proposed the issuance of shares to Nancy, which would 
make her the owner of one-twelfth of Mi Vida. McKeever and another attorney, 
Anita Mosely ("Mosely") attended the May 2, 1987, meeting on Nancy's behalf. 
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By the 1987 meeting, Mark had used money of Cosmos Resources, Inc. 
("Cosmos") to purchase the Cosmos Claims. The total purchase price of the 
Cosmos Claims was about $500,000. Mi Vida and Cosmos had entered into the 
Gold Hill Venture Agreement in March, 1983. Mi Vida was to contribute its 
Boulder County Properties, free of encumbrances. Cosmos was to contribute $4 
million, some of which was to be used to purchase additional mining claims, 
which the Court assumes were the Cosmos Claims, some of which was to be used 
to prepare the Boulder County Properties (and the Cosmos Claims) to be mined, 
and some of which was to be used to construct a mill. The agreement provided for 
a sharing of ownership of the mining claims to be included in the venture; Mi Vida 
and Cosmos would each acquire a 40% interest in the shares owned (or acquired) 
by the other. 
The only cash contribution by Mi Vida to the joint venture with Cosmos 
was $23,000. Mark maintains that this was repaid to Mi Vida. The Cosmos-Mi 
Vida joint venture did not result in the construction of a mill. By late 1984, it 
became clear that Cosmos lacked the resources to construct the mill. Cosmos and 
Mi Vida then became involved in discussions with Richard and Gwen Fraser (the 
"Frasers"), old friends of Charlie Steen. 
Although Cosmos, Mi Vida and the Frasers never signed any joint venture 
or partnership agreement, draft agreements were circulated and the Frasers 
contributed money for the construction of a mill. The mill was actually 
constructed on two mining claims, the Oscar and Good Enough claims, which 
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were part of the Cosmos Claims. Construction of the mill was completed by 1987. 
By that time, Cosmos had contributed $1.3 million to the effort, and the Frasers 
had invested $2.1 million, of which $1.5 million had gone into constructing the 
mill. The Frasers asked for, and received, a quitclaim deed conveying the Oscar 
and Good Enough claims to secure their investment. That deed was signed both 
by Mark, and by Charlie Steen, as president of Mi Vida, the general partner of 
Gold Hill Ventures. 
Junior, and Andrew K. Steen ("Andrew"), another son of Charlie Steen, 
began writing letters to numerous individuals and government agencies, including 
the Frasers, alleging fraud and criminal conduct by Mark. They particularly 
mentioned concern about the ownership of mining claims and the mill. The 
Frasers eventually retained a lawyer, who wrote a letter repudiating the limited 
partnership involving the Frasers, Cosmos and Mi Vida. The Frasers then 
recorded the deed to the Oscar and Good Enough claims, on which the mill had 
been built. 
A verbatim transcript of the 1987 meeting of Mi Vida's shareholders has 
been prepared and portions have been provided to the court. The deed covering 
the Oscar and Good Enough Claims was included in the discussion. McKeever 
and Mosely participated actively in the meeting. The level of distrust between 
Junior and Mark, each involved with a separate faction among Mi Vida's 
shareholders, is evident from the transcript. No one who attended that meeting 
could have been unaware of the Gold Hill Venture Agreement, the dealings with 
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the Frasers, Mark's purchase of the Cosmos Claims, or Junior's belief (supported 
by Andrew), that Mark was engaging in some kind of shady dealing. 
Nancy was not elected to Mi Vida's board, but she was issued shares 
representing one-twelfth of Mi Vida. The shareholders also agreed that 
shareholders would be permitted to attend directors' meetings. From that point on, 
counsel for Mi Vida provided extensive information about corporate dealings and 
meetings to Nancy, initially through counsel, and after July 14, 1992, directly to 
Nancy. 
After the Frasers repudiated the limited partnership, Mi Vida continued 
discussing with Cosmos and the Frasers the possibility of a new agreement. It was 
logical that the Frasers, as owners of a mill, would want to make a deal with 
Cosmos and Mi Vida, owners of mining claims in the same area. By the time Mi 
Vida's shareholders met in 1989, a limited partnership agreement had been signed 
by Mi Vida and Cosmos, and sent to the Frasers for signature. That potential 
agreement was discussed at the 1989 meeting. Junior continued to question the 
integrity of Mark at that meeting. 
The Frasers ultimately refused to sign the limited partnership agreement 
with Cosmos and Mi Vida. However, in February, 1991, Mi Vida finally signed a 
milling contract with Colino Ore Molino, Inc. ("COM"), the corporation formed 
by the Frasers to own the mill. This contract afforded Mi Vida an opportunity to 
have any ores mined from its properties processed at the mill. By that time, Mark 
and another son of Charlie Steen ("John") had purchased the Little and Rodgers 
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Claims. They did not purchase these claims with Mi Vida funds. This purchase 
was disclosed at the 1991 shareholders meeting of Mi Vida. 
COM's mill eventually fell into disrepair. Mi Vida never gathered 
sufficient resources to develop the Boulder County properties, and no commercial 
quantities of ore were ever milled for Mi Vida at COM's mill. In 1992, Mark 
created three companies to take title to the claims he had acquired. The Cosmos 
Claims were deeded to Gold Hill Mines, Inc.1 
In 1998, ITEC Environmental Colorado, Inc. ("ITEC") purchased the mill. 
Mi Vida, Gold Hill Mines, Inc., Gold Reef Mining Company, and Southern Cross 
Prospecting Company then formed a limited liability company called Golden 
Tontine, L.L.C. ("Tontine") in order to act as one in dealing with ITEC. 
B. Nancy's Rule 56(f) Motion 
Consideration of the motion (the "Summary Judgment Motion") is 
complicated by Nancy's request pursuant to Rule 56(f), U.R.C.P. (the "Rule 56(f) 
Request") and her motion to clarify discovery schedule filed on April 12, 2002, 
(the "Discovery Motion") to which Mi Vida has objected. 
Nancy maintains that she may be able to gather information by deposing 
Mark, Durrell Nielson, Rodney Knutson and Richard Harris, that will permit her 
to controvert facts which support Mi Vida's claim for summary judgment. She 
wants to depose Mark to find out what entities he created to receive funds from 
Cosmos Resources and the Frasers, and what he did with that money. She wants 
It is not the responsibility of this court to determine why claims purchased originally for Cosmos were 
deeded to Gold Hill Mines, Inc. Mark has. however, included an explanation of this in his memoranda. 
Gold Hill Mines is apparently owned by original owners and creditors of Cosmos. 
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to depose Durrell Nielson and Rodney Knutson to ask them about portions of their 
affidavits which she disputes. Finally, she wishes to depose Richard Harris, 
expecting to hear from him that Mark acquired certain properties (presumably the 
Cosmos Claims and/or the Little and Rodgers Claims) on behalf of Mi Vida, or a 
joint venture of which Mi Vida was a partner. 
All of the additional discovery sought by Nancy bears on the question of 
whether Nancy has or ever had a claim against Mark. None of the proposed 
discovery would bear on the question of whether she lost a possibly valid claim by 
sitting on it. Accordingly, the court turns first to an analysis of Mi Vida's claim 
that Nancy' claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations or by laches. 
As further set forth below, the Court decides this matter on the issue of the statute 
of limitations. Consequently, the Rule 56(f) request is denied because Nancy has 
not identified any facts she wishes to discover bearing on the limitations issues. 
The parties apparently agree that Mark can still be deposed. It is not clear to the 
court that Nancy still desires to depose Durrell Neilson, Rodney Knutson and 
Richard Harris. The Discovery Motion is denied without prejudice to renew it 
with a showing of how their testimony will aid resolution of the remaining issues. 
C. The Statute Of Limitations 
Mi Vida initially pled the wrong statute of limitations. Mi Vida has now 
moved to amend to plead the correct statute. That motion is unopposed. The 
Court has granted that motion by separate written order dated April 30, 2002 and 
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proceeds to analyze the limitation issues based on the applicable three year 
statute, which is Section 78-12-27, Utah Code. 
Nancy filed her pleading in this case on January 30, 2001. An earlier 
pleading in a related case in Colorado, dismissed on the condition that it could be 
reasserted here, was filed on or about June 8, 1999. Thus, any cause of action 
based on facts known to Nancy before June 8, 1996 is barred by the statue of 
limitations. In addition, under Stewart v. K&S Co., 591 P.2d 433 (Utah 1979), 
any cause of action based upon wrongs which Nancy should have discovered 
before June 8, 1996, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, is also barred. 
Nancy contends that her cause of action to recover a portion of the proceeds 
of the sale of the Cosmos Claims and the Little and Rodgers Claims to Boulder 
County, Colorado, did not arise until May 2001. This answers the wrong question. 
The question is when did Nancy know, or when should she have known, that Mi 
Vida itself asserted no ownership interest in those properties, or that Mark was not 
holding those properties for Mi Vida. 
Nancy's memorandum never identifies the point at which she became 
aware of facts supporting a claim against Mark as an officer of Mi Vida. She 
maintains that she could not sue until after the Cosmos Claims and Little and 
Rodgers Claims were sold to Boulder County, but she obviously felt aggrieved 
before that because she filed a lawsuit in Colorado in 1999. Absent any evidence 
from Nancy about when she became aware of the facts supporting her claim, the 
Court is forced to look to evidence in the record about the business dealing of Mi 
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Vida concerning those properties, and the disclosures to shareholders about those 
dealings. 
The Gold Hill Venture Agreement draws a clear distinction between the 
Cosmos Claims and the Boulder County Properties. Even if the venture had 
proved profitable and permanent, Mi Vida's interest in the Cosmos Claims would 
have been only 40%. It would also have been required, in exchange, to give up 
40% of the Boulder County Properties. Given the ultimate failure of the Gold Hill 
Venture Agreement to reach a point of profitability, it is debatable whether Mi 
Vida and Cosmos would have entitled to assert this cross-ownership. What is not 
debatable, however, is that neither entity did assert this entitlement. It is also plain 
that anyone who had inquired about this as early as 1985, would have been told 
that there were no cross-conveyances and that none were planned. 
The course eventually selected by Mi Vida, of retaining full ownership of 
the Boulder County Properties, while gaining no ownership of the Cosmos Claims, 
does not appear unreasonable in view of the uncontroverted fact that Cosmos had 
contributed virtually all of the cash to the venture, and had lost two mining claims, 
the Oscar and the Good Enough, to the Frasers. Had Mi Vida made such a 
demand, it is unlikely that it could have been sustained. Nancy, through her 
counsel, was kept fully informed of all of the Cosmos, Mi Vida, and Fraser 
dealings. It is likely that counsel did not inquire about ownership of the Cosmos 
Claims because she considered it unreasonable to assert such a claim. Had she 
considered it reasonable to assert such a position, she should have asked whether 
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Mi Vida agreed. Even without inquiring, a cursory reading of the 1991 Milling 
Contract between Mi Vida and COM, a copy of which was provided to Nancy's 
counsel, would have alerted her that Mark and Gold Hill Ventures had title, or 
contemplated taking title, to other claims in the area of the mill. 
There is even less basis for assuming that the Little and Rodgers Claims 
were purchased for Mi Vida. There is no evidence that funds from Mi Vida 
purchased the Little and Rodgers Claims. No agreement, draft or signed, grants 
Mi Vida even a prospective interest in those claims. This court doubts that Nancy 
ever considered the Little and Rodgers Claims part of Mi Vida, but had she so 
considered them, the exercise of reasonable diligence would have led her to 
inquire about their conveyance to Mi Vida. In view of the rancor between 
shareholders, the expressed distrust of Mark by Andrew and Junior, especially the 
December 17, 1986, letter from Andrew to the State of Colorado, a reasonable 
shareholder would have been on high alert for any evidence of shady dealing. 
This Court agrees with Mi Vida that Nancy probably did not pursue those 
leads because the value of her interest in Mi Vida was questionable at the time. 
The real estate was still burdened by the IRS lien, Boyd's mortgage, and the 
mortgage in favor of the trust for Charlie Steen's children. Similarly, it would not 
have been obvious whether Mi Vida was advantaged by asserting ownership of 
100% of the Boulder County Properties, or by giving up 40% of the Boulder 
County Properties to Cosmos (or its successor), in exchange for 40% of the 
Cosmos Claims. 
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One important purpose for statutes of limitations is to encourage people to 
assert their claims when they first arise. This facilitates settlement, for it may still 
be possible to unwind certain transactions. "Waiting to see" whether a claim, 
through valid, is worth a pittance or a fortune, should be discouraged. In this case, 
had Nancy asserted in 1987 that Mi Vida and Cosmos should execute cross-
conveyances, they might well have agreed in order to avoid conflict. Now that the 
Cosmos Claims have been sold to Boulder County for the lion's share of $2.7 
million, the record owners understandably disagree. 
This court is convinced that the material facts, about which there is no 
genuine issue, establish that the statute of limitations on the claim that Mi Vida 
owned a share of the Cosmos Claims and the Little and Rodgers Claims, expired 
long before June 8, 1999, because Nancy, with the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, based upon knowledge she had or was charged with, would have 
discovered that Mi Vida claimed no interest in those properties and that Mark did 
not hold them in trust for Mi Vida, long before June 8, 1996. Mi Vida and Mark 
are therefore entitled to summary judgment excluding those properties from the 
valuation of Nancy's shares. 
D. The ITEC Agreement 
The issues with respect to the ITEC Agreement are less clear. This has not 
been as thoroughly briefed by the parties, but it appears that Mi Vida, through 
Tontine, is a party to the ITEC Agreement. If Tontine has a right to compensation 
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by releasing some rights under that agreement, it would seem reasonable for the 
compensation to be shared with Mi Vida and therefore its shareholders. 
E. Nancy's Claims to Personalty 
Reference appears in the Counterclaim, Crossclaim and Third-Party 
Complaint filed by Nancy to certain other "valuable assets" she claims may be 
owned by Mi Vida or to which Mi Vida may have some claim, including some 
interest in the following entities or assets: (a) Utex Exploration; (b) Grand Deposit 
Mining Company; (c) CASCO; (d) CASEX; (e) New Park Mining Company; (f) 
Steen Mining Company; (g) Litigation Resources, Inc. (h) Steen Minerals, Inc. (i) 
Steen Investment Company; (j) oil and gas production in Oklahoma and New 
Mexico; (k) patented mining claims in Alta, Utah; (1) a library of mining books 
and papers; (m) a mineral collection; (n) grand piano; (o) furniture; (p) jewelry; 
(q) art objects; or (r) any interest in a marble quarry. 
It appears from the allegations and uncontroverted facts that each of these 
claims, if legitimate, arose at or around the time of the incorporation of Mi Vida or 
within a few years thereafter; consequently, any claim thereto is barred by the 
statute of limitations on the same rationale discussed above regarding the mining 
claims. 
WHEREFORE, Summary Judgment is Granted in Part and Denied in Part. 
It is hereby Ordered that, pursuant to U.R.C.P. 56 (a) Judgment be and hereby is 
entered on behalf of Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc. and Mark A. Steen and against 
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Nancy Ciddio Steen-Adams on the Counterclaim, Cross Claim and Third Party 
Complaint insofar as those pleadings make any claim to: 
(1) any interest in the following entities or assets: (a) Utex Exploration; (b) 
Grand Deposit Mining Company; (c) CASCO; (d) CASEX; (e) New Park Mining 
Company; (f) Steen Mining Company; (g) Litigation Resources, Inc. (h) Steen 
Minerals, Inc. (i) Steen Investment Company; (j) oil and gas production in 
Oklahoma and New Mexico; (k) patented mining claims in Alta, Utah; (1) a library 
of mining books and papers; (m) a mineral collection; (n) grand piano; (o) 
furniture; (p) jewelry; (q) art objects; or (r) any interest in a marble quarry; 
(2) the Gold Hill Mill, the Oscar Lode and Good Enough Lode in Boulder 
County, Colorado; 
(3) the claims acquired by Cosmos Resources, Inc. conveyed to Gold Hill 
Mines, Inc. as further described on Exhibit A hereto; 
(4) the claims acquired by Mark A. Steen, John C. Steen and R.T. Heard 
from the Little and Rodgers families and conveyed to Gold Reef Mining Company 
and Southern Cross Prospecting Company as further described on Exhibit B 
hereto; 
said claims, whether individual or derivative on behalf of Mi Vida 
Enterprises, Inc., be and hereby are dismissed with prejudice. Nancy Ciddio 
Steen-Adams remains free to claim the value of her share ownership should 
include an analysis of the rights of Mi Vida pursuant to the ITEC Agreement and 
Golden Tontine Operating Agreement. 
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Exhibit A 
The Cosmos Claims 
The following patented and unpatented mining claims located in the County of 























Paris Mill Site 
Twinn Mill Site 
Bordeaux 
Bordeaux Mill Site 
Grange Mill Site 
Oro Cache 












Cash No. 2 
Time Load 
Morning Glory Lode 




























Boss of the Hill 
Evening Star 
Evening Star No. 2 
Maude S. 
Maude S. No. 2 
Exhibit B 
Claims Acquired from the Littles and Rodgers 
All in the County of Boulder, State of Colorado: 
Auriferous Lode 
Bobby Lode 
Corning Tunnel Millsite 
Creole No. 1 Lode 





Gold Rush Lode 
Golden Age Lode 
Golden Crown Lode 
Lansing Lode 
Lone Star Lode 
Lost Boy Lode 
Mack Lode 
Maxon Lode 
Mount Sterling Lode 
Ocean Wave Lode 
Peacock Lode 
Ready Cash Lode (northearterly lA) 
Saint Joe Lode 
Thorndike Lode 
Van Buren Lode 
Yellow Jacket No. 2 Lode 
Alturas Lode (2/3/ undivided interest) 
Keystone State Lode (1/2 undivided interest) 
Twin Millsite 
Block 11, Lots 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, & 18 
Gold Hill Town Lots, Gold Run Street 




Credit Mobilier Lode 
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George E. Hall Lode 
George Henry Lode 
Georgie Lode 
Gold Hill Lode 















Knox Lode (easterly 1300 feet) 









Knox Lode (westerly 200 feet) 
Scott Lode 
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MI VIDA ENTERPRISES, Inc. 
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vs. 
MAXTNE S. BOYD, et al. 
Defendants. 
and 
NANCY CIDDIO STEEN-ADAMS; 
CHARLES A. STEEN III and 
ANDREW KIRK STEEN, Jr.; 
Counterclaim and Cross-Claimants 
vs. 
MI VIDA ENTERPRISES, INC. and 
MARK ASHBY STEEN 
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THIS MATTER came before the Court for trial April 14, 15 and 16, 
continued to May 21, 22 and 23, 2003. Mi Vida was represented by its Colorado 
counsel, Cynthia T. Kennedy, Esq. and its local counsel, Keith H. Chiara, Esq. 
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Defendants Mark A. Steen ("Mark"), individually and as a representative of the 
Estate of M.L. Steen, were represented by Thomas J. Finch, Esq. as Colorado 
counsel and Allen Thorpe, Esq. as local counsel. Nancy Steen Adams ("Nancy") 
and Charles A. Steen, III ("Charles III") were represented by James M. Hult, Esq. 
and Stephen S. Wills, Esq. as Colorado counsel and Mr. Chase Kimball, Esq. as 
local counsel. 
THIS ORDER is entered pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of 
Judicial Administration based on the oral ruling of the Court dated May 21,2003, 
and constitutes the findings of fact, conclusion of law and judgment of this Court. 
I. Introduction 
After the majority of claims made by dissident shareholders were dismissed 
on summary judgment, this matter went to trial on the valuation of shares, the 
remaining derivative claims, and the corporations' and its officer's counterclaims 
for attorneys fees and costs. To understand the references of the court, some 
historical background is required. 
A. The Players. 
The players (however aligned) consist of members, or one-time members of 
the family of Charles A. Steen ("Charlie Steen"). Charlie and his wife, M.L. Steen 
(now deceased) had four sons: John C. Steen ("John"), Charles A. Steen, Jr. 
("CAS, Jr." or "Junior"), Andrew K. Steen ("Andy") and Mark A. Steen ("Mark"). 
Junior married Eleanor Ruth Ciddio (now Eleanor Ruth Ciddio Steen Adams a/k/a 
Nancy) ("Nancy") in 1968 and was divorced in 1978. The couple had two 
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children: Monica Steen ("Monica") and Charles A. Steen, III ("Charles, III"). 
Junior remarried Jayne Steen ("Jayne") and had two children: Karen and Jennifer. 
Andy, one of the original four brothers, had a son, Andrew K. Steen, Jr. ("Kirk"). 
Upon the death of MX. Steen, Mark A. Steen ("Mark") the youngest of the four 
brothers, became the representative of his mother's estate. Maxine Boyd is 
Charlie's sister, and an aunt of the four Steen brothers. Mi Vida is a Utah 
corporation which was incorporated in 1974 to take title to certain real property 
interests from the Charles A. Steen bankruptcy and from M.L. Steen. 
B. The Colorado Action 
Eight of the individuals identified above (Junior, his wife Jayne and their 
two children Karen and Jennifer, along with his ex-wife Nancy and their two 
children, Monica and CAS, III, and Kirk), claiming to be shareholders of Mi Vida, 
commenced an action in Boulder County, Colorado against Mi Vida, et al., as civil 
action no. 99 CV 1020-2 (the "Colorado Action") as a shareholder's derivative 
action. The Colorado Action, inter alia, requested the appointment of a receiver to 
dissolve Mi Vida. Monica, CAS, III and Kirk claimed shareholder status as 
potential beneficiaries of the undistributed estate of M.L. Steen. 
The derivative claims were asserted against Charlie Steen and two of his 
sons, John and Mark, as officers of the corporation, as well as Southern Cross 
Prospecting Company, Inc., Gold Reef Mining Company, Inc., Gold Hill Mines, 
Inc. and Golden Tontine, LLC (the corporations are collectively referred to 
hereinafter as the "Colorado Companies"). 
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C. The Boyd Action 
Maxine Boyd, claiming to be a creditor of Mi Vida, commenced a lawsuit 
against Mi Vida, et al. as Civil No: 9907-145 in this Seventh Judicial District, 
Grand County, Utah. Claiming that the Colorado Action impaired her rights, 
Boyd requested a temporary restraining order issue restraining the eight putative 
shareholders from their attempts to dissolve the Utah corporation or have a 
receiver appointed. Mi Vida joined in that request and, after hearing, a series of 
restraining orders were issued. Certain funds, which had been held in an 
attorney's trust account, in the approximate amount of $110,000, were interpled 
into the Court and eventually released to Mi Vida for payment of taxes and for 
other purposes. Eventually Mi Vida settled its disputes with Maxine Boyd and a 
Court Approved Settlement Agreement (the "Boyd Settlement") was approved and 
made an order of this Court. 
D. This Action 
This case was commenced directly by Mi Vida as a corporation, requesting, 
inter alia, an Order of preliminary injunction enjoining the putative shareholders 
from taking further action to dissolve or have a receiver appointed for the 
corporation elsewhere than in Utah. Mi Vida also requested it be allowed to 
purchase the shares of any of the putative shareholders found to be legitimate 
shareholders of the company, and for its fees and costs in defending the various 
claims made against it and its officers. By Order dated May 10, 2000, this Court 
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entered a preliminary injunction restraining the putative shareholders from 
pursuing the dissolution or receivership action in Colorado. 
E. Dismissal of the Colorado Action 
Eventually, the Colorado Action was dismissed as to Junior, his wife 
Jayne, and his daughter Monica, when it was discovered they had filed for and 
received discharges in bankruptcy while failing to list their shareholder interests 
(or potential interest in the case of Monica) as assets. 
Thereafter, by a document filed in the Colorado Action entitled Stipulation 
for Dismissal of Action ("Stipulation I") dated October 13, 2000, Nancy, Charles, 
III and Andrew K. Steen (the "Dissident Shareholders") agreed to have their 
shares (if any) bought out by Mi Vida pursuant to U.R.C. §78-10a-1434 in context 
of this proceeding, with October 13, 2000 as the date of valuation. By virtue of the 
Stipulation, the derivative claims asserted in Colorado were dismissed without 
prejudice to reassert them in Utah. Monica contested jurisdiction over her person 
in Utah, and this Court entered an Order on granting a motion to dismiss— 
retaining jurisdiction over Monica only insofar as Mi Vida was requesting a 
determination of her shareholder status and the right to set off amounts in the 
event of her potential inheritance of shares. Stipulation I provided that any claim 
not reasserted in Utah would be dismissed with prejudice, including the claims of 
Mi Vida and Mark Steen for fees. 
Stipulation I was incorporated into a stipulation entered into in this 
proceeding and made an Order of the Court on June 5, 2001 ("Stipulation IF5). 
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Stipulation II provided for the dismissal of the Colorado companies, Charlie and 
John Steen, in exchange for the agreement of Mi Vida to increase the proportional 
amount any Dissident Shareholder would receive from the corporation to include 
any recovery against these companies or officers. 
F. The Claims 
The parameters of the matter before the Court are defined by the Complaint 
of Mi Vida dated March 28, 2000 and the Amended Complaint dated August 15, 
2001, and Nancy's Answer, Counterclaim, Cross Claim and Third Party 
Complaint. The Court granted the Motion to Amend on September 17, 2001. 
Maxine Boyd was dismissed by Court Order dated October 9, 2002 as a result of 
the Settlement of the Boyd case referenced above. 
Certificates of Default entered on 6/26/00 with regard to four named 
defendants, i.e., Charles A. Steen, Jr. ("Junior"); Jayne Marie Steen ("Jayne"); 
Karen M. Steen ("Karen"); and Jennifer Steen ("Jennifer")1. Andrew K. Steen 
("Andy") was dismissed voluntarily by Mi Vida, on Notice pursuant to U.R. Civ. 
Pro. 41(a) (no service having been achieved) dated 9/24/02 and his claims against 
the corporation are the subject matter of Civil Action 02-07-00143 pending before 
this District. 
By filing an Answer, Cross-Claim and Third Party Complaint on January 
31, 2001, Nancy, CAS III and Kirk re-asserted the derivative claims. By Order 
The defaults entered upon the original Complaint and the extent of Mi Vida's recourse against these 
defendants is circumscribed by that pleading. 
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dated 11/06/01, the Court determined that CAS, III and Kirk, claiming to be 
shareholders as beneficiaries pursuant to the undistributed estate of M.L. Steen, 
had no standing as present shareholders of the corporation. Thus, their claims for 
shares or a positive recovery were dismissed. That left Nancy as the sole 
shareholder pursing derivative claims. The Court retained jurisdiction over CAS, 
III and Kirk for purposes of Mi Vida's positive claims for attorneys fees, and over 
Monica to the extent any claim for attorneys fees could be off-set against any 
claim for shares. 
Mi Vida's action against Kirk on its remaining claims were stayed by a 
bankruptcy filing, Case No. BK-N-02-51171-GWZ, United States Bankruptcy 
Court, District of Nevada. 
II. Historical Facts Relevant To the Matters Left for Trial 
Mi Vida was created in 1974. At the time it was created, if we are going to 
talk about reasonable business judgment, it may be that reasonable business 
judgment was to do nothing because Mi Vida had Real estate in Moab, Utah at a 
time when Moab, Utah was not a particularly prosperous place, some mining 
claims in Boulder, Colorado at a time when Boulder, Colorado was becoming a 
less likely place for people to find mining a friendly, neighborly thing to do. And, 
all of those properties were burdened by an obligation to Maxine Boyd, an 
obligation to the four brothers (both of which were secured by deeds of trust on 
the real estate) and then a lien to the Internal Revenue Service. 
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The likelihood of anything ever coming from this—if I had been asked in 
1974 to advise someone I would have said, "Don't waste any time on this. Don't 
waste any money on this. Just leave it alone. Your only hope of anything good 
happening is if the IRS lien never forecloses and their lien expires." 
Well, some effort was placed into this corporation making some things 
happen with it in two areas. One was in renting of the Mi Vida Restaurant—the 
old Steen family home at the top of the cliff here in Moab, a famous landmark in 
the valley—and that generated a little bit of money; not enough to make anybody 
rich and not enough to support fully one person, but enough to maybe keep the 
property taxes paid and maybe enough to make the life of Charlie Steen a little 
less miserable. 
The other thing is maybe, maybe these mining claims in Boulder do have 
some potential and that was the one area where, if you wanted to dream that 
something could happen that would make it possible to pay off the IRS or make 
the IRS go away, it would be that, because if you actually can produce 
economically, profitably minerals from a piece of property, it really doesn't matter 
what the value is per acre. 
And so, that was pursued, (I'm not sure it was reasonable to expend any 
energy on that) but it was pursued and it was pursued, by the evidence I've heard, 
primarily by Mark Steen. And he did that with some money he had received from 
other assets to try to get other people interested and then to go into a partnership 
with Mi Vida. 
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But Mi Vida really had nothing but these mining claims to contribute. 
There was not enough generated income. Even if you saved up for ten years all the 
rental income it would not be enough for Mi Vida to really get into production 
itself—so they were looking for a deep pocket. 
And the 1987, 89 and 91 shareholder meeting minutes reflect the efforts to 
pursue those options. And I've read those excerpts provided to me and I've read 
the associated documents. I did so in connection with the Summary Judgment 
Motion. I read them again as we were tying this case. 
None of those efforts ever panned out and generated enough money to 
persuade the IRS to go away. And I'm not going to get into all the reasons why 
they never panned out. I would have projected they wouldn't pan out if I'd been 
asked about it at the start, I think. Because about that same time I was practicing 
law and advising people who were going after gold that they were wasting their 
money. 
But, hope springs eternal, and it certainly was not inappropriate for this 
corporation to pursue really the only avenue that it had for emerging from its 
cocoon. 
By 1987, Nancy had become an official shareholder. She may have been 
entitled to shares ten years earlier. Her frustration in trying to collect on the assets 
that her ex-husband had promised her in her divorce is understandable. 
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He promised her all these things and it turned out they were things he 
couldn't promise her and she sees him benefiting from them nonetheless. It must 
have been very exasperating to her. 
But she finally, at least with respect to Mi Vida Enterprises, she actually 
gets shares issued and she hires lawyers and lawyers go to at least one meeting— 
they were at the '87 meeting-I don't know if they showed up at the '89 meeting 
also—and they would get a report on what was going on. We have hopes of this 
great thing happening. 
And the other thing that was obvious from the minutes is that there was 
great conflict and distrust between the shareholders and directors. 
If I were the lawyer for Nancy Adams, I would have told her after those 
1987 and 1989 shareholder meetings, you know it doesn't look like these folks are 
ever going to get together enough to do something and if they do get together to do 
something, these are all very high risk projects. They may never pan out into 
anything. 
And the conduct of Nancy after that time suggests that that is the kind of 
advice she got, because she stopped paying attention to Mi Vida Enterprises. 
But I believe she received notice of the 1991 meeting. I believe she 
received notice of the 1994 meeting. But she wasn't very interested anymore. 
She'd put quite a bit of effort to get something out of it and hadn't gotten anything 
out of it and had probably been told that she wasn't likely to ever get anything out 
of it. 
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Then, the single most crucial event in the post-1974 history of Mi Vida 
Enterprises occurs in 1993 or 1994 when the IRS fails to renew its lien, or maybe 
it was unable legally to renew its lien and all of a sudden the hardened portion of 
the cocoon surrounding Mi Vida is shattered and Mi Vida is now something that 
actually has the prospect of doing something without striking it rich on a gold 
mine or a gold mill. They actually have assets that can be sold. 
Now, they still had an obligation to Maxine Boyd, which had accrued 
interest or had expired because of the statute of limitations and lack of payments 
we don't know which, and the debt to the four boys. 
In the meantime, in these intervening twenty years, whatever scraps of 
money that were available from renting the restaurant had gone mostly to help the 
oldest brother and the mother and father, who were shareholders of the 
corporation, and some payments had been made to Maxine Boyd, I think. 
But when they sold property in 1994 in Moab, they needed to deal with 
Maxine Boyd because she had a mortgage, and they needed to deal with the four 
brothers because they had a mortgage. The simplest thing to do would have been, 
as much as possible, to pay those off. 
Interestingly, CAS, Jr. did not want to be paid off on the mortgage but he 
wanted to be paid as a shareholder the same proportion he would have received as 
a mortgage holder. I don't think that was fair. I don't think that was fair to 
anybody else. I don't think that was a reasonable way to proceed. But, he had 
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leverage because they could not make a sale without him signing off on it and who 
knows how long a law suit would take to eliminate his unwillingness to sign. 
So, they cut a deal and it meant that advances or loans to shareholders were 
made, but it turned out it was only to shareholders that had exceptional leverage. 
It was those who held the note secured by a mortgage: it was Maxine Boyd, 
though the amount she got was not proportional to her leverage. She's always 
been a soft touch, I think. And then some payments go to Tera Wright and M.L. 
and Charlie Steen. They are really in no preferred position at all, legally. But, it is 
understandable in a family corporation that they would do that. And I don't think 
it would have been reasonable for the people controlling Mi Vida to think that this 
would be something Nancy Steen Adams would find unacceptable or offensive 
given her interest expressed later in the Denver Post Article in the care of M.L. 
and Charlie Steen. 
So, it is hard to fault the corporation for giving a little favorable treatment 
to some shareholders that maybe legally are not in a strong position, but morally, 
ethically, emotionally you might feel a strong bond to. These are the people 
without whom there probably would have been none of the rest. 
And then some years go by. Three years later, M.L. Steen dies. And there 
is some conflict about that. Apparently not everyone benefits equally from her 
will, but it turns out it is her will, and that's enforced. But in the process, Nancy 
begins to become aware that maybe Mi Vida is worth something. 
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And I'm not clear on where all the source of this information was—whether 
it was from before M.L.'s death from M.L., whether it was from Junior, but she 
begins to recognize the possibility of some value there. And she's pretty 
aggressive in pursuing that through the M.L. Steen estate, even though she's not a 
beneficiary of the estate. 
Then, Junior comes to her with his views, his perceptions of what is going 
on with Mi Vida, and she becomes persuaded. I think she was already inclined to 
want to pursue these things. It is evident she was already inclined to do so, but 
she's convinced that the best way for her to try to get something out of Mi Vida is 
to join with him in his efforts through Reiman & Bayaz , Denver attorneys, in a 
lawsuit against Mi Vida, its officers and the Colorado companies. 
III. The Derivative Claims 
A. The Summary Judgment 
The greatest bulk of the controversy arose out of Nancy's claim that the 
value of her shares should be enhanced by the value of the derivative claims, most 
of which were dismissed on summary judgment entered September 16, 2002. 
Reference is made to that final order regarding the nature of the claims, the 
discussion of the merits, and the ultimate determination that, if valid claims had 
ever existed, they were barred by the relevant statute of limitations. 
B. The Remaining Derivative Claims 
At trial, Nancy argued that certain breach of fiduciary duty claims, and a 
claim arising out an agreement by and between Mi Vida and ITEC Environmental 
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of Colorado, had survived the summary judgment. Whatever is left of the ITEC 
claim is gone now. I didn't hear enough evidence to persuade me that the ITEC 
claim is of any value to the corporation. The claim is dismissed. 
Then there are the breach of fiduciary duty claims. To the extent the claims 
arise from the transactions that were dealt with on summary judgment, the claims 
were included in that analysis and fail by application of the statute of limitations. 
Nancy then claims that disproportionate loans were made to shareholders. 
It was true that disproportionate advances were made to shareholders in 1994 and 
some disproportionate advances of much less magnitude had been made before 
that time; but, Nancy would have known of these if she had paid attention to the 
notice she was given. 
More importantly, to me, it is interesting that she jumps into this lawsuit 
with Junior, who is, more than anyone else, the architect of these disproportionate 
advances in 1994. Now, Junior isn't here to defend himself, so maybe he's being 
painted more darkly than in all fairness he should be, but I have only the evidence 
I do, and the evidence I do have is that he was the architect—the genius—behind 
this "skullduggery" and it doesn't seem to bother her so much that she won't 
participate with him in the lawsuit against this corporation. This does not seem to 
be number one on her agenda. She overlooks what he did to her in her pursuit of 
these other claims against the corporation. And then, what do I do about it? Well, 
is she entitled to a shareholder loan she now must repay? What's the point of that? 
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The only way I might order her relief from that aspect is if I were to say that she's 
entitled to recover something for having pursued that because it brought the 
corporation to its senses, which is discussed in the context of the award of fees 
below. But as to positive recovery on the claim itself, there will be no award and 
the claim is dismissed. 
The only other breaches Nancy claims are that the officers let Mi Vida's 
registration expire, the corporation wasn't in good standing for awhile, and it 
didn't file some tax returns. These claims for breach of fiduciary duty have no 
damage and therefore no remedy, and there should be no recovery for that. 
The amount of legal effort it would have taken to get this corporation to 
stay in good standing and get its tax returns filed, was pretty minimal. 
With each of them, I am left with the question... with each of them, the evidence 
does persuade me that everything was not according to Hoyle in this corporation 
but this is not EXXON either and its not Enron either. Mark Steen did not take a 
bunch of stock options and end up controlling 90% of the corporation instead of 
10% of the corporation. Their registration expired, they weren't in good standing 
for awhile, they didn't file some tax returns. I think those were all things that were 
easily remedied simply by a letter and cooperation of the shareholders. If that had 
been the only complaint, this lawsuit would have been disposed of perhaps before 
it was filed. 
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So, to the extent they had not already been disposed of by Summary 
Judgment in this case, Nancy's claims are dismissed. 
IV. The Valuation 
By the time the matter came to trial, the only shareholder remaining was 
Nancy, and she had agreed, by Stipulation, to have her shares valued and 
purchased pursuant to U.R.C. §16-10a-1434. 
A. Assets 
The assets of Mi Vida Enterprises are: 
(1) $1,493.55 cash in the bank on October 13, 2000. 
(2) The shareholder advances receivable calculated by Mr. Snodgrass at 
$455,882.70. As I understand it is a calculation at 8% interest without 
compounding interest on interest. And I accept that. 
(3) The Vehicle was undisputed at $16,621.32 
(4) The appraised value of the Moab property is $3,400,000 
(5) The appraised value of the Colorado property is $330,000 
(6) Restricted Cash of $36,698.592 
Nancy has asked me to place an additional value on the Colorado property 
because of the possibility of additional mineral values. I read the appraisal as 
appraising those acres at their highest and best use as residences to be sold to 
people to build homes and I think any use of the mineral estate is inconsistent with 
See discussion under Liabilities below. 
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that and would result in elimination of the $330,000 value. I am placing no 
additional value for the possibility of mineral interest. 
B. Liabilities. On the liability side, I've heard no contradictory evidence of: 
(1) accounts payable of $222,141.98 or 
(2) the note payable to Bank one on the vehicle of $ 16,621.32 . 
(3) note payable to Knutson--Responding to my signal that I did not think 
that interest should be compounded on interest on the Knutson Legal Fee Note, 
Mr. Snodgrass changed the amount of that to $ 66,160.44 and Nancy seems to 
have accepted that, so I am finding that is the amount of that liability. 
(4) Andrew Steen Payable. There does not appear to be a contest that 
advances from Andrew Steen in the amount of $ 69,505.25, that is with accrued 
interest, are appropriate. 
(5) Boyd Note. With respect to the note payable to Maxine Boyd, I think 
$570,500 is now the legal amount owing under the Note to Maxine Boyd pursuant 
to the Stipulation made with Maxine Boyd. It might have been a great deal more; 
possibly the statute of limitations had run on that. It might have been zero. It was 
reasonable for Mi Vida to make a compromise settlement, and under that 
compromise settlement it is my opinion that the amount owing to her as of 
October 13, 2000 was $570,500. 
(6) Purchase of Junior's Shares. The Note payable to the Charles Steen 
bankruptcy estate ($19,251.75) and the note payable regarding the Charles Steen 
bankruptcy estate ($6,417.25) totaling $25,669.00 for the purchase of CAS, Jr. 
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shares in Mi Vida are obviously appropriate debts of the corporation since by 
doing so it managed to benefit every shareholder and increased the proportional 
interest of each shareholder, including Nancy, so I accept those numbers as listed 
in Mr. Snodgrass' balance sheet. 
(7) The Mine Production advances—all the testimony about that is that 
those are to be paid out of production from mines. And, I think you've already got 
my opinion as to whether I think production ever will or should occur from these 
properties in Colorado and it apparently is not due unless there is production and 
then only out of production. So it is not a liability that Mi Vida will probably ever 
have to pay. Not even properly treated in my mind as a liability but as a possible 
charge against a potential asset—that potential asset I presently value at 0. So, I 
eliminate that item from the liability side of the balance sheet. 
(8) Liability on the CB&T Note. $388,344.58.1 have heard quite a bit of 
controversy about the purchase of Junior's share in the Continental Bank, later 
Moore Trust, promissory note which ultimately became held by each of the 
brothers individually—no longer held in trust. 
I listened to ten minutes of the October 12th hearing. I looked at the 
documents from the bankruptcy court. I heard testimony that the bankruptcy court 
documents, drafts, before they'd been approved or been signed by Mi Vida, were 
shown to Mr. Sander before the October 12th hearing. 
And I find from that that it was contemplated, that Mr. Sander would have 
been aware from the reference in the ten minutes I heard on October 12, that the 
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deal included the "claims of CAS, Jr. also including a mortgage." The only 
mortgage CAS, Jr. had was the Continental Bank & Trust mortgage. So, if Mr. 
Sander saw the settlement documents, the most appropriate finding here is that 
Nancy, through her attorney, had an opportunity to say we want to benefit from 
that transaction, and that she didn't. In fact, from some of the things that are 
stated in the Trustee's report to the bankruptcy court there was an opportunity for 
Nancy to benefit solely, entirely. She could have gone and made a bid for CAS, 
Jr.'s share of the note. Bids were invited from Reiman & Bayaz early on, or was it 
from Bart Bailey? William Jennings and Bart Bailey. Correspondence from Jeff 
Reinman. "Two months with no response forthcoming from Mr. Bailey and Mr. 
Jennings." Now that it looks like a good deal the way the evidence is now, I don't 
think it is fair to permit her to benefit from something she elected not to benefit 
from, or to take the risk on, at that time. 
So that means the restricted cash on the asset side of the balance sheet stays 
there, but I am not subtracting from the liability side, the amount owing to Junior. 
By my calculations, however, the amount that Mr. Snodgrass placed on the 
liability side for the note to the four boys is too high. Once again the problem of 
interest on interest. That promissory note does say, "interest on the entire 
balance." But before that, it says, "interest on the unpaid principal balance." I read 
the promissory note in its entirety and came away unconvinced that it was 
authorizing interest to be compounded. 
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Now, this compound interest thing is, no pun intended, interesting. If you 
actually make the payments when you are supposed to make them, compounding 
occurs as a natural consequence of having made the payments because your 
payments go first to pay interest and then to pay principal. If you make no 
payments at all, in the absence of explicit language in the promissory note saying 
that every year, whether you make the payment or not, we are going to compound 
the interest, I don't think the law requires calculating interest on accrued interest. 
So, that's my view of the law. The best calculation in all the exhibits I found on 
the subject of the shareholder trust, or the note to the four boys, or the Continental 
Bank and Trust Note (whatever we call it) is that provided in 631 by Nancy. That 
does not appear to compound interest. It appears to give credit for all the 
payments, and it starts out with an amount on June 30, 1980, which appears t have 
been accepted by many of the principals at that time. And Exhibit 631 says that 
the amount owing on October 13, 2000 to the four boys was $388,344.58, so I'm 
plugging in that amount on the liability side of the balance sheet under the 
category note payable shareholders' trust. 
C. Value. 
When I add up these numbers, I get a total liability of $1, 358,942.57. I get 
a total assets of $4, 240,696.16, for an equity of $2,881,753.59. Both parties agree 
that Nancy owns 9.06% of the shares. By arithmetic calculation that is 
$261,086.91. That's what her shares are worth. 
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I've been asked to reduce the value of her shares in recognition that [the 
balance sheet doesn't state anywhere] that the real estate if it is sold will have to 
be sold paying someone a brokerage commission and that I should say the 
brokerage commission would be 10%. Well, I don't know whether the brokerage 
commission would be 6% or 8% or 10%. Moreover, there are assets of this 
corporation in the amount less than Nancy's share of the corporation, that would 
not involve the sale of any real estate. 
They have also asked me to take into account that capital gains taxes would 
have to be paid on the sale of the property. I would make the same point about 
that—we don't know that real estate would have to be sold in order to pay her. 
There's a second point on that. My understanding of the law with respect to 
corporate dissolution and liquidation is that, if the corporation makes the decision 
to liquidate or dissolve itself, and it chooses to do so all at one time, and pay 
whatever is left to the shareholders, that this double taxation, being taxed on the 
corporate level and then again at the shareholder level, can be eliminated. I think 
it is a 351 liquidation. That is what was originally asked for by Nancy and her 
cohorts. And Mi Vida is within its rights to say it doesn't want to do that, but it 
keeps telling me all it has is real estate. So, I find myself asking if all it has is real 
estate, what is the problem with doing that? It just doesn't want to and it doesn't 
have to if it doesn't want to—that's Utah law. But, because it doesn't want to and 
doesn't have to doesn't mean that Nancy ought to be required to reimburse them 
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for a tax they choose to pay by virtue of their decision not to liquidate and make a 
liquidating distribution to all shareholders. 
So, the value of her share in Mi Vida, is not going to be reduced by any 
allowance for real estate commissions or income taxes that would have to be paid 
by the corporation upon the sale of some of its property. 
V. Attorneys Fees 
A. Credibility 
I really am pretty clear about what happened to this corporation, as set forth 
in the Historical facts above. But, I need to tell you, first of all, with regard to 
items which are contradicted, what I believe the truth to be. Some of the conflict 
between what the two antagonists here, Mark Steen and Nancy Steen Adams, say, 
can be attributed to perspective and perception and spin—that does not amount to 
dissembling. They just see things differently. They have looked at this from a 
different perspective for a long time. They have different things that matter to 
them. That's understandable and I am not inclined to treat either of them harshly 
because of that, but there are a few things where I just have to decide what I think 
because they [Mark and Nancy] are absolutely at odds as to what happened. 
And where that is the case, I find Mr. Steen's account to be more credible 
than Nancy Steen Adams' account. Now, I do not pretend any particular genius in 
discerning the truth. The only thing that I can bring to this process is that I don't 
really care who wins in this case, but as I've listened, I have been more persuaded 
of the honesty of Mark Steen than of Nancy Steen Adams. There are two reasons 
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for that. One of them is that, I just do not believe that Sherman & Howard would 
say they sent the 1994 shareholder meeting notice to her at an address she'd given 
to them when in fact they hadn't, and I do not believe that she was so uninvolved 
in the decisions that Reiman & Bayaz [her attorneys] made in late 1998 and early 
1999 as she claims in her testimony in this court, because of what I see in the 
billing sheets of Reiman & Bayaz. She may not have been the client they say they 
saw the most, but she appears to be a very interested client with whom they were 
in frequent communication, and what's more, she'd shown a great deal of interest 
even before the filing of the lawsuit. 
So, I do not believe this portrayal of herself as someone who was simply 
invited by Charles Jr. to join in at the lawsuit at the last second before the filing 
because it looked like the best chance to get money. She was very interested and 
very forward and aggressive before that time. I thought she was very well up to 
date and involved with those decisions and well informed of those. 
B. Additional Facts Bearing on Fee Issues 
It turns out that Junior really wasn't in a very good position to be claiming 
his Mi Vida stock because he filed bankruptcy and failed to list it as an asset; 
failed to list Mi Vida' debt to him as an asset, and discharged all of his obligations. 
By accident, Mi Vida found out about that and consequences followed, the 
most important of which was that Junior no longer had anything to gain from 
participating in this lawsuit. 
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Nancy has a choice to make at this time: does she go on with the lawsuit, 
does she abandon it entirely, or does she view the lawsuit in a different light? 
I would expect that, after an ex-husband who cheated you out of your share 
of two assets he promised you in a divorce and then comes to you with a way to 
get money on the third asset you got out of the divorce, turns out have been 
fraudulent, that all of his allegations would be perceived as deserving a very 
careful scrutiny. 
But I've heard no evidence of any careful scrutiny by Nancy Adams of 
Junior's allegations. In fact, the next thing that I see in the record is a full blown 
acceptance of all his allegations. When reminded that some of those are patently 
false, she drops those that are patently false and accepts all the others. 
Then, she changes lawyers. There is a pause in the litigation. Everybody 
has a chance to kind of clear their heads and consider everything. A decision is 
made to bring the lawsuit entirely to Utah. 
I could have stopped that. From a personal level if I could have stopped it; 
I would have. I would have been happy to have you folks litigate the derivative 
issues in Colorado, and for me to be left with just the valuation issues and the 
Maxine Boyd mortgage. 
But there was an opportunity to drop the derivative actions and proceed in 
Utah simply as a dissident shareholder buyout, and it was contemplated in the 
Settlement Agreement that a new analysis of all that would be undertaken—an 
examination of that—and it would be freshly looked at and a decision would be 
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made. And, if the decision was made not to pursue the derivative allegations, then 
any complaint that Mi Vida or Mark Steen might have had over what had 
happened in Colorado (or even what had happened to that point in Utah) would 
have been dropped and we would simply proceed with this case as a valuation 
case. 
Nancy made a decision to go forward with the derivative claims and that 
opened up again the right of Mi Vida to assert that it was entitled to recover its 
fees from her. 
VI. Discussion on Fees 
And now I have to decide whether I think attorneys fees should be awarded 
to Mi Vida or to Mark Steen. I guess Mi Vida has to pay Mark Steen's attorneys 
fees—everything really is to Mi Vida, for these different aspects of the litigation 
that were pursued by Nancy. 
The most lenient standard for Mi Vida is the standard under the derivative 
action statute which says that if it turns out a shareholder did not have reasonable 
cause for a derivative action that attorney fees should be awarded to the 
corporation. 
There is good reason for that to be a more lenient standard than the 
generally applicable standard of Rule 11 or 78-27-56. Ordinarily, the corporation 
is supposed to make its own decisions through its democratic processes. I don't 
want to be a shareholder of a corporation whose decisions are made by a judge 
after a lawsuit. So there has got to be a presumption of validity to all of the 
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actions of the directors and officers, and you have to get over that presumption in 
order to proceed at all. And if you allege those kinds of things without having any 
reasonable basis for doing so, and thereby inflict legal costs on the corporation, it 
is no comfort to the remaining shareholders that you have your own legal costs. 
They are still going to suffer. On the other hand, if you are doing something that 
is helpful to the corporation, that is actually benefiting the other shareholders, then 
they shouldn't get a free ride on your efforts—they should have to pay a portion of 
your attorneys fees—and so that is why Nancy is claiming attorneys fees in this 
case. She wants me to award her attorneys fees because of the benefit that all of 
the remaining shareholders of the corporation are getting, and they shouldn't be 
permitted to piggy-back on her. 
A. Nancy's Rights to Recover Fees. All of Nancy's derivative claims 
were dismissed; the corporation and the remaining shareholders got no benefit as a 
result of that; so, unless it turns out I am wrong on appeal, that's no benefit to the 
corporation, and I have to proceed on the assumption that I was right. If I proceed 
on any other assumption, I should change my decision. So, all of the effort she's 
put into the derivative action, she shouldn't recover her attorneys fees for. 
Then we have Nancy's efforts to value the corporation. How did they 
benefit the other shareholders? Her efforts to get a fair valuation of the shares of 
the corporation. Well, what benefit is there there? She persuaded me that the 
shareholder advances had to carry interest. She persuaded me that the mine 
production advances were not a bona fide liability of the corporation. She 
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persuaded me that the amount payable to the four boys was too high by 
approximately $300,000. She persuaded me that the amount owing to Knutson 
was too high. 
She asserted some things that I didn't accept and imposed costs on the 
corporation of asserting the contrary, successfully. I also think it is likely that, if 
that is all that this case had been about, the corporation would have readily agreed 
to those demands. They may have been playing hardball on those simply because 
she was also playing hardball. So, in the end, I am persuaded that, as I balance the 
effort that went into the valuation questions on her side with the effort that went 
into the valuation on the corporation's side, neither of them should receive 
anything from the other with respect to valuation efforts. That was a draw. 
Next is the issue of the disproportionate loans to shareholders. Should 
Nancy be entitled to recover her fees for prosecuting a claim that produced no 
positive recovery? Or perhaps she's entitled not to have to pay anything for what 
the corporation spent to defend that because it is indefensible conduct. I don't 
think she can get credit for the time she spent while she was involved with Junior, 
because he was a co-perpetrator with the corporation. She should have distanced 
herself from him if that was something she seriously pursued. I can't imagine that 
we could even dissect or tease out of the billings if there was any effort on the part 
of Reiman & Bayaz on that issue because any effort at all would have immediately 
disclosed that he was as complicit as the corporation in any of that. I think the 
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most I can do for her is to call that a draw as well, and not allow the corporation to 
recover from her anything it spent to defend against that. 
B. Mi Vida's Attorneys Fees for the Dissolution, Receivership and 
Derivative Claims. 
1. The Legal Basis. As I sit back and analyze the question, was there 
reasonable cause to ask this corporation to be placed in receivership, was there 
reasonable cause to ask for this corporation to be liquidated, was there reasonable 
cause to assert that one of the directors or one of the officers had spirited away 
assets belonging to the corporation, recognizing that this is an area where 
shareholders ought to proceed with caution because of the risk of inflicting injury 
on other shareholders if they suspect too much? I -this is the hardest part of my 
decision—but I think it was not reasonable. It was not reasonable for Charles 
Junior and Nancy and Monica to claim what they did when they filed the lawsuit 
in mid-1999 seeking liquidation and a receivership of this corporation. It was not 
reasonable to file it in Colorado. It was not reasonable to seek that relief at all, 
when the plain relief of having your shares valued was available. I do not think it 
was reasonable for them to have asserted the derivative claims they asserted. It is 
easy for me to reach that conclusion with regard to all of those derivative that were 
asserted except the Little and Rogers, Cosmos Resources claims, those claims that 
I ended up having to rule on summary judgment. The rest of the claims never 
should have been asserted. They are simply a matter of allowing one's suspicions 
to run away with oneself. They should never have been asserted in the first place, 
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obviously to me. And clearly should not have been asserted after the settlement 
agreement where it was agreed that everything would be resolved in Utah. I won't 
say anything more about those. 
The dispute that I actually ended up resolving on the motion for summary 
judgment is the one I have had to examine in most detail. I have tried to look at it 
from the perspective of Nancy and Charles Junior, but mostly from Nancy's 
perspective. Is it reasonable to believe that this corporation owns these mining 
claims in 1999 when your basis for your belief are discussions about an agreement 
at a shareholder's meeting in 1987 and 1989, agreements that were to lead to 
production and profits, when you know that production and profits never 
followed? When, if you are paying attention to the 1991 minutes, that it is 
obvious that that has been unraveled? 
It might have been reasonable to think, back then, that the corporation had a 
right to those things: that is, in 1987 or 1989 or 1991 or 1992, or 1994 maybe still 
to some extent, that the corporation had a right to those things. But to believe in 
1999, after what has expired previously, to believe that the corporation has a right 
to those things and could assert it despite the passage of so much time, I do not 
think is reasonable. You are supposed to.. .there is a reason for the statute of 
limitations, and the reason for statutes of limitation is not just to cheat people who 
wait too long. The reason for statues of limitation is we all need to know, with the 
things that we do, if there is someone who is aggrieved by what we do, within a 
reasonable amount of time so we can remember what it is about, or undo it before 
29 
it is too late, undo it at a time when the damage is not too horrendous, so that 
people don't get to take a wait and see attitude—wait to see whether it turns out be 
worth a lot of money. So, I don't think it was reasonable to believe in 1999 that 
they could pursue these claims about these events that had occurred in 1987 and 
1989. 
And obviously that was the concern of the attorneys right off the bat, and it 
gives me some pause that someone apparently as expert as Mr. Reiman thought he 
could go ahead with this. But, I'm not.. .1 have to evaluate it by my lights, and by 
my lights, it was not reasonable, to pursue, not with this corporation particularly 
with the history it had had. So, I am going to award Mi Vida its fees for defending 
against the derivative claims. 
Assessing fees for the attempt to dissolve Mi Vida in Colorado and for the 
appointment of a receiver against this Utah corporation, do not technically fall 
under the derivative statute, and must be based on an abuse of process, Rule 11 or 
§78-27-56 basis. And I find that there was an improper purpose and a lack of 
merit to the pursuit of the Colorado litigation in Colorado. 
2. The Allocation. Who is responsible for those? We've talked about joint 
and several liability. I believe that, with respect to the events that occurred when 
Junior was a litigant, that those are his responsibility with respect to his 
proportional share, and that that was taken into account when the settlement was 
reached with his bankruptcy trustee. The corporation said it had claims it was 
asserting against Junior, but those were rolled into the price that was paid for his 
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interest in the note and the interest in the corporation. So Nancy is only 
responsible for those expenses incurred before the departure of Junior from the 
litigation that are proportional to her interest, which was 35.714% of the 2,758,020 
shares represented in the Colorado Action. To the extent Monica becomes a 
shareholder of Mi Vida, Mi Vida has the right to set off Monica's proportional 
share (7.143%) of the fees incurred in the Colorado Action. Default judgment 
entered against Jennifer & Karen and they did not participate in the trial. Each has 
a .573% participation percentage and Mi Vida may offset their proportional share 
from the purchase price of their shares. Charles, III was a participant in the 
Colorado Action with a 7.143 % participation, and because he entered this case 
and submitted to the jurisdiction of this Court, judgment will enter against him for 
his percentage participation. 
For the fees incurred in the Utah Action, Nancy is solely responsible. 
C. Mark Steen's Fees 
1. Right to Indemnification. Initially in the Colorado Action, Mark Steen 
and Mi Vida were both represented by Thomas J. Finch, Esq. After the Dissident 
Shareholders threatened to disqualify Mr. Finch, separate counsel was obtained for 
the corporation. Mark Steen now seeks indemnification from Mi Vida for his fees 
and Mi Vida does not contest that it is liable pursuant to Utah law for such 
indemnification. Judgment shall enter against Mi Vida and in favor of Mark A. 
Steen in the amount of $162,965.17. Mark Steen is also entitled to reimbursement 
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from the Corporation for any advances made to pay for the costs and fees of Mi 
Vida. He has not asked that judgment enter on these amounts at this time. 
2. Defense of the Derivative Claims. 
Mark Steen incurred fees for which Mi Vida is statutorily liable; 
consequently, those fees are included in Mi Vida's damages. Nancy objects to the 
duplication of fees since both Mi Vida and Mark Steen had not only separate 
counsel, but local counsel as well. In the context of the Colorado Action, the 
Dissident Shareholders threatened to disqualify Thomas J. Finch, Esq. who 
initially undertook to represent both the officer and the corporation. Likewise, 
several times during the course of litigation, Nancy objected to Mi Vida's role in 
defending against the derivative actions. As noted in earlier orders, Nancy was 
prohibited from doing so by her entering into Stipulation II which placed Mi Vida 
in the role of an indemnitor of any judgment which Nancy might receive under the 
derivative claims; consequently, Mi Vida had standing to defend those claims. 
I cannot fault Mi Vida and Mark Steen for having a lawyer for each of them 
when that is something that the dissenting shareholders initially insisted upon and 
as a conceptual matter is required. You'd have to really stipulate to separate 
counsel, and I wish that had been done here. But I have no evidence that this is 
something that Nancy Steen raised at any earlier point, to say "hey, you know, I 
don't want to have to pay for two lawyers if I eventually have to pay for this so I'll 
agree that whatever conflict of interest there may t between the corporation and 
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Mark Steen, we'll address that in court. We're not going to bother the lawyers 
with them. That one lawyer can represent both of them." 
As to local counsel, I think it is necessary to have local counsel here as a 
general principal. I think it has a stabilizing effect on lawyers from out of state 
who probably are never going to see me again; that they are with lawyers who 
probably are going to have to see me again. And in hindsight, it might have been 
better for everybody to get Utah lawyers. Probably the learning curve that they 
ended up going through would have been less expensive than the expense of 
having additional local counsel and the expense of traveling these great distances 
for the hearings and the trial. But nobody knew that at when the matter was 
started, and it was hoped that something short of this day would lead to a 
resolution. And I can't fault the parties for that—can't fault people for hoping they 
will be able to resolve the dispute short of coming into a court and having a judge 
do it. So I am going to award fees incurred by Mark Steen in the categories in 
which fees are awarded and for both Mark Steen and Mi Vida for local counsel's 
work in those categories. 
D. Amounts. 
a) Colorado. Mi Vida produced evidence of $66,524 as the amount 
incurred in defending the Colorado Action. This amount shall be proportionally 
allocated as provided for above, with Nancy's proportional share of Mi Vida's 
fees at $23,749.70. 
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b) The Maxine Boyd Case. Mi Vida is asking for $11,808 for its 
involvement in obtaining a temporary restraining order preventing the Dissident 
Shareholders from pursuing their dissolution and receivership actions in Colorado 
and $2958 in fees incurred by Mi Vida in its successful effort to obtain access to 
the corporate funds in the Court registry Those were both separate and apart from 
the derivative action. I would award those amounts under the same theory— 
pursuit for an improper purpose of the Colorado Action, and resisting, for an 
improper purpose, access of the corporation to money. So, those are $11808 and 
$2958, and I will award those to Mi Vida. 
c) The Derivative Claims. Mi Vida is also seeking for its defense of the 
derivative action $103, 467.00. I'm going to award that as well. 
d) Fees on Fees. For pursuit of its fees, $9,187.50. I think if you are 
entitled to fees, you are entitled to pursue fees. But I have to discount that for the 
fact that they didn't get all the fees they did pursue. So, I will reduce that amount 
to $7,000, which I think is a roughly proportional reduction. 
e) Trial Preparation and Attendance. Then, for the trial preparation and 
attendance, which were not included in the earlier breakdown, Mi Vida is asking 
me to make a rough apportionment of 75% for the derivative action, for pursuit of 
fees for the derivative action as opposed to valuation. That sounds about right 
from what I have seen of Mi Vida's efforts in this court. The 75% comes out to a 
total of $19,755 for Mi Vida's out-of-state counsel and $7796.25 for local counsel, 
for a total of $27,551.25 for Mi Vida. 
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before that date, and $14,076.39 after, for a foil award of $14,485.03 in costs 
against Nancy, and $83.40 against Charles, III and Monica (set-off only). 
VIII. Set Off 
Mi Vida's obligation to purchase the shares of Nancy, Karen and Jennifer 
will be off-set against any judgment in Mi Vida's favor. Thus, the judgment if 
favor of Eleanor Ruth Ciddio Steen Adams and against Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc. 
for the value of her shares in the amount of $261,086.88, will be offset by the 
judgment in favor of Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc. and against Eleanor Ruth Ciddio 
Steen Adams in the amount of $329,710. 
WHEREFORE, judgment shall enter as follows: 
In favor of of Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc. and against Eleanor Ruth Ciddio 
Steen Adams in the amount of $68,623.96, to accrue interest at the statutory rate. 
Ms. Adams shall, within ten (10) days of the entry of this order, return the original 
shares of Mi Vida. Effective immediately, Mi Vida may cancel the shares of 
Eleanor Ruth Ciddio Steen on its books. 
In favor of Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc. and against Charles A. Steen, III in the 
amount of $8,950.55. 
In favor of Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc. and against Monica Steen as an off-set 
only in the event she, her successors or assigns claims any interest in Mi Vida, in 
the amount of $8,950.55. 
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Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc. has ninety (90) days from the date of this order to 
purchase the shares of Karen and Jennifer by sending them funds by check in the 
amount of $3292.00 each, by certified mail, return receipt requested, to their last 
known address. Upon mailing the funds, Mi Vida may cancel the shares on the 
books of the company. 
Dated thisX^day of September, 2003. 
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GREGORY „. CLIP-TON 
" - C M A S MORRIS 
August 9, 1994 
VIA UPS 
Bart J. Bailey, Esq. 
Bradford, Brady & Rasmussen, P.C. 
3S9 North University Avenue 
Provo, UT 84601 
Re: Steen Family Matters 
Dear Bart: 
I have received a written authorization from Mark Steen to 
execute the additional disbursement checks (copy attached) and 
here enclose checks for Charles, Jr., Charles Jr. for the benefit 
of Andy Steen, and Maxine Boyd. 
Because I am in the middle of two weeks of depositions, I am 
not able to make a lengthy reply to your letter. I do note that 
I will be in a Pretrial Conference on the 24th, but available on 
the 25th of August. 
You refer in your letter to my report concerning the 
prospective Federal income tax liability for Mi Vida for the year 
of sale. As I pointed out, this was merely a restatement of the 
preliminary report that Mi Vida?s accountant has given to Mark; I 
had Mark re-confirm this with the accountant* Unless the 
accountant was simply wrong, this information was accurate. I 
have recommended that the accountant be called upon to make a 
written report to the parties as part of preparing the 1993-94 
year taxes. 
I feel that I must continue to express concern to the Mi 
Vida Directors and the other family members on a number of items. 
I believe that the disbursements made to date, and those made in 
the future, must be rationalized based on the status of the 
recipient, either as a mortgage holder and/or shareholder and/or 
as a contractee. To the extent that disbursements are made to 
shareholders or third parties, the interests of all shareholders 
must be protected, and all shareholders should be treated fairly 
and in similar fashion. 
6\steen\aai1ey# 
Brad J. Bailey, Esq. 
August 9, 1994 
Page 2 
The corporation should also act to properly credit the funds 
against corporate obligations, whether they be payments on Notes 
or contractual commitments. A determination should be made as to 
whether payments are due to persons based on their status as 
shareholders, in order to assure consistent, uniform and fair 
treatment based on that status. 
Until such time as we might resign, you and I have agreed to 
act as "stakeholders" for the Mi Vida funds from property sales 
at Mcab, of which the first recently occurred. We act as 
directed by Charles, Jr. and Mark acting jointly. The Mi Vida 
directors must still be aware, however, of the likely existence 
of fiduciary obligations in directing you and I to sign checks 
and to thereby disburse funds on behalf of the corporation. 
I have never undertaken to give Mi Vida advice in the 
corporate realm, and would defer to Rodney Knutson in this arena. 
Still, I cannot emphasize strongly enough just how unavoidable 
fiduciary obligations are in dealing with issues of corporate 
management and shareholder treatment. I would recommend that you 
consult with counsel as to how to treat these matters, and to 
learn the extent of your obligations to each other and to other 
shareholders. 
I hope to be able to communicate at greater length when I 
emerge from"litigation. 
Very truly yours, ; 
VRANESH AHS RAISCH, LLC 
. /TO -
'John R. Henderson 
JRH 
Attachments 
cc: Steen Family Members 




Keith H. Chiara #0621 
Chiara Law Offices 
98 North 400 East 
P.O. Box 955 
Price, UT 84501 
Telephone (435) 637-7011 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COUH'i 
Grand Count/ 
*HH> NOV \ 5 20Qfl 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
8Y_ 
Deputy 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MAXTNE S. BOYD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MI VTDA ENTERPRISES, a Utah 
Corporation, CHARLES A. STEEN, SR., 
CHARLES A. STEEN JR., ANDREW K. 
STEEN, JOHN C. STEEN, MARK A. 
STEEN and JOHN DOES 1-20, 
Defendants, 
REVISED ORDER FOR DIRECTION 
OF MONIES HELD IN REGISTRY OF 
THE COURT 
Civil No. 9907-145 
Judge Lyle Anderson 
THIS MATTER, having come before the Court on the Motion of Mi Vida 
Enterprises, Inc. for the use of funds currently held in the registry of the Court in this 
action, and the matter having come on before the Court for hearing on October 12, 2000 
and the Court having detennined that the funds should be released for the specific 
purpose of settling matters between Mi Vida and the bankruptcy estate of Charles A. 
Steen, Jr. and Jayne Steen; 
&U;V \»33 "^ T 
o : z "• zooo 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court release the funds by 
making one check in the amount of $31,637.62 payable to Theodor C. Albert, Chapter 7 
Trustee of the estate of In re Charles Augustus Steen and Jayne Marie Steen, at the 
following address: 
Theodor C. Albeit, Chapter 7 Trustee 
In re Charles A. Steen and Jayne M. Steen 
P.O. Box 1860 
Costa Mesa, CA 92628 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the remaining funds, if any, be sent to Mi 
Vida's counsel, Cynthia T. Kennedy, for application toward the obligation already 
incurred by Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc. in the amount of $6417.25 plus accrued interest to 
the date of payment, which funds were borrowed to make the first installment on the 
purchase the shares of Charles A. Steen. The check should be made payable to: 
Cynthia T. Kennedy, Esq. 
308 E. Simpson Street, #102 
Lafayette, CO 80026 
Any funds not used for such purposes will be escrowed by Ms. Kennedy for future 
payments on the obligation to the Trustee to purchase the shares. 
Dated this JslU day of November, 2000. 
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ALBERT, WEJLAND & GOLDEN, LLP 
Philip E. Strok #169296 
Saar Swartzon #198732 
650 Town Center Drive, Suite 1350 
Costa Mesa, California 92626 
Telephone: (714) 966-1000 
Facsimile: (714) 966-1002 
Attorneys for 
Theodor C. Albert, Chapter 7 Trustee 
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
SANTA ANA DIVISION 
In re 
CHARLES STEEN and JAYNE MARIE 
STEEN, 
Debtors. 
Case No. SA 98-26644 LR 
Chapter 7 Case 
MOTION FOR ORDER APPROVING 
COMPROMISE OF CONTROVERSY WITH 
Ml VIDA ENTERPRISES, INC. 
PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF 
BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 9019; 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES; DECLARATIONS OF 
THEODOR C. ALBERT AND SAAR 
SWARTZON IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
[No Hearing required Pursuant to Local 
Bankruptcy Rule 9013-1(7)(a)(xiii)] 
Theodor C. Albert, the chapter 7 trustee for the estate of Charles Steen and 
Jayne Marie Steen ("Debtors"), moves this Court for an order authorizing the 
Trustee to compromise a controversy with Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc. ("Mi Vida"), a 
Utah corporation, pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019. This 
motion ("Motion") is based upon the notice of motion, the following memorandum of 
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On January 19, 1999 ("Petition Date"), the Debtors filed a voluntary petition 
for relief under chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the "Bankruptcy 
Case"). Theodor C. Albert was subsequently appointed the chapter 7 trustee 
("Trustee") of the Bankruptcy Case. 
A. Trustee's No Asset Report 
Upon investigation and diligent inquiry by the Trustee, the Trustee determined 
that there were no assets or property of the estate to administer. Accordingly, on 
January 27, 1999, the Trustee requested that his no asset report be approved and 
that the Trustee be discharged from office and the Bankruptcy Case closed as a no 
asset case. The Debtors received their discharge on March 29, 1999 and the 
Bankruptcy Case was subsequently closed. 
B. Reopeninqoftbe Bankruptcy Case 
Subsequent to the Bankruptcy Case closing, the Trustee received additional 
information regarding undisclosed assets and requested that the Trustee's report be 
withdrawn and that the Bankruptcy Case be reopened for further administration of 
undisclosed assets. The undisclosed assets are comprised of the following: 
1. A one-fourth interest in a note and mortgage of which the 
Debtors are a beneficiary and Mi Vida is the obligor, wi th the one-fourth interest 
valued at approximately $60,202.76 as of the Petition Date; 
2. A claim by the Debtors to an assignment of mortgages from a 
third party, Ms. Maxine Boyd ("Boyd"); and 
3. Claims the Debtors have as a shareholders against Mi Vida or its 
officers and directors, individually or derivatively. 
WP9SS1028 2 MOTION 
04/11/2003 14:03 7145670016 JNS COPY SERVICE PAGE 04 
Boyd is a third party that claims a right to all real property of Mi Vida or in the 
alternative, to damages of over $19 million. Pursuant to information provided to the 
Trustee, if Boyd is successful on her damages claim, her recovery would far exceed 
any and all assets of Mi Vida. 
C. Mi Vida Enterprises. Inc. 
Mi Vida is a closely held family corporation in the business of mining, 
acquiring land for mining projects and developing real estate. It was started by 
Charles and M.L. Steen, and their four sons, one of which is the Debtor, Charles 
Steen. Pursuant to information received by the Trustee, it appears that Mi Vida was 
incorporated in Utah in or about 1973. Mi Vida owns real estate in Boulder County, 
Colorado and elsewhere. Mi Vida has been the scene of hostile family struggles over 
various assets of the corporation between numerous individuals, mostly family 
members, including the Debtors. The Debtors, collectively, own approximately 8.1 % 
of Mi Vida. 
The Trustee was originally contacted by the attorney for Mi Vida on or about 
May 18, 2000, concerning the fact that the Debtor apparently had not been entirely 
forthcoming on his schedules concerning his interests in Mi Vida. Counsel also 
alerted the Trustee that Mi Vida might have an interest in buying the estate's claim, 
as an alternative to litigation. In response, the Trustee was visited by Bart J, Bailey 
and William T. Jennings, Utah attorneys aligned with litigation interests adverse to 
Mi Vida, who attempted to explain the convoluted history and Debtor's peripheral 
involvement. The Trustee encouraged Mr. Bailey and Mr. Jennings to "make an 
offer" as an alternative to the estate negotiating with and selling to Mi Vida through 
counsel who had originally contacted the Trustee. The Trustee also received 
correspondence from Jeff Reiman, Esq., of Reiman & Bayaz, P.C., Denver attorneys 
aligned with Debtors and other family members in a case against Mi Vida in 
Colorado, 
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After about two months with no response forthcoming from Mr. Bailey and 
Mr. Jennings, the Trustee attempted to employ Reiman & Bayazf P.C.r located in 
Colorado to represent the estate in the litigation pending in Utah and Colorado. This 
effort proved fruitless as it developed not only that the fee demanded was too high 
but also (the Trustee later learned from Mi Vida's counsel) Mr. Reiman was 
prevented by various conflicts from immediate representation of the estate on any 
basis. 
The Trustee formulated the opinion that the complicated and protracted 
maelstrom of litigation already pending concerning Mi Vida would be something to 
avoid both from the perspectives of delay (the cases had already been ongoing for 
years) and from the perspective of expense (there was otherwise little or no money 
with which to finance litigation in the estate). While joining the litigation might 
potentially recover more money, the Trustee is concerned that the creditor body 
(only about $80,000 approx.) might prefer a percentage recovery as a sure thing 
within a reasonable time. The better part of valor dictated that the best possible 
deal should be struck with Mi Vida, who seemed the only party both financially able 
and inclined to seek a realistic business solution to the estate's claims. 
Mi Vida claims that there are outstanding issues as to Debtors' liability to 
Mi Vida for (1) shareholder advances in the amount of approximately $32,263 as of 
the Petition Date and (2) Debtors' liability for penalties and interest on taxes, 
tortuous interference and breach of fiduciary duty arising out of, but not limited to, 
the commencement of a dissolution and malicious receivership action against 
Mi Vida in the State of Colorado which claims are subject matter of two cases 
currently pending in the State of Utah; Maxine S. Bovd v. Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc., 
et_al., Civil No. 99 07-00145 PR (the "Maxine Boyd Case 1"), and Mi Vida 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Maxine Boyd, et al., Civil No. 00 07-00040 (the "Maxine Boyd 
Case 2"). As such, Mi Vida claims a right to set off any amounts allegedly due to 
the Debtors. 
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D. ^Withdrawal of Trustees1 s Report 
Pursuant to the application of Trustee and withdrawal of Trustee's report, an 
order was entered on June 19, 2000 by the Bankruptcy Court reopening the 
Bankruptcy Case to allow the Trustee to administer the undisclosed assets. 
H. TERMS OF THE COMPROMISE 
The parties wish to settle their differences without the expense, inconvenience 
and uncertainty of litigation and, therefore, the parties have entered into a settlement 
agreement ("Settlement Agreement"). A copy of the executed Settlement 
Agreement between the Trustee, on behalf of the estate, and Mi Vida is attached 
hereto as Exhibit " 1 . " A summary of the salient terms of the agreement provide 
that: 
A. The Settlement Agreement is subject to the 
Bankruptcy Court's approval; 
B. On or before the 10th calendar day after entry of 
final order of the Bankruptcy Court approving the 
Settlement Agreement (the "Effective Date"), Mi 
Vida agrees to pay to the Trustee $31,637.62 
("Settlement Funds") in full settlement of any 
potential claims the estate may have relatina to 
Mi Vida; y 
C. After the Effective Date and payment of the 
Settlement Funds and subject to certain overbid 
procedures as more particularly set forth below 
upon written notice by Mi Vida, the Trustee agrees 
to (1} execute and deliver to Mi Vida a quit claim 
deed to all of Mi Vida's real property and (2) execute 
a partial release of trust mortgage releasing any and 
all claims of the estate to the trust mortgage 
("Option 1"). At the option of Mi Vida, the Trustee 
shall, within a reasonable period of time, in lieu of 
Option 1, execute an assignment of trust note and 
mortgage documents ("Option 2") or execute an 
assignment of the Boyd Notes and Mortgages, to 
any third party Mi Vida chooses ("Option 3"). Such 
quit claim deed and any and all transfers and 
assignments made pursuant to either Option 1, 
Option 2 or Option 3 are on a "as-is," "where-i's," 
basis without any warranty or representation of any 
kind concerning the value and enforceability of any 
rights as against any third party. 
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D. The parties shall execute mutual releases for one 
another with respect to all claims between the 
parties. 
The Settlement Agreement is subject to the right of the Trustee to accept any 
overbids for the purchase of any and all claims of the estate against Mi Vida (the 
"Overbid Purchase") so long as the initial overbid is in the form of cash only and 
exceeds the amount of Settlement Funds by 5% (the "Overbid Price"). 
Notwithstanding the Overbid Purchase, Mi Vida shall not be precluded from 
overbidding the Overbid Price for the Overbid Purchase. Additionally, in the event of 
a successful overbid, the Overbid Purchase would be subject to any and all defenses 
and counterclaims whatsoever of Mi Vida. 
III. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS THE BEST INTEREST OF THE ESTATE 
AND IS AUTHORIZED BY RULE 9019 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF 
BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 provides in part that the Court 
may approve a compromise upon the proper motion by the Trustee and after a 
hearing on notice to the Debtor, all creditors, and all interested parties. 
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019(a) provides "on motion by trustee 
and after notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise of settlement. 
Notice shall be given to the creditors, the United States Trustee, the Debtor and 
indenture trustees as provided in Rule 2002 and to any other entity as the Court may 
direct." 
The Trustee does not anticipate opposition to this Motion and requests that 
this Motion be approved without a hearing pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 
9013-1 (7)(a)(xiii) to save administrative costs, 
WP9SS1026 6 MOTION 





























The standards to be applied to the approval of any settlement include: 
1. The probability of success on the litigation on its merits; 
2. The difficulties in collection on a judgment; 
3. The complexity of litigation involved, and the expense, 
inconvenience or delay occasioned by litigation; and 
4. The interest of creditors. 
In re A&C Properties. 784 F.2d 1377, 1380-81 (9th Cir. 1986) cert, den. Martin v. 
Robinson. 479 U.S. 854 107 S.Ct. 189 (1999). 
Although the Court is to consider the range of results in litigation, the Court's 
assessment does not require resolution of the issues, but only their identification, so 
that the reasonableness of the settlement may be evaluated. (Emphasis added) In re 
Hermitage. Inc.. 66 B.R. 7 1 , 72 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1996). 
(1) Probability of Success on Litigation 
The probability of success on the litigation is unknown. The Trustee is 
confident that the Debtor does own a one-fourth interest claim in the Mi Vida note, 
but is uncertain about the validity of assignment of mortgages from Boyd and 
potential claims against Mi Vida and/or its officers personally or derivatively. 
Nevertheless, the uncertainties of litigation, especially in light of the defenses raised 
by Mi Vida, may spell defeat for the Trustee in any adversary proceeding. A defeat 
would cost the estate's creditors any chance of recovering any funds. The estate 
would once again be deemed a no asset estate and there would be no distribution to 
the creditors. 
The issues presented would involve countless hours and significant sums to 
litigate, all without the certainty of success. The Trustee would be required to 
litigate issues involving contract, assignment and corporate law, based upon the 
laws of the states of Colorado and Utah. 
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(2) Complexity of Litigation and Expense 
Though the issues in this case are not necessarily novel, the litigation would 
be complex in that any claims the Trustee would assert would necessarily be based 
upon the laws of the states of Utah and Colorado, requiring the Trustee to hire 
experienced out of state counsel. Moreover, the Trustee would need to contend 
wi th the various defenses asserted by Mi Vida including, but not limited to, Mi Vida's 
right to set off any amounts claimed for shareholder advances and their claim for the 
Debtors1 tortious interference and breach of fiduciary duties pursuant to the filing of 
a dissolution and malicious receivership action. These factual and legal issues lead 
to significant uncertainty as to the outcome of any litigation and the Trustee's 
probability of success. 
Based upon Mi Vida's defenses, extensive discovery would be required, 
constituting a time consuming and financial burden to the Debtor's estate. Mi Vida 
intends to vigorously defend any action brought by the Trustee and offensively 
assert counterclaims against the Debtors. All of these factors would cause 
administrative expenses to escalate to the detriment of estate creditors. 
Accordingly, a settlement of these issues is the most appropriate action to resolve 
this matter for the benefit of all parties. 
(3) Interest of Creditors 
Unless the Trustee is successful in the prospective litigation, it is certain that 
no creditor would receive a distribution. These claims represent the sole asset of the 
estate and the only reason the Trustee sought to reopen the Bankruptcy Case. The 
Settlement funds will provide the estate with funds that may result in a significant 
distribution to the creditors, all of whom were scheduled to receive nothing if the 
Bankruptcy Case remained dosed. Now, for the first time, the creditor's have the 
opportunity to receive a distribution from the estate. Clearly, the Settlement 
Agreement is in the best interest of the creditors. 
WP9SS1028 MOTION 
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IV. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS FAIR AND REASONABLE AND IS IN THE 
BEST INTEREST OF THE ESTATE 
Based upon the foregoing, the Trustee believes that the compromise with 
Mi Vida is in the best interest of the estate and the creditors and the Trustee 
respectfully requests an order authorizing the Trustee to enter into the Settlement 
Agreement and approving the terms of the Settlement Agreement as agreed upon by 
the parties. 
V. CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, the Trustee respectfully requests this Court to enter an order: 
1. Authorizing the Trustee to enter into the Settlement Agreement 
attached hereto as Exhibit " 1 ; " 
2. Approving the terms of the Settlement Agreement; 
3. Authorizing the Trustee to execute any and all documents 
necessary to effectuate the terms of the Settlement Agreement; and 
4. Granting such other and further relief as the Court may deem 
necessary and proper. 
DATED: February £ 2001 Respectfully submitted, ALBERT, WpfL/5lND_J5l GOLDEN, LLP 
odor C. Albert, 
WP9SS1028 9 MOTION 
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DECLARATION OF THEODOR C. ALBERT 
I, Theodor C. Albert, declare: 
1. I am the chapter 7 trustee of the estate of Charles Steen and Jayne 
Marie Steen ("Debtors"). I am submitting this declaration in support of a motion for 
order approving compromise of controversy with Mi Vida Enterprises. All terms 
defined in the motion shall be incorporated herein by reference. I know each of the 
following facts to be true of my personal knowledge and, if called upon as a witness, 
I could and would competently testify wi th respect thereto. 
2. On January 19, 1999, the Debtors filed a voluntary petition for relief 
under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. I was subsequently appointed chapter 7 
trustee of the Debtor's chapter 7 case. 
3. Though I investigated and inquired into the whereabouts of any property 
and assets of the Debtor, I determined that there were no assets or property of the 
estate to administer. 
4. Pursuant thereto, on January 27, 1999, I requested that the Trustee's 
report be approved and that I be discharged from office and the Bankruptcy Case 
closed as a no asset case. 
5. Pursuant to my request and the Trustee's report, the Debtors received 
their discharge on March 29, 1999 and the Bankruptcy Case was subsequently 
closed. 
6. Subsequent to the Bankruptcy Case closing, I received additional 
information regarding undisclosed assets and requested that the Trustee's report be 
withdrawn and that the Bankruptcy Case be reopened for further administration of 
these undisclosed assets. The undisclosed assets are comprised of three distinct 
parts. 
(1) A one-fourth interest in a note and mortgage of which the Debtors are a 
beneficiary and Mi Vida is the obligor, with the one-fourth interest valued at 
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approximately $60,202.76 as of the Petition Date; 
A claim by the Debtors to an assignment of a certain mortgage from a third 
party known as Ms. Maxine Boyd ("Boyd"); and 
Claims that the Debtors have as a shareholders against Mi Vida or its officers 
and directors, individually or derivatively. 
7. Boyd is apparently a third party that claims the right to ad real property 
of Mi Vida, or in the alternative, to damages over $19 million. Pursuant to 
information provided to me, if Boyd is successful on her damages claim, her recovery 
would far exceed any and all assets of Mi Vida. 
8. In corresponding with counsel for Mi Vida, I have been informed that Mi 
Vida claims that there are a number of outstanding issues as to the Debtor's liability 
to Mi Vida for (1) certain shareholder advances in the amount of approximately 
$32,263 as of the petition date and (2) the Debtors' liability for penalties and 
interest on taxes, tortious interference and breach of fiduciary duty arising out of but 
not limited to the commencement of a certain dissolution or malicious receivership 
action against Mi Vida in the State of Colorado which claims are the subject matter 
of two cases currently pending in the State of Utah. Additionally, Mi Vida, according 
to their counsel, claims a right to set off any amounts due to the Debtors. 
9. The parties desire to settle their differences without the expense, 
inconvenience and uncertainty of litigation. As set forth in the Motion, the litigation 
would be complex, expensive to litigate and time consuming. I have carefully 
reviewed the strengths and weaknesses of our case with my counsel and negotiated 
the proposed settlement to maximize the assets for the creditors in light of: (1) the 
probability of success on the merits; (2) the complexity of litigation, the expense 
inconvenience and delay and (3) various other legal and factual issues relating to this 
matter. These factors are discussed in more detail in the attached motion. 
10. I have reviewed the Settlement Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit 
" 1 " and believe that the terms contained therein are fair and reasonable and in the 
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best interest of the estate. If I am unsuccessful in pursuing an action on behalf of 
the Debtors, it is unlikely that there would be any distribution to creditors since this 
case was previously closed as a no asset case and only reopened when the 
undisclosed assets were discovered. These assets will provide the estate with funds 
that may result in a significant distribution to creditors. A settlement of all claims 
between the estate and Mi Vida is a reasonable way to resolve the matter for the 
benefit of all parties. 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Executed this 6 r ^ d a y of February, 2001 , at Costa Mesa, California. 
(p.a^— 
ODOR C. ALBERT 
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DECLARATION OF SAAR SWARTZON 
!r Saar Swartzon, declare: 
1. I am an associate of the law firm of Albert, Weiland & Golden, LLP, 
attorneys of record for Theodor C. Albert, the chapter 7 trustee of the estate of 
Charles Steen and Jayne Marie Steen ("Debtors"). I am licensed to practice before 
this Court and the courts of the State of California. I am submitting this declaration 
in support of a motion for order approving compromise of controversy with Mi Vida 
Enterprises. AH terms defined in the motion shall be incorporated herein by 
reference. I know each of the following facts to be true of my own personal 
knowledge and, if called as witness, I could and would competently testify with 
respect thereto. 
2. I have personally reviewed all documents relating to the issues 
discussed in the Motion and I am thoroughly familiar wi th both the factual and legal 
claims supporting the Trustee's position. 
3. I am also thoroughly familiar with both the factual and legal claims 
supporting Mi Vida's position and have been informed by Mi Vida's counsel that Mi 
Vida intends to vigorously defend any and all claims of the Trustee and pursue 
counter claims against the Debtors based upon actions taken by them. To litigate 
these issues would be complex and expensive for the estate. Based upon the 
specific facts and legal claims the Trustee would need to assert, the Trustee would 
need to hire out of state counsel to proceed under the laws of the states of Utah and 
Colorado. Additionally, the Trustee would be required to take extensive discovery 
and spend a significant amount of time investigating the claims. Necessary 
discovery may very well require subpoenas to several individuals outside of the State 
of California. This discovery will be time consuming and a financial burden to the 
Debtors' estate. 
WP9SS1028
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4. The numerous factual and legal issues lead to a significant uncertainty 
as to the outcome of any litigation and the Trustee's probability of success. 
5. Both the Trustee and Mi Vida have indicated an intention to vigorously 
protect their respective positions. Administrative expenses will continue to mount to 
the detriment of unsecured creditors. Moreover, no distribution of the estate's 
assets to creditors will occur unless the Trustee is successful in the litigation. 
Accordingly, a settlement of all claims between the estate and Mi Vida is a 
reasonable way to resolve the matter for the benefit of all parties. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit " 1 M is a true and correct copy of the 
Settlement Agreement. 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Executed this G day of February, 2001 , at y^f ^/^^ , California. 
WPSS$1028
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ALBERT, WEILAND & GOLDEN, LLP 
Philip E. Strok #169296 
Saar Swartzon #198732 
650 Town Center Drive, Suite 1350 
Costa Mesa, California 92626 
Telephone: (714) 966-1000 
Facsimile: (714) 966-1002 
Attorneys for Theodor C. Albert, Chapter 7 Trustee 
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CLERK. U ^ BANKRUPTCY COURT 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY m i l t f r %mM-'mma'"S£231 
ENTERED 
MAR 12001 
CHARLES STEEN and JAYNE MARIE 
STJEEISI, 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
SANTA ANA DIVISION 
Case No. SA 98-26644 LR 
Chapter 7 Case 
Debtors. 
ORDER APPROVING COMPROMISE 
WITH Ml VIDA ENTERPRISES, INC. 
PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF 
BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 9019 
[No Hearing required Pursuant to Local 
Bankruptcy Rule 9013-1 (7)(a)(xiii)] 
Based on the Motion of Theodor C. Albert, the chapter 7 trustee ("Trustee") of 
the estate of Charles Steen and Jayne Marie Steen ("Debtors") for an order 
authorizing the Trustee to compromise a controversy with Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc. 
("Motion"), the notice of Motion, the declaration of Saar Swartzon regarding lack of 
opposition to the Motion, and good cause appearing therefrom, 
IT IS ORDERED that: 
1. The Motion is granted; 
2. The Trustee is authorized to enter into the Settlement Agreement 
attached hereto as Exhibit " 1 " and incorporated herein by reference; 
DECLARATIO 
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3. The terms of the Settlement Agreement are approved; 
4. The Trustee is authorized to execute any documents or take any actions 
reasonably necessary to effectuate the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 
DATED: (Wjk^ " 2 J O O \ 
iHfc-HUNUhABLE LYNNIE RIDDLE, 
United States Bankruptcy Judge 
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
This Settlement Agreement ("Agreement") is made, executed and entered into 
by and between the following parties, each of whom is individually referred to as a 
"Party", and all of whom are collectively referred to as the "Parties": 
1. Theodor C. Albert, solely in his capacity as chapter 7 trustee of the estate 
of In re Charles Augustus Steen and Javne Marie Steen. 
2. Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc. ("Mi Vida"), a Utah corporation. 
R E C I T A L S : 
A. On January 19, 1999, Charles Augustus Steen and Jayne Marie Steen 
(collectively the "Debtor") filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 7 of the 
United States Bankruptcy Code (SA 98-26644 LR) (the "Bankruptcy Case"). 
B. Theodor C. Albert ("Trustee") was subsequently appointed the chapter 7 
trustee in the Bankruptcy Case. 
C. Upon investigation and diligent inquiry by the Trustee into the whereabouts 
of property and assets of the Debtor, the Trustee determined that there was no property 
or assets in the estate. Pursuant thereto, on January 27, 1999, the Trustee requested 
that the Trustee's report ("Report") be approved and that the Trustee be discharged 
from office as the Bankruptcy Case was a no asset case. 
D. Pursuant to the Trustee's Report, the Debtor was discharged from the 
Bankruptcy Case on March 29, 1999 (the "Discharge") and the Bankruptcy Case was 
closed. 
E. Subsequently, the Trustee received additional information regarding an 
undisclosed asset and requested that the Trustee's Report be withdrawn and that the 
Bankruptcy Case be reopened for further administration of the undisclosed asset. 
F. The undisclosed asset was made up of three distinct parts: (1) a one-
fourth interest in a note and mortgage of which the Debtor is a beneficiary and on which 
Mi Vida is the obligor, with the one-fourth interest being valued at $60,20276 as of 
January 19, 1999; (2) a claim by the Debtor to an assignment of mortgages from a third 
party, Ms. Maxine Boyd ("Boyd"); and (3) claims the Debtor had as a shareholder 
against Mi Vida or its officers or directors individually or derivatively. 
G. Boyd is a third party that claims a right to all real property of Mi Vida or in 
the alternative to damages of over $19 million which if granted, would far exceed any 
and all assets of Mi Vida. 
H. Mi Vida claims that there is an outstanding issue as to the Debtor's liability 
to Mi Vida for (1) shareholder advances in the amount of $32,263 as of January 19, 
1999 and (2) Debtor's liabilities for penalties and interest on taxes, tortious interference 
and breach of fiduciary duty arising out of, but not limited to, the commencement of a 
dissolution and receivership action against Mi Vida in the State of Colorado which 
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claims are the subject matter of two cases currently pending in the State of Utah: 
Maxine S, Bovd v. Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc.. et aL Civil No. 9907-00-145 PR (the 
"Maxine Boyd Case 1") and Mi Vida Enterprises. Inc. v. Maxine S. Bovd, et aL. Civil 
No. 0007-00-040 (the "Maxine Boyd Case 2"). As such, Mi Vida claims a right to set-
off to any amount allegedly due the Debtor pursuant to Recital F. 
I. Pursuant to the application of Trustee and the withdrawal of Trustee's 
Report, an order was entered on June 19, 2000 by the Bankruptcy Court reopening the 
Bankruptcy Case. 
J. The Parties desire pursuant to this Agreement to once and forever settle 
any and all present and future claims, disputes, allegations and defenses of any kind or 
nature that any Party may have against any other Party, which may result from, relate 
to, or otherwise arise in connection with any matters referenced in this Agreement. 
K. "Effective Date" is defined as the tenth calendar day after entry of a Final 
Order of the Bankruptcy Court approving this Agreement. An order becomes a "Final 
Order" after 10 days of entry of the order, unless there is a notice of appeal filed within 
10 days and a stay pending appeal is obtained. No Effective Date shall occur if the 
Bankruptcy Court denies approval of the Motion. 
PURSUANT TO THE FOREGOING RECITALS and for good and valuable 
consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which is acknowledged, the Parties 
covenant, agree and declare as follows: 
ARTICLE 1. 
APPROVAL OF AGREEMENT BY COURT 
1.1- Obligation of Parties to Seek Approval of Agreement Each Party shall in 
good faith exercise all reasonable efforts which may be required of such Party to cause 
the bankruptcy court ("Bankruptcy Court") in the Bankruptcy Case to issue a final 
binding order approving this Agreement, including without limitation promptly executing 
and delivering any motions or declarations or other items of support that may be 
reasonably required in connection therewith. Notice of the hearing before said Court 
seeking the approval of this Agreement shall be served on all of the creditors in the 
Bankruptcy Case. 
1.2. Remainder of Agreement Contingent Upon Court Approval. All of the terms 
of this Agreement, with the sole exception of the terms set forth in this Article 1, are 
contingent upon the issuance of a final binding order by the Bankruptcy Court in the 
Bankruptcy Case approving the Agreement. If this Agreement is not approved pursuant 
to Section 1.1, then this Agreement shall automatically terminate and be of no further 
force or effect. 
WPSS1090 2 
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ARTICLE 2. 
TERMS OF SETTLEMENT 
2.1. Payment of Settlement Funds to Trustee. On or before the Effective Date, Mi 
Vida agrees to pay $31,637.62 ("Settlement Funds") to the Trustee in full settlement 
of any potential claim the estate (the "Estate") may have relating to Mi Vida. 
2.2. Deposit of Funds. Mi Vida agrees to deposit into the client trust account of 
Trustee's attorneys, Albert, Weiland & Golden, LLP ("AWG"), the Settlement Funds, on 
or before the execution of this Agreement by Mi Vida. The Deposit will be held in the 
AWG client trust account pending Bankruptcy Court approval of the Agreement. The 
Settlement Funds are non-refundable unless the Bankruptcy Court fails to approve the 
Agreement and Mi Vida is in compliance with §1.1 supra. 
2.3. Trustee's Duties to Mi Vida. After the Effective Date, payment of the 
Settlement Funds, and subject to § 2.4 infra , upon written notice by Mi Vida, the 
Trustee agrees to: (1) execute and deliver to Mi Vida a quitclaim deed to all of Mi Vida's 
real property and (2) execute a partial release of trust mortgage, releasing any and all 
claims of the Estate to the trust mortgage ("Option 1"), At the option of Mi Vida, the 
Trustee shall, within a reasonable period of time, in lieu of Option 1, execute an 
assignment of trust note and mortgage documents ("Option 2") or execute an 
assignment of the Boyd notes and mortgages, to any third party Mi Vida chooses 
(Option 3"). Such quitclaim deed and any and all other transfers and assignments 
pursuant to either Option 1, Option 2 or Option 3 are on an "as-is, where-is" basis 
without any warranty or representation concerning the value or enforce ability of any 
rights as against any third parties. Mi Vida shall prepare, in a form mutually acceptable 
to all Parties, any required documents to comply with this § 2.3. 
2.4. Overbid Procedure. This Agreement is subject to the right of the Trustee to 
accept overbids for the purchase of any and all claims of the Estate against Mi Vida 
(the "Overbid Purchase") so long as the initial overbid is in the form of cash only and 
exceeds the amount of Settlement Funds by five percent (5%) (the "Overbid Price"). 
Notwithstanding an Overbid Purchase, Mi Vida shall not be precluded from overbidding 
the Overbid Price for the Overbid Purchase. Additionally, in the event of a successful 
overbid, the Overbid Purchase would be subject to any and all defenses and 
counterclaims whatsoever of Mi Vida. 
ARTICLE 3. 
RELEASE OF CLAIMS 
Subject to the overbid procedure in § 2.4 supra and upon the Effective Date and 
only after compliance by Mi Vida with §§ 1.1, 2.1 through 2.3 supra, the following 
releases shall be effective: 
31 • Definition of a Claim for Purposes of this Article. For purposes of this Article 
3, "Claim" shall mean and refer to any claims, demands, rights, obligations, duties, 
debts, liens, encumbrances, levies, contracts, agreements, promises, covenants, 
understandings, damages, injuries, actions, causes of action, expenses, costs, charges, 
attorneys' fees, judgements, orders and liabilities of any kind, whether in law, equity or 
otherwise, whether known or unknown, and whether or not concealed or hidden. 
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3.2. Release of Claims bv Mi Vida. On the Effective Date and after receipt of the 
Settlement Funds, except for: (a) obligations which are created pursuant to this 
Agreement; (b) Claims, if any, which arise by reason of any breach or default of this 
Agreement; and (c) Claims, if any, which arise due to acts, errors or omissions which 
occur subsequent to the effective date of this Agreement: Mi Vida for and on behalf of 
themselves and their respective successors, assigns, grantees and administrators 
(collectively, the "Releasing Parties"), hereby now and forever release, discharge and 
promise not to sue the Estate and Trustee, individually and in his representative 
capacity, or any administrators, attorneys, heirs, successors, executors, trustees or 
assigns of said Parties (collectively, the "Released Parties"), from any and all Claims 
which said Releasing Parties may now own or hold, or have at any time prior hereto 
owned or held, or may in the future own or hold, against said Released Parties, 
resulting from, arising out of, or otherwise relating in any way to, the acts, errors, 
omissions, business, affairs, dealings and conduct relating to or arising out of the 
Bankruptcy Case or the facts cited in recitals A - J, including without limitation, the 
specific matters and disputes referenced in this Agreement. It is the intention of the 
Releasing Parties that by executing this Agreement, this Agreement shall be effective 
as a complete and absolute bar to each and every Claim which is referenced in this 
Agreement. In furtherance of this intention, the Releasing Parties hereby waive any 
and all rights and benefits conferred upon the Releasing Parties pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 1542 of the California Civil Code, which states as follows: 
"A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS WHICH THE 
CREDITOR DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO EXIST IN HIS FAVOR 
AT THE TIME OF EXECUTING THE RELEASE, WHICH, IF KNOWN BY 
HIM, MUST HAVE MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS SETTLEMENT WITH 
THE DEBTOR." 
3-3- Release of Claims bv Trustee. On the Effective Date and after receipt of the 
Settlement Funds, except for: (a) obligations which are created pursuant to this 
Agreement; (b) Claims, if any, which arise by reason of any breach or default of this 
Agreement; and (c) Claims, if any, which arise due to acts, errors or omissions which 
occur subsequent to the effective date of this Agreement; the Trustee for and on behalf 
of the Estate, (collectively, the "Releasing Party"), hereby now and forever releases 
discharges and covenants not to sue Mi Vida or any officers, directors, employees 
members, agents, affiliates, administrators, attorneys, heirs, successors executors 
trustees or assigns of said Parties (collectively, the "Released Parties") with respect 
to any and all Claims, the acts, errors, omissions, business, affairs, dealings and 
conduct relating to or arising out of the Bankruptcy Case or the facts cited in recitals A -
J, including without limitation, the specific matters and disputes referenced in this 
Agreement. It is the intention of the Releasing Parties that by executing this 
Agreement, this Agreement shall be effective as a complete and absolute bar to each 
and every Claim referenced in this Agreement. In furtherance of this intention the 
Releasing Parties hereby waive any and all rights and benefits conferred upon the 
Releasing Parties pursuant to the provisions of Section 1542 of the California Civil 
Code, which states as follows: 
"A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS WHICH THE 
CREDITOR DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO EXIST IN HIS FAVOR 
AT THE TIME OF EXECUTING THE RELEASE, WHICH, IF KNOWN BY 
K & ZUgJiSW* MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS SETTLEMENT WITH H i t DEBTOR. 
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3.4. Binding Effect To the fullest extent permitted by law, the terms of this 
Agreement, including all benefits derived by any Party pursuant to the terms of this 
Agreement, shall be binding on all of the Parties and on all of the creditors in the 
Bankruptcy Case. 
ARTICLE 4. 
REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES 
4.1. Legal Capacity to Contract Each Party represents that, subject to the entry of 
an order by the Bankruptcy Court approving of this Agreement pursuant to Section 1.1, 
it has the requisite power, authority and legal capacity to make, execute, enter into and 
deliver this Agreement and to fully perform its duties and obligations under this 
Agreement, and that neither this Agreement nor the performance by such Party of any 
duty or obligation under this Agreement will violate any other contract, agreement, 
covenant or restriction by which such Party is bound. 
4.2. No Prior Assignments. Each Party represents that it has not pledged, 
transferred or assigned to any third party any right, interest, claim, or cause of action 
being transferred, conveyed, released or compromised pursuant to this Agreement, 
and such Party shall indemnify all other Parties from and against any third party claim 
asserting such an pledge, transfer or assignment of any such right, interest, claim or 
cause of action. 
4.3. No Undisclosed Inducements. Each Party represents that it executed and 
entered into this Agreement in reliance solely upon its own independent investigation 
and analysis of the facts and circumstances, and that no representations, warranties or 
promises other than those set forth in this Agreement were made by any Party or any 
employee, agent or legal counsel of any Party to induce said Party to execute this 
Agreement. 
4.4. No Admission of Liability. This Agreement has been negotiated and executed 
for the purpose of settling the various disputes described herein and obtaining the 
release of any known, suspected or unknown claims that the Releasing Parties may 
have against the Released Parties with respect to the various disputes described 
herein. The execution of this Agreement by any Party does not constitute, infer or 
evidence the truth of any claim, the admission of any liability, the validity of any defense 
or the existence of any circumstance or fact which could constitute a basis for any 
claim, liability or defense, other than for the purpose of enforcing the terms and 
provisions of this Agreement. 
4.5. Representation bv Counsel. Each Party represents that it has acted pursuant 
to the advice of legal counsel of its own choosing in connection with the negotiation, 
preparation and execution of this Agreement, or that it was advised to obtain the 
advice of such legal counsel, had ample opportunity to obtain the 
advice of such legal counsel and willfully declined to obtain the 
advice of such legal counsel. 
4.6. Truth and Accuracy of Representations and Warranties. Each of the 
representations, warranties and covenants set forth in this Agreement shall be and the 
Party making the same shall cause them to be, true and correct as of the time of 
execution of this Agreement and as of the time of the entry by the Court pursuant to 
Section 1,1 of the order approving this Agreement. 
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4.7. Survival- Each of the statements, certifications, representations, warranties, 
covenants, disclosures, disclaimers, waivers and other agreements contained in this 
Agreement shall survive the execution of this Agreement, the payment of any 
settlement consideration provided for in this Agreement, and the dismissal of any legal 
actions referenced in this Agreement. 
ARTICLE 5. 
GENERAL TERMS AND PROVISIONS: 
5.1. Entire Agreement This Agreement shall constitute the sole and entire 
agreement between the Parties with respect to the settlement of disputes and release 
of claims provided for herein. Any and all prior or contemporaneous agreements and 
negotiations, whether oral or written, with respect to the subject matter of this 
Agreement, are hereby superseded. No employee or agent of any Party has authority 
to orally modify any term or condition of this Agreement, or to make any representation 
or agreement other than as contained in this Agreement. Unless any representation or 
agreement is contained in this Agreement or is added pursuant to a written agreement 
executed by all Parties, it shall not be binding nor otherwise affect the validity of this 
Agreement. 
5.2. Amendment of Agreement No modification of, deletion from, or addition to this 
Agreement shall be effective unless made in writing and executed by each Party hereto. 
5.3. Construction of Agreement The provisions of this Agreement shall be liberally 
construed to effectuate the intended settlement of the disputes and the release of all 
related claims. Section headings have been inserted for convenience only and shall not 
be given undue consideration in resolving questions of construction or interpretation. 
For purposes of determining the meaning of, or resolving any ambiguity with respect to, 
any word, phrase, term or provision of this Agreement, each Party shall be deemed to 
have had equal bargaining strength in the negotiation of this Agreement and equal 
control over the preparation of this document, such that neither the Agreement nor any 
uncertainty or ambiguity herein shall be arbitrarily construed or resolved against any 
Party under any rule of construction. 
5.4. Further Assurances. Each Party shall promptly execute any and all instruments 
and documents and take all other actions, including without limitation the payment of 
money, that may be required to effectuate the contemplated settlement and release. 
5.5. Gender and Quantitative Use. Wherever the context of this Agreement may so 
require, the gender shall include the masculine, feminine and neuter, and the 
quantitative usage of any word, term or phrase shall include the singular and plural. 
5.6. Enforcement of Agreement. Each Party to this Agreement shall have the right 
to enforce by proceedings at law or in equity all of the terms and provisions of this 
Agreement, including without limitation the right to prosecute proceedings at law or in 
equity against the person(s) who have violated or who are attempting to violate any of 
such terms or provisions, to enjoin such person(s) from doing so, to cause such 
violation to be remedied, and/or to recover damages for such violation. 
5.7. Waiver. The failure by any Party to enforce any term or provision of this 
Agreement shall not constitute a waiver of the right to enforce the same term or 
provision, or any other term or provision, thereafter. No waiver by any Party of any 
term or provision of this Agreement shall be deemed or shall constitute a waiver of any 
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other provision of this Agreement, whether or not similar, nor shall any such waiver 
constitute a continuing waiver unless otherwise expressly provided in writing. 
5.8. Severability. In the event that any term or provision of this Agreement is held by 
any court of competent jurisdiction to be illegal, invalid or unenforceable for any reason, 
then the remaining portions of this Agreement shall nonetheless remain in full force and 
effect, unless such portion of the Agreement is so material that its deletion would violate 
the obvious purpose and intent of the Parties. 
5.9. Litigation Coats and Attorneys' Fees. If any Party(s) shall commence legal 
proceedings against any other Party(s) to enforce the provisions of this Agreement or to 
declare any rights or obligations under this Agreement, then the prevailing Party(s) shall 
recover from the losing Party(s) its/their costs of suit, including attorneys' fees, as shall 
be determined by the court. 
5.10. Governing Law. This Agreement is made under and shall be construed in 
accordance with and governed by the laws of the State of California, without giving 
effect to the principles of conflicts of law. All Parties consent to the jurisdiction of the 
United States Bankruptcy Court - Central District of California, Santa Ana Division, for 
the purpose of resolving any disputes which may arise under this Agreement. If for any 
reason said Bankruptcy Court shall decline to accept such jurisdiction, then the Parties 
shall be deemed to have consented to the jurisdiction of California Courts and to venue 
in Orange County, California. 
5.11. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in any number of identical 
counterparts, each of which is an original, and all of which together constitute one and 
the same agreement. 
5.12. Inurement. This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of and be fully binding 
upon each of the Parties and upon their respective heirs, executors, successors, 
assigns and grantees. 
5.13. Notices. Any payments to be made or any notices or other communications to 
be given pursuant to this Agreement shall be delivered to the appropriate Party at the 
address shown below, until written notice of a different address is given by such Party 
in accordance with this Section. Any payments to be made pursuant to this Agreement 
shall be deemed made only upon actual receipt. Any notices or other communications 
must be in writing. Any notices or other communications given by personal service shall 
be deemed to have been received upon delivery. Any notices or other communications 
given by first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the address required by this 
Section, shall be deemed to have been received three Business Days following the 
deposit thereof with the United States Post Office. Any notices or other 
communications given by overnight courier service shall be deemed to have been 
received on the date of delivery confirmed by the courier service. Any notice give by 
facsimile transmission shall be deemed to have been received on the dated upon which 
the recipient's facsimile machine electronically confirms the receipt of such notice, 
provided that a copy of any such notice given by facsimile transmission shall also'be 
sent to the recipient by first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the address 
required by this Section. Telephone numbers, if listed below, have been listed for 
convenience purposes only, and not for the purposes of giving notice pursuant to this 
Agreement 
WVPSS1090 7 
EXHIBIT I PAGE _£ 
04/11/2003 13:55 7145670016 JNS COPY SERVICE PAGE 12 
THEODOR C. ALBERT, TRUSTEE 
P.O. Box 1860 
Costa Mesa, CA 92628 
Telephone: (714) 966-1000 
A COPY OF ANY NOTICE TO THE TRUSTEE MUST ALSO BE SENT TO: 
Albert, Weiland & Golden, LLP 
Attention: Saar Swartzon 
650 Town Center Drive - Suite 1350 
Costa Mesa, California 92626 
Telephone: (714) 966-1000 
Facsimile: (714) 966-1002 
A COPY OF ANY NOTICE TO THE TRUSTEE MUST ALSO BE SENT TO: 
Ml VIDA ENTERPRISES 
Mi Vida Enterprises, a Utah corporation 
Attention: Mark A. Steen, Vice President 
A COPY OF ANY NOTICE TO Ml VIDA MUST ALSO BE SENT TO: 
Kennedy & Kennedy, P.C. 
Attention: Cynthia T. Kennedy 
308 E. Simpson Street, Suite 102 
La Fayette, CO 80026 
Telephone: (303) 604-1600 
Facsimile: (303) 604-1601 
[SIGNATURE PAGE FOLLOWS] 
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OCT 16. 2000 2:39PM ALBERT WEILAND I GOLDEN LLP NO. 5 7 7 6 P. 3 
THE UNDERSIGNED PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMF. IT have made, executed 
and entered Into this Agreement. 
"Trustee" 
The'odor C. Albert, solely In nis 
capacity as chapter 7 trustee o: 
the estate of Charles A. Steen and Javne. A. Steen 
"Mi Vlda Enterprises, Inc." 
Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc., a Utah ccrp: ration: 
Mark A. Steen 
Vice President 
By: 
~"oYm C. S t e e n , S e c r e t a r y 
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THE UNDERSIGNED PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT have made, executed 
and entered into this Agreement. 
"Trustee" 
By: 
Theodor C. Albert, solely in his 
capacity as chapter 7 trustee of 
the estate of Charles A. Steen and Jayne M. Steen 
"Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc." 
Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc., a Utah corporation: 
By: 
Charles A. Steen 
Vice President 
By: 
"*•*»•* EXHIBIT—-/ PAGE !?~ 





























PROOF OF SERVICE 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE 
I am employed in the County of Orange, State of 
California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within 
action; my business address is 650 Town Center Drive, Suite 1350, 
Costa Mesa, California 92626 
On February 26, 2001, I served the foregoing documents 
described as ORDER APPROVING COMPROMISE OF CONTROVERSY WITH MI 
VIDA ENTERPRISES, INC. PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF BANKRUPTCY 
PROCEDURE 9019 on the interested parties in this action by placing 
a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed as 
follows: 
SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST 
X (BY MAIL) I caused such envelope with postage thereon 
fully prepaid to be placed in the United States mail at Costa 
Mesa, California. 
(BY PERSONAL SERVICE) I caused such envelope to be 
delivered by hand to the offices of the addressee. 
(VIA TELECOPY) I caused the above-mentioned document(s) 
to be telecopied to the parties named on the attached list. 
(BY FEDERAL EXPRESS) I caused such envelope to be 
delivered via Federal Express. 




I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws 
of the State of California that the above is true 
and correct. 
I declare that I am employed in the office of a 
member of the bar of this court at whose direction 
the service was made. 
Deanna Morris 
Signature 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
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SERVICE LIST 
U.S. Trustee 
Ronald Reagan Federal Bldg. 
411 W. 4th St,, Suite 9041 
Santa Ana, CA 92701-8000 
Charles Augustus Steen 
Jayne Marie Steen 
8416 San Carloso Way 
Buena Park, CA 9 0620 
Debtors 
Andrew H. Lund, Esq. 
Law Office of Andrew H. Lund 
3 54 West Ocean Blvd. 
Long Beach, CA 90802 
Atty» for Debtors 
Cynthia T. Kennedy, Esq. 
Kennedy & Kennedy, P.C. 
3 08 E. Simpson Street, Suite 102 
Lafayette, CO 80026 
Attys. for Mi Vida Enterprises 
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NOTE TO THE USERS OF THIS FORM: 
Phyeically attach this form as the last pngc of. the proposed Order or Judgment 
Do not file this form as a separate doevmcDt. 
(Short Title) C h a p t e r 7 Case Number 
IN RE CHARLES STEEN SA 9 8 - 2 6 6 4 4 LR 
NOTICE OP ENTRY OP JUDGMENT OR ORDER 
AND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
TO ALL PARTIES IN INTEREST ON THE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST: 
1. You are hereby notified that a judgment or order entitled (specify): 
ORDER APPROVING COMPROMISE WITH MI VIDA ENTERPRISES, INC. PURSUANT TO 
FEDERAL RULE OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 9019 
was e n t e r e d on (specify date) : MAR - 1 2001 
2. I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of this notice and a true copy 
of the order or judgment to the persons and entities on the attached 
service list on (specify date) : ^ „ ,.--, 
MAR - 1 2001 
DATED: fl^R ~ \ 2001 Jon D. Ceretto 
Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court 
By j 
Deputy Clerk 
2£? S/M iS o p t i O M l- Ir' h a s b e e n W « " * rcr use by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California. 
110 
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SERVICE LIST 
U.S. Trustee 
Ronald Reagan Federal Bldg. 
411 W. 4th St., Suite 9041 
Santa Ana, CA 92701-8000 
Charles Augustus Steen 
Jayne Marie Steen 
8416 San Carloso Way 
Buena Park, CA 90620 
Debtors 
Andrew H* Lund, Esq. 
Law Office of Andrew H. Lund 
3 54 West Ocean Blvd. 
Long Beach, CA 90802 
Atty. for Debtors 
Cynthia T. Kennedy, Esq, 
Kennedy & Kennedy, P*C. 
3 08 E. Simpson Street, Suite 102 
Lafayette, CO 80026 
Attys. for Mi Vida Enterprises 
Saar Swartzon, Esq. 
Albert, Weiland & Golden, LLP 
650 Town Center Drive, Suite 1350 
Costa Mesa, CA 92626 
Attys. for Chapter 7 Trustee 
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
This Settlement Agreement ("Agreement") is made, executed and entered into 
by and between the following parties, each of whom is individually referred to as a 
"Party", and all of whom are collectively referred to as the "Parties": 
1. Theodor C. Albert, solely in his capacity as chapter 7 trustee of the estate 
of In re Charles Augustus Steen and Javne Marie Steen. 
2. Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc. ("Mi Vida"), a Utah corporation. 
R E C I T A L S : 
A. On January 19,1999, Charles Augustus Steen and Jayne Marie Steen 
(collectively the "Debtor") filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 7 of the 
United States Bankruptcy Code (SA 98-26644 LR) (the "Bankruptcy Case"). 
B. Theodor C. Albert ("Trustee") was subsequently appointed the chapter 7 
trustee in the Bankruptcy Case. 
C. Upon investigation and diligent inquiry by the Trustee into the whereabouts 
of property and assets of the Debtor, the Trustee determined that there was no property 
or assets in the estate. Pursuant thereto, on January 27,1999, the Trustee requested 
that the Trustee's report ("Report") be approved and that the Trustee be discharged 
from office as the Bankruptcy Case was a no asset case. 
D. Pursuant to the Trustee's Report, the Debtor was discharged from the 
Bankruptcy Case on March 29, 1999 (the "Discharge") and the Bankruptcy Case was 
closed. 
E. Subsequently, the Trustee received additional information regarding an 
undisclosed asset and requested that the Trustee's Report be withdrawn and that the 
Bankruptcy Case be reopened for further administration of the undisclosed asset. 
F. The undisclosed asset was made up of three distinct parts: (1) a one-
fourth interest in a note and mortgage of which the Debtor is a beneficiary and on which 
Mi Vida is the obligor, with the one-fourth interest being valued at $60,202.76 as of 
January 19, 1999; (2) a claim by the Debtor to an assignment of mortgages from a third 
party, Ms. Maxine Boyd ("Boyd"); and (3) claims the Debtor had as a shareholder 
against Mi Vida or its officers or directors individually or derivatively. 
G. Boyd is a third party that claims a right to all real property of Mi Vida or in 
the alternative to damages of over $19 million which if granted, would far exceed any 
and all assets of Mi Vida. 
H. Mi Vida claims that there is an outstanding issue as to the Debtor's liability 
to Mi Vida for (1) shareholder advances in the amount of $32,263 as of January 19, 
1999 and (2) Debtor's liabilities for penalties and interest on taxes, tortious interference 
and breach of fiduciary duty arising out of, but not limited to, the commencement of a 
dissolution and receivership action against Mi Vida in the State of Colorado which 
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claims are the subject matter of two cases currently pending in the State of Utah: 
Maxine S. Boyd v. Mi Vida Enterprises. Inc.. et al.. Civil No. 9907-00-145 PR (the 
"Maxine Boyd Case 1") and Mi Vida Enterprises. Inc. v. Maxine S. Bovd. et al.. Civil 
No. 0007-00-040 (the "Maxine Boyd Case 2"). As such, Mi Vida claims a right to set-
off to any amount allegedly due the Debtor pursuant to Recital F. 
I. Pursuant to the application of Trustee and the withdrawal of Trustee's 
Report, an order was entered on June 19, 2000 by the Bankruptcy Court reopening the 
Bankruptcy Case. 
J. The Parties desire pursuant to this Agreement to once and forever settle 
any and all present and future claims, disputes, allegations and defenses of any kind or 
nature that any Party may have against any other Party, which may result from, relate 
to, or otherwise arise in connection with any matters referenced in this Agreement. 
K. "Effective Date" is defined as the tenth calendar day after entry of a Final 
Order of the Bankruptcy Court approving this Agreement. An order becomes a "Final 
Order" after 10 days of entry of the order, unless there is a notice of appeal filed within 
10 days a M a stay pending appeal is obtained. No Effective Date shall occur if the 
Bankruptcy Court denies approval of the Motion. 
PURSUANT TO THE FOREGOING RECITALS and for good and valuable 
consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which is acknowledged, the Parties 
covenant, agree and declare as follows: 
ARTICLE 1. 
APPROVAL OF AGREEMENT BY COURT 
1.1. Obligation of Parties to Seek Approval of Agreement. Each Parry shall in 
good faith exercise all reasonable efforts which may be required of such Party to cause 
the bankruptcy court ("Bankruptcy Court") in the Bankruptcy Case to issue a final 
binding order approving this Agreement, including without limitation promptly executing 
and delivering any motions or declarations or other items of support that may be 
reasonably required in connection therewith. Notice of the hearing before said Court 





- Remainder of Agreement Contingent Upon Court Approval. All of the terms 
of this Agreement, with the sole exception of the terms set forth in this Article 1 are 
contingent upon the issuance of a final binding order by the Bankruptcy Court in the 
Bankruptcy Case approving the Agreement. If this Agreement is not approved pursuant 
to Section 1.1, then this Agreement shall automatically terminate and be of no further 
force or effect. 
2
 EXHIBIT—Z_ PAnF IU 
04/11/2003 14:03 7145670016 JNS COPY SERVICE PAGE 21 
ARTICLE 2. 
TERMS OF SETTLEMENT 
2.1. Payment of Settlement Funds to Trustee. On or before the Effective Date, Mi 
Vida agrees to pay $31,637.62 ("Settlement Funds") to the Trustee in full settlement 
of any potential claim the estate (the "Estate") may have relating to Mi Vida. 
2.2. Deposit of Funds. Mi Vida agrees to deposit into the client trust account of 
Trustee's attorneys, Albert, Weiland & Golden, LLP ("AWG"), the Settlement Funds, on 
or before the execution of this Agreement by Mi Vida. The Deposit will be held in the 
AWG client trust account pending Bankruptcy Court approval of the Agreement. The 
Settlement Funds are non-refundable unless the Bankruptcy Court fails to approve the 
Agreement and Mi Vida is in compliance with § 1.1 supra. 
2.3. Trustee's Duties to Mi Vida. After the Effective Date, payment of the 
Settlement Funds, and subject to § 2.4 infra , upon written notice by Mi Vida, the 
Trustee agrees to: (1) execute and deliver to Mi Vida a quitclaim deed to all of Mi Vida's 
real property and (2) execute a partial release of trust mortgage, releasing any and all 
claims of the Estate to the trust mortgage ("Option 1"). At the option of Mi Vida, the 
Trustee shall, within a reasonable period of time, in lieu of Option 1, execute an 
assignment of trust note and mortgage documents ("Option 2") or execute an 
assignment of the Boyd notes and mortgages, to any third party Mi Vida chooses 
("Option 3"). Such quitclaim deed and any and all other transfers and assignments 
pursuant to either Option 1, Option 2 or Option 3 are on an "as-is, where-is" basis 
without any warranty or representation concerning the value or enforce ability of any 
rights as against any third parties. Mi Vida shall prepare, in a form mutually acceptable 
to all Parties, any required documents to comply with this § 2.3. 
2.4. Overbid Procedure. This Agreement is subject to the right of the Trustee to 
accept overbids for the purchase of any and all claims of the Estate against Mi Vida (the "Overbid Purchase") so long as the initial overbid is in the form of cash only and 
exceeds the amount of Settlement Funds by five percent (5%) (the "Overbid Price") 
Notwithstanding an Overbid Purchase, Mi Vida shall not be precluded from overbidding 
the Overbid Price for the Overbid Purchase. Additionally, in the event of a successful 
overbid, the Overbid Purchase would be subject to any and all defenses and 
counterclaims whatsoever of Mi Vida. 
ARTICLE 3. 
RELEASE OF CLAIMS 
Subject to the overbid procedure in § 2.4 supra and upon the Effective Date and 
only after compliance by Mi Vida with §§ 1.1, 2.1 through 2.3 supra the followina 
releases shall be effective: 
H . i De f i n i tJ0 .? o f a C l a i™ fP r P u r p ° s e s of this Article. For purposes of this Article 
f * L?.m s h a " m e a n a n d refer t 0 a n v c , a i m s , demands, rights, obligations duties 
debts, liens, encumbrances, levies, contracts, agreements, promises, covenants ' 
understandings, damages, injuries, actions, causes of action, expenses, costs charges 
attorneys fees, judgements, orders and liabilities of any kind, whether in law equity or ' 
otherwise, whether known or unknown, and whether or not concealed or hidden 
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3.2. Release of Claims bv Mi Vida. On the Effective Date and after receipt of the 
Settlement Funds, except for: (a) obligations which are created pursuant to this 
Agreement; (b) Claims, if any, which arise by reason of any breach or default of this 
Agreement; and (c) Claims, if any, which arise due to acts, errors or omissions which 
occur subsequent to the effective date of this Agreement: Mi Vida for and on behalf of 
themselves and their respective successors, assigns, grantees and administrators 
(collectively, the "Releasing Parties"), hereby now and forever release, discharge and 
promise not to sue the Estate and Trustee, individually and in his representative 
capacity, or any administrators, attorneys, heirs, successors, executors, trustees or 
assigns of said Parties (collectively, the "Released Parties"), from any and all Claims 
which said Releasing Parties may now own or hold, or have at any time prior hereto 
owned or held, or may in the future own or hold, against said Released Parties, 
resulting from, arising out of, or otherwise relating in any way to, the acts, errors, 
omissions, business, affairs, dealings and conduct relating to or arising out of the 
Bankruptcy Case or the facts cited in recitals A - J, including without limitation, the 
specific matters and disputes referenced in this Agreement. It is the intention of the 
Releasing Parties that by executing this Agreement, this Agreement shall be effective 
as a complete and absolute bar to each and every Claim which is referenced in this 
Agreement. In furtherance of this intention, the Releasing Parties hereby waive any 
and all rights and benefits conferred upon the Releasing Parties pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 1542 of the California Civil Code, which states as follows: 
"A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS WHICH THE 
CREDITOR DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO EXIST IN HIS FAVOR 
AT THE TIME OF EXECUTING THE RELEASE, WHICH, IF KNOWN BY 
HIM, MUST HAVE MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS SETTLEMENT WITH 
THE DEBTOR." 
3.3. Release of Claims bv Trustee. On the Effective Date and after receipt of the 
Settlement Funds, except for: (a) obligations which are created pursuant to this 
Agreement; (b) Claims, if any, which arise by reason of any breach or default of this 
Agreement; and (c) Claims, if any, which arise due to acts, errors or omissions which 
occur subsequent to the effective date of this Agreement; the Trustee for and on behalf 
of the Estate, (collectively, the "Releasing Party"), hereby now and forever releases, 
discharges and covenants not to sue Mi Vida or any officers, directors, employees, 
members, agents, affiliates, administrators, attorneys, heirs, successors, executors, 
trustees or assigns of said Parties (collectively, the "Released Parties"), with respect 
to any and all Claims, the acts, errors, omissions, business, affairs, dealings and 
conduct relating to or arising out of the Bankruptcy Case or the facts cited in recitals A -
J, including without limitation, the specific matters and disputes referenced in this 
Agreement. It is the intention of the Releasing Parties that by executing this 
Agreement, this Agreement shall be effective as a complete and absolute bar to each 
and every Claim referenced in this Agreement. In furtherance of this intention the 
Releasing Parties hereby waive any and all rights and benefits conferred upon the 
Releasing Parties pursuant to the provisions of Section 1542 of the California Civil 
Code, which states as follows: 
"A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS WHICH THE 
CREDITOR DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO EXIST IN HIS FAVOR 
AT THE TIME OF EXECUTING THE RELEASE, WHICH, IF KNOWN BY 
K S S£ST^y E MATER,ALl-Y AFFECTED HIS SETTLEMENT WITH Trie DEBTOR. 
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3.4. Binding Effect To the fullest extent permitted by lawt the terms of this 
Agreement, including all benefits derived by any Party pursuant to the terms of this 
Agreement! shall be binding on all of the Parties and on all of the creditors in the 
Bankruptcy Case. 
ARTICLE 4. 
REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES 
4.1. Leoal Capacity to Contract. Each Party represents that, subject to the entry of 
an order by the Bankruptcy Court approving of this Agreement pursuant to Section 1.1, 
it has the requisite power, authority and legal capacity to make, execute, enter into and 
deliver this Agreement and to fully perform its duties and obligations under this 
Agreement, and that neither this Agreement nor the performance by such Party of any 
duty or obligation under this Agreement will violate any other contract, agreement, 
covenant or restriction by which such Party is bound. 
4.2. No Prior Assignments, Each Party represents that it has not pledged, 
transferred or assigned to any third party any right, interest, claim, or cause of action 
being transferred, conveyed, released or compromised pursuant to this Agreement, 
and such Party shall indemnify all other Parties from and against any third party claim 
asserting such an pledge, transfer or assignment of any such right, interest, claim or 
cause of action. 
4.3. No Undisclosed Inducements. Each Party represents that it executed and 
entered into this Agreement in reliance solely upon its own independent investigation 
and analysis of the facts and circumstances, and that no representations, warranties or 
promises other than those set forth in this Agreement were made by any Party or any 
employee, agent or legal counsel of any Party to induce said Party to execute this 
Agreement. 
4.4. No Admission of Liability. This Agreement has been negotiated and executed 
for the purpose of settling the various disputes described herein and obtaining the 
release of any known, suspected or unknown claims that the Releasing Parties may 
have against the Released Parties with respect to the various disputes described 
herein. The execution of this Agreement by any Party does not constitute, infer or 
evidence the truth of any claim, the admission of any liability, the validity of any defense 
or the existence of any circumstance or fact which could constitute a basis for any 
claim, liability or defense, other than for the purpose of enforcing the terms and 
provisions of this Agreement. 
4
-5; Representation by Counsel Each Party represents that it has acted pursuant 
to the advice of legal counsel of its own choosing in connection with the negotiation 
preparation and execution of this Agreement, or that it was advised to obtain the ' 
advice of such legal counsel, had ample opportunity to obtain the 
advice of such legal counsel and willfully declined to obtain the 




- Truth and Accuracy of Representations and Warranto* Each of the 
p l P ^ 2 l a t , o r ] u , w a r r a n t i ^ s ,p n d covenants set forth in this Agreement shall be, and the 
Party making the same shall cause them to be, true and correct as of the time of 
SlSiS0? ? f ? 5 A 9 ^ e m e n t an.d a!u? f * » t j ™ of the entry by the Court pursuant to Section 1.1 of the order approving this Agreement. K 
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4.7. Survival. Each of the statements, certifications, representations, warranties, 
covenants, disclosures, disclaimers, waivers and other agreements contained in this 
Agreement shall survive the execution of this Agreement, the payment of any 
settlement consideration provided for in this Agreement, and the dismissal of any legal 
actions referenced in this Agreement. 
ARTICLE 5. 
GENERAL TERMS AND PROVISIONS: 
5.1. Entire Agreement This Agreement shall constitute the sole and entire 
agreement between the Parties with respect to the settlement of disputes and release 
of claims provided for herein. Any and all prior or contemporaneous agreements and 
negotiations, whether oral or written, with respect to the subject matter of this 
Agreement, are hereby superseded. No employee or agent of any Party has authority 
to orally modify any term or condition of this Agreement, or to make any representation 
or agreement other than as contained in this Agreement. Unless any representation or 
agreement is contained in this Agreement or is added pursuant to a written agreement 
executed by all Parties, it shall not be binding nor otherwise affect the validity of this 
Agreement. 
5.2. Amendment of Agreement. No modification of, deletion from, or addition to this 
Agreement shall be effective unless made in writing and executed by each Party hereto. 
5.3. Construction of Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement shall be liberally 
construed to effectuate the intended settlement of the disputes and the release of all 
related claims. Section headings have been inserted for convenience only and shall not 
be given undue consideration in resolving questions of construction or interpretation. 
For purposes of determining the meaning of, or resolving any ambiguity with respect to, 
any word, phrase, term or provision of this Agreement, each Party shall be deemed to 
have had equal bargaining strength in the negotiation of this Agreement and equal 
control over the preparation of this document, such that neither the Agreement nor any 
uncertainty or ambiguity herein shall be arbitrarily construed or resolved against any 
Party under any rule of construction. 
5.4. Further Assurances. Each Party shall promptly execute any and all instruments 
and documents and take all other actions, including without limitation the payment of 
money, that may be required to effectuate the contemplated settlement and release. 
5.5. Gender and Quantitative Use. Wherever the context of this Agreement may so 
require, the gender shall include the masculine, feminine and neuter and the 




- Enforcement of Agreement. Each Party to this Agreement shall have the right 
to enforce by proceedings at law or in equity all of the terms and provisions of this 
Agreement, including without limitation the right to prosecute proceedings at law or in 
equity against the person(s) who have violated or who are attempting to violate any of 
such terms or provisions, to enjoin such person(s) from doing so, to cause such 
violation to be remedied, and/or to recover damages for such violation. 
5.7. Waiver. The failure by any Party to enforce any term or provision of this 
Agreement shall not constitute a waiver of the right to enforce the same term or 
provision, or any other term or provision, thereafter. No waiver by any Partv of anv 
term or provision of this Agreement shall be deemed or shall constitute a waiver of any 
6
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other provision of this Agreement, whether or not similar, nor shall any such waiver 
constitute a continuing waiver unless otherwise expressly provided in writing. 
5.8. Severability, In the event that any term or provision of this Agreement is held by 
any court of competent jurisdiction to be illegal, invalid or unenforceable for any reason, 
then the remaining portions of this Agreement shall nonetheless remain in full force and 
effect, unless such portion of the Agreement is so material that its deletion would violate 
the obvious purpose and intent of the Parties. 
5.9. Litigation Costs and Attorneys' Fees. If any Party(s) shall commence legal 
proceedings against any other Party(s) to enforce the provisions of this Agreement or to 
declare any rights or obligations under this Agreement, then the prevailing Party(s) shall 
recover from the losing Party(s) its/their costs of suit, including attorneys' fees, as shall 
be determined by the court. 
5.10. Governing Law. This Agreement is made under and shall be construed in 
accordance with and governed by the laws of the State of California, without giving 
effect to the principles of conflicts of law. All Parties consent to the jurisdiction of the 
United States Bankruptcy Court - Central District of California, Santa Ana Division, for 
the purpose of resolving any disputes which may arise under this Agreement. If for any 
reason said Bankruptcy Court shall decline to accept such jurisdiction, then the Parties 
shall be deemed to have consented to the jurisdiction of California Courts and to venue 
in Orange County, California. 
5.11. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in any number of identical 
counterparts, each of which is an original, and all of which together constitute one and 
the same agreement. 
5.12. Inurement This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of and be fully binding 
upon each of the Parties and upon their respective heirs, executors, successors, 
assigns and grantees. 
5.13. Notices. Any payments to be made or any notices or other communications to 
be given pursuant to this Agreement shall be delivered to the appropriate Party at the 
address shown below, until written notice of a different address is given by such Party 
in accordance with this Section. Any payments to be made pursuant to this Agreement 
shall be deemed made only upon actual receipt. Any notices or other communications 
must be in writing. Any notices or other communications given by personal service shall 
be deemed to have been received upon delivery. Any notices or other communications 
given by first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the address required by this 
Section, shall be deemed to have been received three Business Days following the 
deposit thereof with the United States Post Office. Any notices or other 
communications given by overnight courier service shall be deemed to have been 
received on the date of delivery confirmed by the courier service. Any notice give by 
facsimile transmission shall be deemed to have been received on the dated upon which 
the recipient's facsimile machine electronically confirms the receipt of such notice, 
provided that a copy of any such notice given by facsimile transmission shall also'be 
sent to the recipient by first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the address 
required by this Section. Telephone numbers, if listed below, have been listed for 
convenience purposes only, and not for the purposes of giving notice pursuant to this 
Agreement. 
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THEODOR C. ALBERT, TRUSTEE 
P.O. Box 1860 
Costa Mesa, CA 92628 
Telephone: (714) 966-1000 
A COPY OF ANY NOTICE TO THE TRUSTEE MUST ALSO BE SENT TO: 
Albert, Weiland & Golden, LLP 
Attention: Saar Swartzon 
650 Town Center Drive - Suite 1350 
Costa Mesa, California 92626 
Telephone: (714) 966-1000 
Facsimile: (714) 966-1002 
A COPY OF ANY NOTICE TO THE TRUSTEE MUST ALSO BE SENT TO: 
Ml VIDA ENTERPRISES 
Mi Vida Enterprises, a Utah corporation 
Attention: Mark A. Steen, Vice President 
A COPY OF ANY NOTICE TO Ml VIDA MUST ALSO BE SENT TO: 
Kennedy & Kennedy, P.C. 
Attention: Cynthia T. Kennedy 
308 E. Simpson Street, Suite 102 
La Fayette, CO 80026 
Telephone: (303) 604-1600 
Facsimile: (303) 604-1601 
[SIGNATURE PAGE FOLLOWS] 
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OCT. 16. 2000 2:39PM \ I T WE1LAND I GOLDEN LLP NO. 5776 P. 3 
THE UNDERSIGNED PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT have ntfde, executed 
and entered into this Agreement, 
"Trustee" 
By: 
Theodor C. Albert, solely in his 
capacity as chapter 7 trustee of 
the estate of Charles A. Steen and Jayne M. Steen 
"Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc." 
Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc., a Utah corporation: 
Mark A. Steen 
Vice President 
By. 
ohn C. Steen, Secretary 
WPWWW s
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE 
I am employed in the County of Orange, State of 
California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within 
action; my business address is 650 Town Center Drive, Suite 1350, 
Costa Mesa, California 92626 
On February 6, 2001, I served the foregoing documents 
described as MOTION FOR ORDER APPROVING COMPROMISE OF CONTROVERSY 
WITH MI VIDA ENTERPRISES, INC. PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF 
BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 9019; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; 
DECLARATIONS OF THEODOR C. ALBERT AND SAAR SWARTZON IN SUPPORT 
THEREOF on the interested parties in this action by placing a true 
copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed as follows*. 
SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST 
X (BY MAIL) I caused such envelope with postage thereon 
fully prepaid to be placed in the United States mail at Costa 
Mesaf California. 
(BY PERSONAL SERVICE) I caused such envelope to be 
delivered by hand to the offices of the addressee. 
(VIA TELECOPY) I caused the above-mentioned document (s) 
to be telecopied to the parties named on the attached list. 
(BY FEDERAL EXPRESS) I caused such envelope to be 
delivered via Federal Express. 
(STATE) 
Executed on February 6, 2001, at Costa Mesa, California. 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws 
of the State of California that the above is true 
and correct. 
(FEDERAL) I declare that I am employed in the office of a 
member of the bar of this court at whose direction 
the service was made* 
Deanna Morris O&t^x^^ /V^triy^^<i_ 
Signature 
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SERVICE LIST 
U.S. Trustee 
Ronald Reagan Federal Bldg. 
411 W. 4th St., Suite 9041 
Santa Ana, CA 92701-8000 
Charles Augustus Steen 
Jayne Marie Steen 
8416 San Carloso Way 
Buena Park, CA 90620 
Debtors 
Andrew H. Lund, Esq. 
Law Office of Andrew H. Lund 
354 West Ocean Blvd. 
Long Beach, CA 90802 
Atty. for Debtors 
Cynthia T. Kennedy, Esq. 
Kennedy & Kennedy, P.C. 
308 E. Simpson Street, Suite 102 
Lafayette, CO 80026 
Attys. for Mi Vida Enterprises 
Tab 9 
Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc. 
Schedule of Loans to and from Stockholders with Unpaid Interest 
Date Tax Return Signed By Preparer (note 3) 
Days Beyond Maximum Extended Due Date (note 6) 
Loans to Stockholders Per Exhibit A-3 
Stockholder's Name 
Charles A Steen, Sr (note 1) 
M L Steen Estate (note 1) 
John C Steen (note 1) 
Andrew Steen (note 1) 
Mark A Steen (note 1) 
Nancy Steen-Adams (notes 1, 2) 

























































































B Total Loans To Stockholders per Tax Returns (note 3) 68,135 77,368 64,156 49,743 53,488 53,746 56,720 60,760 64,635 
C Total Loans From Stockholders perTax Returns (note 3) (21,043) (17,285) (6,173) (6,292) (6,292) (6,292) (6,292) (6,292) (6,292) 
D Net Loans To Stockholders perTax Returns (B-C) 47,092 60,083 57,983 43,451 47,196 47,454 50,428 54,468 58,343 
E Cumulative Unpaid Interest Income at 12% (note 7) 1,792 9,217 17,281 24,569 33,181 42,857 54,052 67,074 82,124 
F Net Loans To Stockholders Plus Unpaid Interest (D + E) 48,884 69,300 75,264 68,020 80,377 90,311 104,480 121,542 140,467 
Notes. 
1 Information obtained from Exhibit A-3 received 3/28/03 
2 Informatin obtained from Na,ncy Steen-Adams 
3 Information obtained from Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc ' s U S Income Tax Returns 
4 Per Mark Steen, U S Income Tax Returns have not been prepared or filed for this year 
5 Information is from line A during the years when income tax returns have not been filed 
6 
The maximum extended due date to file a domestic corporation's U S Income Tax Return for a year ending June 
30th is March 15th of the following year Per I R C Reg 1 6072-2(a) the corporate income tax return of a 
domestic U S corporation is due on or before the 15th day of the 3rd month after the close of its taxable year Per 
I R C Reg 1 6081-3(a) a domestic U S corporation shall be allowed an automatic exension of time to the 15th day 
of the 6th month following the month in which falls the date prescribed for the filing of its income tax return 
7 Interest rate is equal to the rate on the note payable to Rodney Knutson, Esq , which is also unsecured 
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Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc. 
Schedule of Loans to and from Stockholders with Unpaid Interest 
Date Tax Return Signed By Preparer (note 3) 
Days Beyond Maximum Extended Due Date (note 6) 
Loans to Stockholders Per Exhibi t A-3 
Stockholder 's Name 
Charles A Steen, Sr (note 1) 
M L Steen Estate (note 1) 
John C Steen (note 1) 
Andrew Steen (note 1) 
Mark A Steen (note 1) 
Nancy Steen-Adams (notes 1, 2) 































Not f i led 
760 
10/13/00 

































































B. Total Loans To Stockholders per Tax Returns (note 3) 61,700 185,946 227,846 273,951 260,770 307,518 Note 4 Note 4 Note 4 
c. Total Loans From Stockholders perTax Returns (note 3) 
D. Net Loans To Stockholders perTax Returns (B-C) 
(6,292) (6,292) (6,292) (6,292) (6,292) (6,292) Note 4 Note 4 Note 4 
Note 5 Note 5 Note 5 
55,408 179,654 221,554 267,659 254,478 301,226 291,787 273,537 279,337 
E. Cumulat ive Unpaid Interest Income at 12% (note 7) 98,628 132,022 174,451 227,504 285,342 355,730 433,432 518,268 546,025 
F. Net Loans To Stockholders Plus Unpaid Interest (D + E) 154,036 311,676 396,005 495,163 539,820 656,956 725,219 791,806 825,362 
Page 2 of 2 
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BY 
MI VIDA ENTERPRISES, a Utah 
corporation, 
v s 
MAXINE BOYD, et al . 
No. 000700040 
ORAL ARGUMENTS/STATUS CONFERENCE 
October 12, 2000 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that the above-captioned 
cause came on to be heard on this, the 12th day of 
October, 2000, before the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, 
Judge presiding, when and where the following 
proceedings were had, to wit: FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JUL 2 0 2004 
a O O b O Q ^ ^ 
[Court, LLC 
THE REPORTING GROUP 
50 South Main, Suite 830 
Salt Lake Citv, Ltah 8 4 U 4 
801 532 3441 TOLL FREE 877.532.3441 FV\ 801 532 3*14 
rt^ 
/u A 
Oral Arguments/Status Conference * October 12, 2000 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the P l a i n t i f f Mi Vida E n t e r p r i s e s 
C y n t h i a T. Kennedy-
A t t o r n e y at Law 
308 E. S i m p s o n Street 
Suite 10 2 
L a f a y e t t e , C o l o r a d o 80026 
Keith Ch i a r a 
A t t o r n e y at Law 
P.O. Box 955 
P r i c e , U tah 84501 
Mark Steen 
Pro S e 
P.O. Box 1523 
L o n g m o n t , C o l o r a d o 80502 
For the D e f e n d a n t s and C o u n t e r c 1 a i m a n t s : 
M o n i c a Lee S t e e n ; A n d r e w Kirk, J r . ; E l e a n o r Ruth C i d d i o 
S t e e n - A d a m s , aka N a n c y S t e e n - A d a m s ; and C h a r l e s A. 
S t e e n , I I I : 
K r i s t i n e R o g e r s 
A t t o r n e y at Law 
2 3 3 8 B r o a d w a y 
Suite 110 
B o u l d e r , C o l o r a d o 80304 
Chip S a n d e r 
B o s t r o m , Sands & Sander 
C O U R T R E P O R T I N G FIRM: C i t i c o u r t R e p o r t i n g S e r v i c e s 
Debra A. D i b b l e ; C.S.R., R.P 
50 S. Main Street 
920 Key Bank Tower 
Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 84144 
(801) 5 3 2 - 3 4 4 1 
w w w . c i t i c o u r t r e p o r t i n g . c o m 
CitiCourt, LLC 
801.532.3441 
Oral Arguments/Status Conference * October 12, 2000 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE BAILIFF: All rise. 
The Seventh District Court in and for Grand 
County, State of Utah, is now in session, the Honorable 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson presiding. 
THE COURT: Folks, your files reach up over 
the top of the bar here. And now we're going to be 
working on another stack of files, I guess. 
We were supposed to have a hearing today to 
discuss, I guess, where we're going in this case. And 
also, there are some requests from the corporation. 
We've got actually two cases; Mi Vida 
Enterprises against Maxine Boyd and shareholders of the 
corporation; and then Maxine Boyd against Mi Vida 
Enterprises and shareholders of the corporation. 
Well, let's - - first let's find out who's 
who here. We've got lots of -- some -- lots of 
familiar faces, and some new faces. 
Start over here? 
MR. CHIARA: Keith Chiara, attorney for 
Mi Vida Corporation. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. STEEN: Mark Steen appearing pro se for 
himself . 
MS. KENNEDY: Cynthia Kennedy, for Mi Vida 
CitiCourt, LLC 
801.532.3441 
Oral Arguments/Status Conference * October 12, 2000 
Enterprises. I am pro hac vice counsel. 
THE COURT: Okay. And you've already gone 
through that process, haven't you --
MS . KENNEDY : Yes . 
THE COURT: -- Miss Kennedy? 
MS. ROGERS: And I'm Kristine Rogers, for - -
see if I can remember all of these names. 
Nancy Steen, Monica Steen, Charles the III, 
and Andrew Steen. Is that accurate? 
And, Your Honor, this is Rick Sander. 
If I could just take a second to explain. 
Originally there was -- there were Jeff 
Reiman and Marcy Bayaz who were representing these same 
individuals as plaintiffs in the Colorado action. They 
have dissolved their partnership. Mr. Sander is taking 
over in Colorado. 
And we've moved to have him admitted pro hac 
vice in this case. 
The status on that is the documents -- the 
necessary documents have been filed with the Utah State 
Bar. 
My secretary hand carried them yesterday to 
the Utah State Bar. I was already in Grand County. 
I spoke to her this morning. She's faxing 
down to -- to your clerks, the documents that she filed 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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with the Utah State Bar, as well as an order for your 
signature. And we can produce the originals and we'll 
file the originals within the week. 
Based on that, I would ask that you allow 
Mr. Sander to address the Court as though he had been 
admitted pro hac vice, because he has a lot of the 
information. 
He's worked very diligently with regard to 
the Colorado case. And I think this Court needs to be 
aware of what's going on in Colorado because it 
directly affects the Utah case. 
THE COURT: Anybody here have a problem with 
Mr. Sander talking? 
MS. KENNEDY: We have no problem at all, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. 
MS. ROGERS: And seated to my far right is 
Nancy Steen-Adams. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
I'm trying to see her on the list here. 
You represent Andrew, Monica, and Nancy 
S t e en - Adams . 
MR. SANDER: Your Honor, on the caption I 
think it says Eleanor Ruth Ciddio Steen. And that's 
Nancy Adam Steen. 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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1 THE COURT: Oh, okay. Eleanor Ruth. 
2 You go by Nancy, huh? I can understand 
3 that. 
4 And so we don't have John C.; Jayne Marie; 
5 Charles A.; Andrew Kirk, Jr.; Karen M; Jennifer; or 
6 Charles A., Sr.; or Jr. represented here. 
7 True ? 
8 MS. KENNEDY: Your Honor, we filed motions 
9 for default against four of those individuals: 
10 Charles, Jr.; Jayne; Karen; and Jennifer. So there 
11 are -- there are clerks' defaults in the record for 
12 those four, regarding the Mi Vida case. 
13 And I believe there's a motion outstanding 
14 for Mr. Jennings to withdraw representing Charles Jr. 
15 in the Maxine Boyd case. 
16 So those matters are sort of outstanding. 
17 But that's the status of those. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. 
19 MS. ROGERS: Your Honor, could we have 
20 clarification into as to what capacity Mark Steen is 
21 appearing pro se? It's my understanding that --
22 THE COURT: The only way he could be 
23 appearing pro se is for himself. That's the only 
24 capacity. 
25 MS. ROGERS: Well, I understand that. 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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But that would then necessarily require us 
to understand what capacity other attorneys are 
representing him, or if he's unrepresented by counsel. 
And I think that's a little confusing. 
MS. KENNEDY: He's not represented by 
counsel. I represent Mi Vida, as does Mr. Chiara. 
Does that --
THE COURT: All right. Who wants to talk 
first? 
MR. SANDER: If I may, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
What do you want to talk about, Mr. Sander? 
MR. SANDER: Well, I wanted to give Your 
Honor, if I may, a status update on the Boulder case, 
and how that impacts, probably, what we're going to do 
today. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SANDER: Three weeks ago I had never 
heard of the Steen family, and didn't know anything 
about this case and I was asked to take a look at it. 
And when I looked at the Boulder action, and this 
action, and had some conversation with counsel, had 
some conversations with prior counsel for my clients, 
it seemed to me that it made sense to consolidate the 
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with regard to the others. 
What happened in this case was, as we went 
to serve people in this case, our investigators found 
several bankruptcies. Charles Jr. had filed bankruptcy 
with his wife Jayne in California, and as had Monica. 
As a result, we brought a motion to dismiss 
those individuals as plaintiffs in the Boulder case, 
because they clearly lacked standing. 
They had not disclosed their purported share 
ownership in their respective bankruptcies, and the law 
is pretty clear, if you don't disclose an asset in a 
bankruptcy. Even though the bankruptcy may be 
discharged and closed, that that asset still is 
retained by the trustee, to be opened in the future 
eventuality that that asset materializes. 
Well, that's the case that we have here. 
So they were dismissed as plaintiffs for 
lack of standing, and shareholders in Mi Vida. 
The impact in this case, default judge -- or 
the clerk's default had already entered, and since we 
weren't aware of the bankruptcies at that time, that 
clerk's default is probably negated with regard to any 
pre-petition charges against those individuals, because 
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But with regard to claims that arose after 
the finding of their bankruptcies, which Mi Vida's 
claims -- has claims for the wrongful bringing of the 
Colorado action, would still be before this Court. 
I contacted the trustee for Charles, Jr. and 
Jayne's bankruptcy, because the bylaws of Mi Vida allow 
the corporation to buy out, at book value, the shares. 
And we have a stipulation now with that trustee to buy 
out both the shares of Jayne and Charles, Jr., at book 
value. Which is much reduced, I would think, from fair 
value, although we don't know fair value yet. 
And that money, or that purchase price has 
been tendered in the form of a first payment and a 
promissory note. And it -- it's around $26,000 for the 
purchase of their shares. 
Now, that purchase benefits all of the other 
shareholders, as you can imagine, because, pro rata, 
they own more of the corporation once those shares come 
back in. 
We have also negotiated with that trustee to 
buy out any claims that Charles, Jr. may have against 
Mi Vida. And that includes what you may recall as the 
wayward conveyance from Maxine Boyd. She had assigned 
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THE COURT: Mm-hmm. 
MS. KENNEDY: This settlement with that 
trustee will then bring those back into our control. 
Putting us then in a position where we can deal 
directly with Maxine Boyd, as opposed to having to 
litigate her conveyance of those -- or assignment of 
her interests to Charles, Jr. 
There also were -- there was a mortgage that 
Charles, Jr. held on some Mi Vida property. There was 
some shareholder advances that had been made. 
We did a calculation of all of the various 
counterclaims and claims and came up with a compromise 
figure, which is around $32,000. So we have around a 
$57,000 compromise with the bankruptcy trustee. 
Now, we've just reached that in the last 
couple of days. 
As a matter of fact, I just had the 
trustee's final offer to me faxed to your Court this 
morning. But it's acceptable to Mi Vida, and we will 
be moving forward on that. 
THE COURT: Now, this is -- this is for 
the 
MS. KENNEDY: It purchases the shares of 
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And it resolves all claims of Charles, Jr. 
against Mi Vida, and Charles, Jr. -- including Charles 
Jr.'s ownership or assignment of the Maxine Boyd notes 
THE COURT: Okay. And that's for $26,000 -• 
or that's for $57,000 total. 
MS. KENNEDY: Yes. 
THE COURT: And that includes the 26,000 to 
buy out the shares? 
MS. KENNEDY: Yes. Exactly. 
And we'll get to this later because that's 
why we need access to the money, or the funds that are 
in the registry of the Court, is to, in part, pay 
that -- those amounts, and settle those accounts. 
And I think it's a great deal. I think 
we've made some -- some good in-road in terms of 
cleaning up some of the messes, including -- as I say, 
it's a first step to moving forward on Maxine Boyd. 
There's the complication of the Monica Boyd 
bankruptcy, because Monica -- well, Nancy Ciddio Steen 
owns one -- currently, one-sixth of the shares, and we 
have not ever disputed that. 
The other three that are appearing here 
today, Kirk -- we'll call him Kirk, or the -- or Andy, 
Jr., and Charles the III, and Monica, all claim an 
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I am going to author -- I will authorize, in 
concept, then, the borrowing of the money, and instruct 
you to try to reach an agreement as to what amount 
should be borrowed. 
If not, we'll have a telephone conference, 
and I'll resolve that dispute. 
I'm going to authorize the corporation to 
make these expenditures. 
I'm going to release the money from the 
Court registry and authorize the corporation to use the 
money to buy out the interests, the bankruptcy -- from 
the bankruptcy trustees. 
Also, to pay litigation fees in unrelated 
cases . 
Also, to pay property taxes. 
And to pay its litigation fees in this case, 
with respect to the valuation and buy out, subject to 
submitting an application. 
I will authorize the corporation's attorneys 
to redact information where they consider there is a 
privilege that's applicable. 
And permit the dissident shareholders to 
object. 
To guide you in deciding whether to object 
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COMES NOW Plaintiff, Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc., a Utah corporation 
(hereinafter "Mi Vida") by and through its attorneys, Keith H. Chiara and Cynthia 
T. Kennedy, and, pursuant to the earlier Ruling and Order of Preliminary 
Injunction, requests this Court enter an order granting Mi Vida access to the fiinds 
in the registry of the Court and granting authority to borrow against its Utah land. 
Because the request is for action pursuant to the Ruling and Order of Preliminary 
Injunction entered in the above-captioned cases, which were consolidated for the 
purpose of the injunction hearing, this motion is brought under the caption of the 
consolidated action and all parties are served with a copy of the requests. 
A Memorandum in Support of this Motion is filed herewith. 
Respectfully submitted this JT day of August, 2000. 
Keith H. Chiara, # 0 6 2 ^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc. 
Cynftiia T. Kennedy, U 
Colo. #11668 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc. 
Certificate of Mailing 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Motion and copy of Proposed Order was served this 8th day of August, 2000 by placing a 
copy of the same in the United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, addressed as 
follows: 
Christopher Edward, Esq. 
Attorney for Maxine S. Boyd 
P.O. Box 386 
55 South 300 West, Suite 1 
Hurricane, UT 84737 
William Jennings, Esq. 
Troon Park Building 
584 S. State Street 
Orem,Utah 84058 
Bart Bailey, Esq. 
Bailey, Taylor & Waldron 
Troon Park Building 
584 South State Street 
Orem,UT 84058 
Charles A. Steen, Jr. 
Jayne Marie Steen 
Karen M. Steen 
Jennifer Steen 
8416 San Carlos Way 
Buena Park, California 90620 
Kristine M. Rogers, Esq. 
712 Judge Building 
8 East Broadway (300 So.) 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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PROPOSED ORDER ON MOTION TO 
ACCESS FUNDS IN THE REGISTRY 
I OF THE COURT 
Civil No: 9907-00-145 PR 
Judge: Lyle R. Anderson 
PROPOSED ORDER ON 
PLAINTIFF MI VIDA'S MOTION TO 
BORROW AGAINST LAND 
Civil No: 0007-00-040 
Judge: Lyle R. Anderson 
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THIS MATTER, having come before the Court on the Motions of Mi Vida 
Enterprises, Inc. ("Mi Vida"), a Utah corporation for access to the funds currently 
in the registry of the Court in the above-captioned matter, and for authority of this 
Court to borrow funds against land owned by the corporation for specific 
purposes; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court is hereby ordered 
to issue a check in the full amount of the funds in the registry of the Court made 
payable to Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc., and hand-delivered or mailed to Keith H. 
Chiara, Esq., counsel for Mi Vida, at P.O. Box 955, Price, Utah 84501; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Mi Vida is authorized to borrow against 
its Utah property to the extent necessary to pay its ongoing creditors, including 
attorneys, and for the purpose of negotiating and purchasing the buyout of other 
minority shareholders of Mi Vida. 
Dated this day of August, 2000. 
Lyle R. Anderson, District Court Judge 
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P.O. Box 955 
Price, UT 84501 
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Lafayette, Co 80026 
Telephone: (303) 604-1600 
Attorneys for Defendant Mi Vida Enterprises 
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PLAINTIFF MI VIDA'S MOTION TO 
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COMES NOW Plaintiff, Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc., a Utah corporation 
(hereinafter "Mi Vida") by and through its attorneys, Keith H. Chiara and Cynthia 
T. Kennedy, and requests this Court grant Mi Vida access to the funds in the 
registry of the Court and to borrow against its Utah land for specific purposes 
outlined below. Because the request is for action pursuant to the Ruling and Order 
of Preliminary Injunction entered in the above-captioned cases, which were 
consolidated for the purpose of the injunction hearing, this motion is brought 
under the caption of the consolidated action and all parties are served with a copy 
of the requests. 
I. Mi Vida Needs Access to the Funds in the Registry of the Court for the 
Purpose of Buying the Shares Formerly belonging to Charles, Jr. and Jayne 
Charles Steen Jr. ("Charles, Jr.") and Jayne Marie Steen ("Jayne"), prior to 
their bankruptcy filing on December 15, 19981, were shareholders of Mi Vida, 
collectively holding 241.980 shares of common stock, or approximately 8.1%. The 
bankruptcy filing of Charles Steen Jr. and Jayne resulted in the transfer of any 
shareholder interest to their Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate even though Charles, Jr. 
and Jayne failed to divulge their Mi Vida equity holdings. A copy of the 
bankruptcy pleadings is attached as Exhibit A. 
The bankruptcy filing has had several effects on the ongoing litigation. First, a 
Motion to Dismiss Charles, Jr. and Jayne from the Colorado Action was granted. 
This fact was only discovered by Mi Vida in May of 2000 after independent investigation and was never 
affirmatively disclosed by Charles. Jr. or Jayne. 
2 
A copy of this order is attached as Exhibit B. The Colorado Court correctly found 
that the shares and any rights associated therewith (i.e., shareholder direct and 
derivative claims) belonged to the trustee. Second, the filing triggered a buyout 
under the corporate bylaws, which allows Mi Vida to purchase the shares at book 
value. A copy of the relevant portion of the Bylaws is attached as Exhibit C. A 
complete copy was presented to the Court at the preliminary injunction hearing of 
April 10, 2000. 
Since Mi Vida's purpose in this lawsuit is to address the dissention amongst its 
shareholders and buyout certain minority shareholders, including Charles, Jr. and 
Jayne, there is no question that it would be in the best interest of the corporation 
and the creditors of Mi Vida for the corporation to exercise its rights to buyout 
these shares. Mi Vida did contact the Bankruptcy Trustee by letter dated May 24, 
2000 and made its election to buyout the shares. The Bylaws require a payment be 
made by Mi Vida by August 24, 2000. Id. 
The book value of the shares is currently being determined by the accountant 
for Mi Vida. Furthermore, negotiations are being conducted with the Trustee for 
the estate of Charles, Jr. and Jayne to resolve any other claims and counterclaims 
in the context of the buy-out.2 It is in the best interest of Mi Vida to resolve any 
and all claims by and between itself and these former shareholders. Specifically, 
" Both the known claims against Charles. Jr. and a request for a determination of the claims in favor of 
Charles. Jr. against Mi Vida were brought in this lawsuit. Both Charles, Jr. and Jayne were properly served 
and failed to timely respond. A clerk's default has entered against them. A determination of the pre-
petition claims is currently stayed by the bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §362; however, the pre-petition 
claims and the proper amount of set-off are the proper subject of a settlement with the trustee. 
3 
Charles, Jr. claimed to own by transfer certain mortgages held by Maxine Boyd 
The purported assignments were tendered as exhibits at the Preliminary 
Injunction Hearing. The interest of Charles, Jr. in such mortgages, if any, also 
became an asset in the bankruptcy and may be resolved in the context of a 
settlement. This will enable Mi Vida to deal directly with Maxine Boyd on the 
mortgages free of any assignment asserted by Charles, Jr. 
Thus, it is in Mi Vida's interest to move forward with the buyout under the 
Bylaws. As made clear in the Preliminary Injunction Hearing and as found by this 
Court in its Order of Preliminary Injunction, Mi Vida has little income and its only 
liquid asset is the account in the registry of the Court. Mi Vida asks for these 
funds to be made available to it for the purchase of the shares. No party in either of 
the above-captioned suits other than Mi Vida has made any claim to the funds in 
the registry of the Court, and it is undisputed that the funds were the result of a 
sale of Mi Vida's property. The Settlement Agreement governing the use of the 
proceeds is in evidence before this Court in conjunction with the Motion for Order 
Requiring Deposit with the Court in the Maxine Boyd case dated January 28, 
2000. That agreement allows for the use of the proceeds as "necessary to protect 
and preserve the assets of Mi Vida." If the funds are not released, Mi Vida will 
lose an opportunity to acquire the stock and claims formerly owned by Charles, Jr. 
and Jayne at a reasonable value. Clearly the action will inure to the benefit of Mi 
Vida's creditors (including Boyd) and the remaining shareholders. 
4 
Maxine Boyd, upon whose insistence the funds were originally deposited, has 
asked only that the funds be disbursed or withdrawn only for the benefit of Mi 
Vida or to preserve the property of Mi Vida. The contemplated use benefits Mi 
Vida. 
II. Mi Vida Requests the Ability to Borrow Against the Utah Land 
In the context of the preliminary injunction, Mi Vida stipulated that there 
would be no sales of real estate without approval of the Court. Although there is 
no specific restriction against Mi Vida encumbering its property, Mi Vida wishes 
to comply with the spirit of its stipulation as well as the word, and requests the 
Court grant it specific authority to borrow against the Utah properties. 
The Court should grant such action for several reasons: 
A. The Preliminary Injunction has been Rendered Moot 
The Preliminary Injunction has been rendered moot. Upon motion of Mi Vida, 
based on the bankruptcy filing of Charles, Jr. and Jayne, those Plaintiffs were 
dismissed from the Colorado Action and a new Verified Complaint was filed. 
This new Complaint contains no claim for dissolution or receivership on behalf of 
any of the remaining Colorado plaintiffs; see Exhibit D\ consequently, the issues 
involved in the preliminary injunction (restraining the pursuit in Colorado of 
dissolution and receivership claims) have become moot. No claims against Mi 
5 
Vida have been made by its shareholders in the actions pending before this Court3. 
The only claims asserted against Mi Vida are those of Maxine Boyd. Maxine Boyd 
comes to this Court as a creditor, with an uncertain claim- See Ruling on Motions 
for Preliminary Injunction at 7 ("Boyd's claims are murky"). 
There is no legal basis for depriving Mi Vida of its funds and access to its 
assets. Absent a pre-judgment attachment pursuant to U.R.C.P. 64, a creditor must 
await judgment before impacting the assets of a debtor. 
B. The Funds are Necessary to Benefit Mi Vida, Facilitate the Settlement and 
Pay Creditors 
The Court funds (approximately $40,000) will be insufficient to complete the 
buyout of the shares and compromise of claims with the trustee in bankruptcy for 
the estates of Charles, Jr. and Jayne4. Additionally, Mi Vida is negotiating with 
other dissident shareholders for a buyout, based either on a negotiated price or a 
value placed on the shares by this Court. As noted above, voiding the suspect 
transfers of the Maxine Boyd claim is the first step in Mi Vida's efforts to finding 
a resolution for its dissident shareholders. 
Clerk's default has entered against Charles. Jr., Ja>Tie. and their two daughters in Civil Action No. 
00700040 (which is binding on the rwo bankrupts regarding post-petition claims, i.e., those arising after 
December of 1998). The remaining Dissident Shareholders have contested jurisdiction by filing motions to 
dismiss. Curiously, they have not submitted the motions for decision. Because Mi Vida recognizes the 
need for dealing with the Maxine Boyd claim prior to valuation of minority shares, the corporation is in no 
hurry regarding the other defendants. Mi Vida views its potential settlement with the bankruptcy trustee as 
the first necessary step in resolving the shareholder situation. 
Mi Vida anticipates a settlement in the approximate amount of $70,000, based on the amount of claims in 
the Charles, Jr. and Jayne Steen bankruptcy. 
6 
Additionally, paying its creditors is in the best interest of Mi Vida. Mi Vida 
has incurred attorneys fees occasioned by the (now known to be) completely 
fraudulent assertions of Charles, Jr. and Jayne, who did not even have legal 
shareholder status (recall Charles, Jr. was the only one verifying the original 
Colorado Complaint, see Preliminary Injunction Exhibit C). Mi Vida has been 
successful in ferreting out the truth, in tracking and serving difficult defendants, in 
obtaining the injunction, in obtaining dismissals of all claims brought against it by 
Charles, Jr. and Jayne, and in obtaining a dismissal of all claims brought by any 
party for dissolution or receivership. Mi Vida's needs to pay its counsel to 
continue in the effort to effectuate a buyout of the remaining Dissident 
Shareholders. 
WHEREFORE, Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc., a Utah corporation, requests that 
it be granted immediate access to the funds in the registry of the Court to be used 
for the purchase of the shares formerly owned by Charles A. Steen, Jr. and Jayne 
Marie Steen in context of a settlement of all claims with their bankruptcy trustee. 
Further, Mi Vida requests that it be granted the ability to mortgage and borrow 
against its Utah properties for the purpose of adding funds to the settlement with 
the bankruptcy trustee, paying its creditors and buying out dissident shareholders. 
7 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MI VIDA ENTERPRISES, Inc. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MAXINE S. BOYD, et al. 
Defendants. 
and 
NANCY CIDDIO STEEN-ADAMS; 
CHARLES A. STEEN III and 
ANDREW KIRK STEEN, Jr.; 
Counterclaim and Cross-Claimants 
vs. 
MI VIDA ENTERPRISES, INC. and 
MARK ASHBY STEEN 
ORDER 
CERTIFYING F SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AS FINAL 
Civil No: 000-700-040 
Judge Lyle Anderson 
THIS MATTER, having come before the Court on the Motion of Plaintiff, 
Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc.f'Mi Vida") on a Motion to Certify Summary Judgment 
as Final, and the Court finding there is no just reason for delay; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Final Order entered by this Court on September 16, 2002 be deemed a final 
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Clerk 
of the Court is hereby directed to enter the judgment as final. 
Dated t h i s j ^ day of y^£<£M. ITI^ , 2002. 
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